The case concerns the execution in Italy of an executive European Arrest Warrant issued by the Romanian judicial authorities for the surrender of a person convicted of using a false instrument, the issuing State having consented to the sentence being served in Italy. The Court of Appeal had acknowledged the appellant's settled residence in Italy and the issuing State's consent to transfer of execution, yet refused recognition of the foreign judgment on the ground that, after dissolving the cumulative sentence, the penalty attributable to the surrendered offence (four months) fell below the six-month threshold set for recognition of foreign judgments. The Court of Cassation held that the appellate court had no power to unilaterally re-determine or increase the sentence set by the foreign court, and that the six-month residual-penalty threshold for recognition under Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA cannot be read so as to neutralise the optional refusal ground under Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA based on the social rehabilitation interests of a person settled in the executing State, where the issuing State has already consented to domestic execution. The contested judgment was therefore annulled and remanded for a fresh assessment of the refusal ground under Article 18-bis of Law No. 69/2005, applying the principles set out.

The case concerned a European Arrest Warrant issued by the Romanian judicial authorities for the surrender of a Romanian national convicted, by a non-final judgment, of drug-related offences. The Court of Appeal of Naples ordered surrender, rejecting the defence objection based on the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in Romanian detention. The requested person argued that the Court of Appeal had failed to properly assess several reliable sources, including statements from directors of Romanian penitentiary institutions, showing overcrowding and the lack of the minimum three square metres of personal space, excluding fixed furniture. The Italian Supreme Court held that the appellate court’s reasoning was merely apparent: it had relied on the general adequacy of the detention regime indicated by Romania, without analytically addressing the defence material that appeared, in abstract terms, capable of contradicting those assurances. The Court stressed that, where relevant defence sources have been duly submitted, the executing court must carry out a full assessment of all available information and, if uncertainty remains, seek supplementary information on the individual detention conditions. By contrast, the Court rejected the argument that surrender was barred because the Romanian conviction was not yet final, holding that the Framework Decision requires enforceability, not finality, of the conviction. The judgment was therefore annulled with remand for a new assessment of detention conditions.

The case concerned an execution European Arrest Warrant issued by Romania for the enforcement of a final two-year prison sentence for aggravated theft and driving without a licence. The requested person resisted surrender, arguing that the Italian Court of Appeal had failed to assess documents allegedly showing stable integration in Italy and that refusal of surrender was required under Article 18-bis of Law No. 69/2005 in order to allow the sentence to be served in Italy. The Italian Supreme Court held that, after Legislative Decree No. 10/2021, an appeal against a surrender decision may not be brought on grounds of defective reasoning, including alleged omission or misreading of evidence. In any event, the Court found that the requested person had not even alleged the essential statutory requirement of lawful and effective residence or stay in Italy for at least five years, which applies under the amended Article 18-bis. A post-arrest offer of employment was insufficient to prove such integration and, if anything, confirmed the weakness of the claim. The appeal was therefore declared inadmissible and surrender remained ordered.

The case concerned a prosecution European Arrest Warrant issued by the Court of Móstoles, Spain, for robbery and personal injury. The requested person was also in custody in Italy in separate drug-related proceedings and challenged the surrender decision because the Court of Appeal had refused to postpone surrender under Article 24 of Law No. 69/2005. The Italian Supreme Court held that the complaint concerned the discretionary assessment entrusted to the Court of Appeal when deciding whether surrender should be postponed to allow domestic proceedings to continue. Such an assessment, when supported by adequate reasoning, is not reviewable before the Supreme Court as a mere defect of reasoning. In any event, the Court noted that the Spanish proceedings were more advanced, since prosecution had already been brought and trial was pending, whereas the Italian proceedings were still at an early investigative stage. The requested person had also failed to identify any specific prejudice to his defence in Italy, relying only on a generic claim that surrender would impair his participation in the investigation. The appeal was therefore declared inadmissible.

The case concerned a prosecution European Arrest Warrant issued by the District Court of Rostock, Germany, in criminal proceedings for breach of instructions connected with German “conduct supervision”, a measure imposed after the requested person had fully served a previous prison sentence. The requested person argued that, given his alleged integration in Italy, the measure and any future sentence should be executed in Italy, and that the custodial measure was disproportionate. The Italian Supreme Court rejected the argument based on residence, noting that no five-year lawful and effective residence in Italy had been alleged and that, in any event, the case concerned a prosecution EAW, for which integration may at most lead to the return condition under Article 19(2) of Law No. 69/2005. However, the Court held that the Court of Appeal had failed to assess the legal nature of the German “conduct supervision” measure, which was essential to verify double criminality. Depending on its classification, the breach could be comparable under Italian law to violation of an ancillary penalty, breach of special preventive supervision, or mere breach of a security measure such as supervised liberty, the latter not amounting to a separate criminal offence in Italy. Since that assessment had not been carried out, the judgment was annulled and the case remitted for supplementary information and a new decision.

The case concerned a prosecution European Arrest Warrant issued by the District Court of Heidelberg, Germany, for the execution of a national arrest warrant relating to aggravated theft and fraud. The requested person challenged the surrender decision on the ground that the EAW did not expressly indicate the minimum and maximum penalties applicable under German law, as required by Article 6 of Law No. 69/2005, and argued that the Italian court should at least have requested supplementary information from the issuing authority. The Italian Supreme Court held that the omission of the penalty range in a prosecution EAW does not itself constitute a ground for refusal, since the grounds for refusal are exhaustively listed in Articles 18 and 18-bis of Law No. 69/2005. The Court further held that the EAW must be unequivocal but not necessarily explicit where the missing information can be inferred without uncertainty from the statutory provisions indicated in the warrant. Since the requested person had not shown any specific prejudice to his defence rights or any concrete risk of disproportionate or inhuman punishment, the appeal was dismissed and surrender remained ordered.

EAW must contain only the minimum formal information necessary to allow the executing judicial authority to decide promptly on surrender. The description of the offence and of the requested person’s role, including the “degree of participation”, need only be sufficient to enable the executing State to carry out the checks required by law, such as judicial origin, double criminality, ne bis in idem and territoriality. The warrant is not required to provide a detailed evidentiary account of the requested person’s conduct, nor may the executing authority review the evidential basis relied upon by the issuing authority. The expression “degree of participation” does not refer to the intensity of the person’s involvement, but to the different ways in which European legal systems classify participation in criminal associations, complicity, inchoate offences, incitement, attempt or conspiracy. Those distinctions are not decisive under Italian law, which is based on the equal liability of all participants in the offence. Therefore, where the warrant makes clear that the requested person provided essential assistance to the material perpetrator, the information is sufficient for surrender.

The case concerned a prosecution European Arrest Warrant issued by the Judicial Court of Grasse, France, for the execution of a custodial measure in criminal proceedings concerning attempted robbery with violence committed by an organised group and participation in a criminal association. The requested person challenged the surrender order, arguing that the French investigative phase did not sufficiently protect the rights of defence, that the EAW did not adequately describe her role in the alleged offences, and that the Italian court should have assessed the evidential basis of the accusation, including an alibi document produced by the defence. The Italian Supreme Court rejected those arguments, holding that generic allegations about the secrecy of French investigative proceedings did not establish systemic or individualised deficiencies capable of justifying refusal. It further held that, after Legislative Decree No. 10/2021, the executing judicial authority is not required to review the seriousness of the evidence underlying a prosecution EAW, and that the information concerning the facts and the requested person’s degree of participation need only be sufficient to allow the statutory checks and a prompt surrender decision. The Court also rejected the constitutional challenge to Article 17(4) of Law No. 69/2005 and refused to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU, dismissing the appeal and leaving the surrender order in force.

The case concerned an extradition request by Brazil for the prosecution of the requested person in relation to aggravated sexual violence against a minor allegedly committed in Brazil between 2011 and 2018. The requested person challenged the judgment granting extradition, arguing that the Court of Appeal had failed to assess the risk of inhuman or degrading detention conditions in Brazil and should have requested information on the specific prison facility of destination, overcrowding, sanitary conditions and minimum living standards. The Italian Supreme Court held that the burden lies on the requested person to provide objective, precise, reliable and up-to-date evidence capable of raising a concrete risk of treatment incompatible with fundamental rights. General references to prison conditions, NGO reports or press articles were held insufficient, especially where the material relied upon did not contain specific and individualised information concerning the requested person’s likely detention. Since no concrete elements had been produced to undermine mutual trust between the States, the Court held that the Court of Appeal was not required to seek further information from the Brazilian authorities and dismissed the appeal.

The case concerned appeals by the Public Prosecutor and the Attorney General’s Office against a first-instance decision refusing the extradition of a Costa Rican national requested by the United States for prosecution for cocaine trafficking and conspiracy offences. The first-instance court had held that the 2025 reform of Article 32 of the Costa Rican Constitution, which permits the extradition of nationals in cases of international drug trafficking and terrorism, could not apply to facts occurring before the reform entered into force. The Court of Appeal reversed that conclusion. Relying on binding Constitutional Chamber case law, it held that extradition is a procedural mechanism of international cooperation and that the constitutional reform was immediately applicable to pending extradition proceedings. The Court further reasoned that the Costa Rica–United States extradition treaty had already allowed, since 1991, the extradition of nationals where domestic constitutional law did not prohibit it; the 2025 reform therefore removed the internal constitutional obstacle rather than creating a new substantive offence or punishment. Since the first-instance court had already found that the treaty requirements were met, including double criminality, legality and non-prescription, the Court of Appeal granted extradition in deferred form, subject to the prior resolution of pending Costa Rican criminal proceedings and to formal assurances from the United States on speciality, non-imposition of death penalty or life imprisonment, and a maximum prison term not exceeding fifty years.

The case concerned an extradition request submitted by Turkey, based on reciprocity, for the prosecution of a naturalized Brazilian citizen accused of membership in the armed terrorist organisation FETÖ/PDY. The Brazilian Supreme Federal Court refused extradition on two independent grounds. First, the Court held that the requested person had acquired Brazilian nationality in January 2012, whereas the alleged offence was said to have occurred in April 2017. Since the offence was allegedly committed after naturalization, and there was no allegation of prior common crime or drug trafficking, Article 5, LI, of the Brazilian Constitution created an absolute constitutional bar to extradition. Secondly, the Court found that the Turkish request did not clearly and precisely individualize the requested person’s conduct. The allegations referred generally to his links with cultural and educational activities, alleged use of ByLock, bank movements and alleged association with FETÖ/PDY, but failed to explain with sufficient specificity his role, hierarchy or concrete contribution to the alleged terrorist organisation. The Court held that such lack of individualization prevented verification of double criminality under Brazilian law. The extradition request was therefore unanimously refused.

The High Court of Singapore held that, at the stage of issuing a notice under s. 11(1)(b) of the Extradition Act, the Minister performs a preliminary and limited function. The Minister is not required to determine whether the requesting State has already established a prima facie case against the fugitive, nor to assess conclusively the sufficiency or admissibility of the extradition evidence. Those questions are reserved for the committal hearing before the Magistrate. The Court further clarified that alleged defects in the extradition materials — including issues concerning certification, authentication of documents, production of the arrest warrant, or the form of witness statements — do not automatically render the Minister’s notice unlawful. Such defects may be relevant only if they show that the statutory or treaty conditions for the exercise of the Minister’s power were not met. The applicant must therefore identify a legal defect going to the Minister’s jurisdiction or power, not merely raise evidentiary objections that can be examined at the committal stage. The Court also held that judicial review of the Minister’s notice is subject to ordinary time limits. Time runs from the Minister’s decision to issue the notice, not from later developments in the extradition proceedings. Although an extension of time may be granted where the delay is adequately explained, the applicant must still establish an arguable public law error before leave to commence judicial review can be granted. Finally, the Court rejected the applicant’s detention challenge. Since the argument that the provisional arrest had become unlawful depended on the alleged invalidity of the extradition request and the Minister’s notice, the failure of the judicial review challenge also defeated the application for review of detention. The decision is important because it draws a clear distinction between the ministerial notice stage and the committal stage in Singapore extradition proceedings. It confirms that challenges based on the sufficiency of the requesting State’s evidence should ordinarily be addressed before the Magistrate, while judicial review at the notice stage is confined to genuine public law defects affecting the legality of the Minister’s decision.

The extension of the time limits of custodial detention ordered for extradition purposes — sought by the Prosecutor General pursuant to Article 714(4) of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure — must be decided by the Court of Appeal, failing which the decision is void under the intermediate nullity regime, after a concrete and effective adversarial exchange between the parties. Such exchange does not require a participatory chamber procedure, but may also take place in written form.

The case concerned a Singaporean requested person arrested in Singapore pursuant to a request by the United States in relation to alleged securities fraud and money laundering offences. Pending the extradition proceedings, the requested person sought release on bail on the ground that he was “sick or infirm”, relying on a serious eye condition and a history of bipolar disorder, and arguing that prison medical facilities were inadequate. The High Court held that the relevant threshold was not satisfied, as the medical evidence showed that the conditions either required no ongoing specialist management or could reasonably be managed by the Singapore Prison Service. The Court also considered, for completeness, that there was a real risk of flight given the seriousness of the charges and the prospect of extradition, and therefore dismissed the application for bail

If there is a current and concrete risk of a violation of the fundamental rights of the requested person, the extradition request must be refused. After reconstructing the procedural background and confirming that the formal requirements for extradition were met, the Court ruled out surrender on the ground that, if transferred to Turkey, the requested person would face a concrete risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. In particular, the Court relied on the updated picture of systemic concerns regarding the protection of fundamental rights in Turkey, with specific reference to detention conditions, the independence of the judiciary, the protection of fair trial rights, and the effectiveness of the guarantees arising under the ECHR. Referring to domestic and supranational case law, as well as several institutional and international sources, the Court held that any assurances provided by the requesting State were not sufficient, in the absence of objective, precise and up-to-date elements, to rule out the risk of violations of the requested person’s fundamental rights.