The appellant was arrested in Singapore pursuant to a United States extradition request concerning alleged computer fraud, wire fraud and money laundering offences, and electronic devices, storage media and bank cards were seized during the arrest. The appellant challenged the seizure and later sought judicial review of the magistrate’s refusal to declare the items unlawfully seized. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the magistrate lacked supervisory jurisdiction to determine the legality of the police seizure, that criminal revision should have been exhausted before judicial review was pursued, and that no arguable case for quashing the magistrate’s decision had been established. The Court further held that, under the Extradition Act, authorised officers may ordinarily rely on credible information supplied by the requesting State without conducting an independent investigation, unless that information is patently wrong or the property plainly has no connection with the alleged offences.

The Italian Court of Appeal ordered the surrender of the requested person to Germany pursuant to a prosecution European Arrest Warrant concerning aggravated theft offences. The appellant argued, inter alia, that the pending challenge against the rejection of his application for international protection triggered the principle of non-refoulement, that his social and occupational ties in Italy justified execution of any future sentence in Italy, and that double criminality had not been adequately established. The Supreme Court held that non-refoulement protection based on refugee status did not prevent surrender because refugee status and subsidiary protection had both been expressly denied, notwithstanding the fact that the refusal was under appeal; it also found that the five-year residence requirement under Italian EAW law was not met. The Court further reiterated that double criminality does not require identical criminal offences in the two legal systems, but only that the conduct be punishable in both, and declared the appeal inadmissible.

The requested person challenged an Italian appellate judgment ordering surrender to Spain for prosecution in connection with an aggravated robbery allegedly committed in Ibiza. He argued that the European Arrest Warrant lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis, that flight risk was absent, and that personal and family medical circumstances should prevent surrender. The Supreme Court of Cassation declared the appeal inadmissible, holding that, following the 2021 reform of Italian EAW legislation, the warrant is no longer required to set out serious indications of guilt or include a separate account of the evidentiary sources, provided that it adequately describes the circumstances of the offence and the requested person’s degree of participation. The Court further held that the executing judicial authority may not reassess the precautionary requirements underlying the warrant, while health-related concerns ordinarily pertain to the execution phase rather than constituting grounds for refusal.

The requested person challenged his surrender from Italy to Poland for the execution of a sentence concerning tax fraud and accounting offences, arguing that France had previously refused surrender on nationality grounds and had agreed to recognise and enforce the same Polish judgment. The Supreme Court held that the refusal by the French authorities did not preclude execution of the Polish EAW because there was no evidence that Poland had transmitted the judgment and the certificate required by Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA or that enforcement had actually begun in France. A French summons concerning a hearing on possible alternatives to detention could not be treated either as a valid EAW or as a formal request for surrender. Since Poland had confirmed that the EAW remained valid, while remaining willing to consider enforcement of the sentence in France, the appeal was dismissed and surrender to Poland was upheld.

Two Bahraini pro-democracy activists brought civil proceedings alleging that agents of Bahrain had remotely infected their computers in the United Kingdom with spyware, conducted intrusive surveillance and caused them psychiatric injury. By a majority, the Supreme Court held that section 5 of the State Immunity Act 1978 applies where legally causative acts occur in the United Kingdom, even though the operation was initiated abroad and the foreign State’s agents were never physically present there. The installation and operation of spyware on computers located in the United Kingdom, including the accessing and exfiltration of data and activation of cameras and microphones, constituted causative acts within the jurisdiction. Bahrain was therefore not entitled to State immunity, and its appeal was dismissed; Lord Leggatt dissented, considering that an act occurs where the human actor is located rather than where its effects are produced.

Following certification of the requested person’s extradition from the United States to Türkiye, the requested person renewed her application for release, relying on the existence of special circumstances and the court’s general authority to consider bail before and after certification. The District Court held that an extradition court has no discretion to grant bail where the governing treaty expressly requires the requested person to remain detained until the extradition request is determined and, if granted, until surrender. It found that Article 9 of the United States–Türkiye Extradition Treaty was a self-executing provision binding on the court as the supreme law of the land under the Supremacy Clause. The court rejected the special-circumstances argument and distinguished earlier authority granting bail because that authority had not considered the treaty’s mandatory-detention clause.