Extradition for exploiting a smart-contract vulnerability: double criminality does not require identical offences

Extradition
🇮🇱Israel→🇺🇸United States
Granted
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Court
Supreme Court of Israel
Decision date
08/03/2026
Decision number
ExtrA 82202-07-25; ExtrA 88783-07-25
Main ground
Double criminality
Extradition type
Extradition
Language
English
🇬🇧 Summary
The Supreme Court of Israel dismissed the requested person’s appeal and upheld his extradition to the United States to stand trial for computer fraud, interstate transportation of stolen goods and money laundering. It held that double criminality must be assessed substantively and flexibly and does not require the offences in the requesting and requested States to have identical statutory elements. Knowingly exploiting a vulnerability in a smart contract may correspond to Israeli computer offences even without altering the code, bypassing a password or using a conventional form of unauthorised access. The Court also found sufficient evidentiary support for the money-laundering charge and held that the interstate element of the US offence was merely jurisdictional and therefore irrelevant to the double-criminality assessment.
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Extradition for exploiting a smart-contract vulnerability: double criminality does not require identical offences, Supreme Court of Israel, 8 March 2026, No ExtrA 82202-07-25; ExtrA 88783-07-25, in Extradition Hub, extraditionhub.com/case-law/extradition-smart-contract-double-criminality-israel-united-states-march-2026
🇬🇧 Full Text

JUDGMENT
Justice [OMISSIS]:

Before us is an appeal against the judgment of the Jerusalem District Court (Hon. Judge [OMISSIS]) in ExtrP 700-05-25 (Nevo) of 14 July 2025, which held that the Appellant is extraditable to the United States pursuant to section 3 of the Extradition Law, 5714-1954 (hereinafter: the Extradition Law).

Administrative note: apparently due to an oversight, two appeal files were opened in this case, which are, in effect, to be regarded as a single appeal.

Background and Course of Events
1. On 10 December 2024, the Government of the United States submitted a request for the extradition of the Appellant, Mr. [OMISSIS], in order to bring him to criminal trial (hereinafter: the extradition request). As set out in the extradition request, an indictment was filed against the Appellant on 16 August 2023 in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California (hereinafter: the American indictment).

The Appellant was charged with the following counts: four counts of fraud and related activity in connection with computers (18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A), 1030(c)(4)(B)(i) (hereinafter: computer fraud)); interstate transportation of stolen goods (18 U.S.C. § 2314; hereinafter: transportation of stolen goods); and three counts of money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956).

Attached to the extradition request were, inter alia, the affidavit of the federal prosecutor, Attorney [OMISSIS] (hereinafter: the prosecutor’s affidavit), and the affidavit of FBI agent [OMISSIS] (hereinafter: the federal agent’s affidavit).

The extradition request alleges that the Appellant exploited a vulnerability in a computerized system called [OMISSIS], owned by [OMISSIS], in order to steal digital currencies worth more than 2.8 million dollars, and thereafter carried out various transactions in order to obscure their source. The charges against the Appellant will be briefly set out below; but first, some short background necessary for understanding them.

2. Digital currencies are computerized units used as a means of payment. Digital currencies are issued, traded and “held” on blockchain networks (for various definitions of the term “digital currencies”, see: Committee for Examining the Regulation of the Issuance of Decentralized Cryptocurrencies to the Public, Interim Report (Hebrew) 8 (2018); [OMISSIS], “Are Securities Issued in ICOs? On the Regulation of Digital Tokens Issued by Companies” (Hebrew), 51 Mishpatim 437, 444–446 (2021) (hereinafter: [OMISSIS])).

A blockchain network is a decentralized database, maintained simultaneously on many computers, which contains a complete record of all prior operations (such as transactions and transfers) carried out on that network. The database is updated simultaneously on all the computers operating on the network, and it does not depend on a decision of any central organization – hence the decentralized nature of the network (see: [OMISSIS], at pp. 441–442; [OMISSIS], “Smart Contracts” (Hebrew), in Disruptive Technologies: Challenges in Israeli Law 279, 281–282 ([OMISSIS] eds., 2022)).

Transactions on a blockchain network are visible to all users of the network – but the parties to each such transaction are identified not by name, but by a public address (consisting of a string of digits and letters) to which other users of the network can transfer digital currencies (this address will hereinafter be referred to as: a digital wallet. See: [OMISSIS], “Cryptocurrencies: Conceptual, Legal and Regulatory Challenges” (Hebrew), 16 Din uDevarim 447, 475–476 (2023); State Comptroller, Taxation of Digital Currencies (Hebrew) 5 (2024)).

In addition, many blockchain networks make it possible to establish smart contracts on them. Smart contracts are software programs which, upon the fulfillment of certain predetermined conditions, autonomously execute contractual agreements embedded in the code that defines the smart contract (a kind of “standard-form contract untouched by human hand”. For further discussion, see: [OMISSIS], Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L. J. 101, 108 (2017); [OMISSIS], “‘Smart’ Contract Law – Between Technological Progress and Regulation” (Hebrew), 12 Maasei Mishpat 349, 355 (2021) (hereinafter: [OMISSIS])).

3. Since each blockchain network constitutes a separate decentralized database, one digital currency cannot be converted directly into another, and therefore, as a rule, in order to carry out a transaction between different digital currencies, bridging services between the relevant networks are required (see the details in paragraphs 14–20 of the federal agent’s affidavit).

The [OMISSIS] system provides such bridging services, in a format known as “Lock-And-Mint”. The system operates as follows: a user “locks” digital currencies on one blockchain network, so that they cannot be used for other transactions. The locked digital currencies are held in a digital wallet owned by [OMISSIS]. In return for locking the digital currencies, the user receives digital currencies on another blockchain network, referred to as “tokens”, whose value is equal to that of the digital currencies that were locked (hereinafter: the tokens).

The tokens can be used on the other blockchain network and can also be exchanged back for the digital currencies that were locked (for further discussion of the relationship between such tokens and other types of assets held on blockchain networks, see: [OMISSIS], at pp. 446–448). These bridging services were provided, inter alia, by means of smart contracts created by [OMISSIS] (hereinafter: the smart contracts).

4. According to the extradition request, in June 2022 a software update was carried out on the [OMISSIS] system, following which an unintended security vulnerability was created in the smart contracts. The smart contracts used a certain function to verify that the digital currencies on one blockchain network had indeed been “locked” and could no longer be used, before the smart contracts transferred tokens of equivalent value to the user on another blockchain network (this function is called “proveAndProcess()”).

As a result of the flaw in the smart contracts, users were able to send a message that caused the system to use a function other than the one intended (a function called “process()”; hereinafter: the security vulnerability). This function enabled users to receive tokens on one blockchain network without “locking” digital currencies of similar value on another network.

The extradition request alleges that the Appellant, who operated under the name “[OMISSIS]” (hereinafter: [OMISSIS]), identified this security vulnerability. He first carried out six test transfers, in which he instructed the [OMISSIS] system to issue tokens to him without “locking” digital currencies in return. In parallel with those transfers, the Appellant deposited the digital currencies in [OMISSIS]’s digital wallet, in order to prevent the security vulnerability from being discovered.

Having seen that all was well, on or about 1 August 2022 the Appellant, by means of the security vulnerability, carried out four transfers from [OMISSIS]’s digital wallet on the Ethereum blockchain network to an address associated with the user “[OMISSIS]”, without “locking” digital currencies in return (these transfers will hereinafter be referred to as: the main transfers). In total, in these transfers, tokens worth more than 2.8 million dollars were issued to the Appellant.

Thereafter, the Appellant transferred the tokens he had received to a number of digital wallets and converted them into other digital currencies, allegedly in order to conceal the source of the tokens. The Appellant’s actions exposed the security vulnerability to other users of [OMISSIS], and enabled those parties to drain a digital wallet owned by [OMISSIS], which held digital currencies belonging to other users worth more than 186 million dollars.

Several days later, the Appellant returned some of the tokens taken to [OMISSIS], and contacted a senior executive of [OMISSIS] via the “Telegram” social network (under an account bearing the name “[OMISSIS]”). The Appellant offered to return the rest of the tokens he had taken to [OMISSIS], in exchange for receiving payment for having brought the security vulnerability to [OMISSIS]’s attention.

The parties began negotiations, but at a certain point the Appellant cut off contact with [OMISSIS], and the company turned to the law enforcement authorities in the United States. In the course of the investigation conducted by the authorities, the Appellant was identified as the owner of the digital wallet associated with the user “[OMISSIS]”.

5. On 2 May 2025, the Respondent (hereinafter: the State) filed a petition requesting that the Appellant be declared extraditable. The State argued that the acts described in the extradition request constitute extradition offenses under Israeli law.

In particular, it was argued that the acts attributed to the Appellant constitute the offenses of disrupting or interfering with computer material and of access to computer material in order to commit another offense (under sections 2 and 5 of the Computers Law, 5755-1995 (hereinafter: the Computers Law)); the offenses of obtaining a thing by fraud under aggravated circumstances and theft under aggravated circumstances (under sections 415, latter part, and 384A(b) of the Penal Law, 5737-1977); and offenses under sections 3(a) and 4 of the Prohibition on Money Laundering Law, 5760-2000 (hereinafter: the Money Laundering Law).

6. Before the District Court, the Appellant raised a host of arguments against his extradition. The Appellant also submitted an opinion written by Adv. [OMISSIS] (hereinafter: the Appellant’s opinion). The opinion argued that the actions attributed to the Appellant constituted lawful use of the smart contracts, since it was not alleged that he had carried out any prohibited manipulation of the code underlying the smart contracts.

It was further argued that a money laundering offense cannot be attributed to the Appellant, since all transfers on blockchain networks are public and visible to all users of the network, and it was not even alleged that the Appellant carried out various actions to disguise the source of the tokens taken.

As will be detailed below, following the oral hearing held before us, the Appellant announced that he was focusing the appeal on two of the conditions set out in the Extradition Law – the existence of “a hold for a charge” in the extradition request, and the criminality of the acts attributed to him under Israeli law. I shall therefore focus on the conclusions of the lower court with respect to these conditions.

7. In the District Court’s judgment of 14 July 2025, the petition was granted, and it was held that the Appellant is extraditable.

First, the court found that the affidavits attached to the extradition request present “a hold for a charge” with respect to all the offenses attributed to the Appellant. The court noted that the Appellant did not dispute the claim that he is the person behind the user “[OMISSIS]”, even after being given the opportunity to do so, and that in any event, sufficient evidence for this stage had also been presented as to his identification as “[OMISSIS]”.

As to the criminality of the acts, the court noted that the Appellant did not address the existence of parallel prohibitions in the United States and in Israel on the acts attributed to him, but rather focused on the argument that they were legitimate actions, relying on the opinion he had submitted.

However, the court held that the conclusions of that opinion could not be adopted. First, it was noted that its author is an Israeli attorney who gave his opinion as to the criminality of the Appellant’s acts – a question of law, which is not a matter for expert opinion. In any event, it was emphasized that the conclusions of the Appellant’s opinion are not unequivocal; that they rely on a factual foundation that differs from what is stated in the extradition request; and that they were reached without sufficient authority being cited in support.

The Parties’ Arguments on Appeal
8. The Appellant filed an appeal against this judgment, through the counsel who had represented him in the District Court (Adv. [OMISSIS]), raising various arguments against all aspects of the judgment.

On 11 January 2026, shortly before the date that had been set for the hearing of the appeal, notice was given of a change of representation, accompanied by a request for a short postponement of the hearing in order to study the case. This request was granted, and the hearing took place before us on 22 January 2026.

At the opening of the hearing, the Appellant’s new counsel, Adv. [OMISSIS], announced that he would focus his arguments on two issues: the double criminality requirement and the existence of “a hold for a charge” on the evidentiary level (see: transcript of the hearing of 22 January 2026, p. 1, lines 3–6).

These issues had indeed been raised in the grounds of appeal that had been filed, but the new counsel’s argument regarding them was considerably broader and more detailed than what had appeared in the written submissions. Accordingly, and so as not to prejudice either of the parties, we permitted them, after the conclusion of the oral hearing, to file supplementary written arguments on those issues.

9. In his supplementary argument, filed on 29 January 2026, the Appellant argues that the lower court erred in holding that the main transfers were criminal. According to the Appellant, the extradition request did not allege, even implicitly, that the Appellant “changed code, broke into a system, circumvented a security mechanism or acted outside the ordinary and autonomous operating framework of the smart contract” (ibid., para. 11).

The flaw in the smart contracts was caused by an error of the programmers of the [OMISSIS] system, meaning that it was an internal malfunction, and not a failure resulting from an external action carried out by the Appellant. This error in understanding the factual basis of the extradition request, so it is argued, carried over into the court’s legal conclusions.

10. In particular, the Appellant contends that the requirement of “double criminality” is not met with respect to the offenses for which extradition is sought.

As to the computer fraud offense – the Appellant argues that this offense, under American law, concerns the knowing transmission of code with intent to cause damage to a computer, without requiring unauthorized access or any other intrusion into the computer system. By contrast, the Computers Law, on which the State relied in this regard, recognizes no similar offense, and the relevant offenses under Israeli law require that the accused have accessed a computer without authorization, or have substantially disrupted its operation.

In the Appellant’s view, the extradition request does not attribute to him any acts at all that are prohibited by Israeli law, since it is undisputed that the smart contracts are available to every user, without authorization being limited to particular users, and since the Appellant did not cause the smart contracts to crash or impair their functioning.

Indeed, the Appellant adds that even under American case law interpreting the computer fraud offense, the acts attributed to him are insufficient for a conviction of that offense.

The Appellant further argues that there is no parallel in Israeli law to the offense of transportation of stolen goods, neither in terms of the elements of the offense nor in terms of the protected values underlying it.

According to the Appellant, the offense of transportation of stolen goods deals with acts of transportation between different states of the United States after the property has been stolen, whereas the parallel offenses under Israeli law concern the act of theft itself (the offenses of theft under special circumstances and obtaining a thing by fraud under aggravated circumstances). The Appellant adds that the American indictment did not set out facts corresponding to the elements constituting these offenses.

11. Finally, the Appellant argues that the extradition request contains no evidentiary hold for a charge of money laundering. This is because all the actions attributed to him were carried out by means of blockchain networks, in which all activity is visible to all users of the network, and therefore it cannot be argued that the Appellant acted to disguise or conceal the source of the tokens, as required for the money laundering offense under section 3 of that Law.

The Appellant adds that the acts attributed to him cannot be equated with the offense of performing a transaction in prohibited property under section 4 of the Prohibition on Money Laundering Law, since that offense does not exist in American law.

In this context, the Appellant adds that the lower court erred in not attributing weight to his opinion, which showed that the acts in the American indictment do not constitute a money laundering offense. Should his arguments be rejected, the Appellant requests that an expert be appointed by the court, so as to base the decision on the petition for his extradition on an objective professional foundation.

12. In its supplementary argument, filed on 5 February 2026, the State emphasizes that the double criminality requirement is anchored in a substantive test, which examines whether the acts attributed to the requested person constitute any extradition offense under Israeli law, even if there is no complete overlap between the elements of that offense and the offense for which extradition is sought.

In the State’s view, the American indictment meets this requirement. According to the State, sending the wrong function call (“process()” instead of “proveAndProcess()”) affected the code of the smart contracts, and therefore amounts to disruption of or interference with its operation.

These acts also constitute access to the system in order to commit another offense, in light of the broad interpretation given in the case law to the term “access to computer material”. The other offense, in the State’s view, is theft under aggravated circumstances, manifested in the taking of the tokens contrary to the rules of the [OMISSIS] system, and obtaining a thing by fraud under aggravated circumstances, manifested in presenting a misrepresentation to the system, according to which tokens could be issued to him without first verifying that the Appellant had “locked” digital currencies of similar value.

The State contends that there is a parallel in Israeli law also to the offense of transportation of stolen goods. The parallel offense, in its view, is the money laundering offense. The State adds that, contrary to the Appellant’s argument, it does not seek to equate the offense of transportation of stolen goods with the Israeli offenses of theft under aggravated circumstances and obtaining a thing by fraud, and that it relied on those offenses only with respect to the offense under section 5 of the Computers Law.

According to the American indictment, after taking the tokens, which were issued by the [OMISSIS] system and are therefore identified with it, the Appellant converted them into several types of digital currencies, transferred them between different accounts, while crossing a state line in the United States, and split them up several times.

These acts, it is argued, attest to an attempt to conceal the source of the tokens and to obscure the Appellant’s identity as their beneficiary, as required for offenses under the Money Laundering Law.

13. In his response to the State’s supplementary argument, filed on 13 February 2026 with leave granted, the Appellant argues that the State relies on offenses under Israeli law that include an element of intrusion into a restricted area of a computer or circumvention of an authorization mechanism – but the American indictment does not attribute an act of this kind to the Appellant.

The State’s position, so it is argued, assumes that sending the function call to the smart contracts (“process()”) constitutes circumvention of the authorization mechanism established by [OMISSIS], whereas in practice this was proper use of the smart contracts, consistent with the settings defined by the system’s programmers.

As to the remaining offenses – the Appellant argues that the State does not dispute that there is no normatively parallel offense in Israeli law to the offense of transportation of stolen goods, and that this gap cannot be bridged by attributing other offenses to the Appellant.

Discussion and Decision
14. Having reviewed the parties’ submissions and heard their arguments, I have reached the conclusion that the Appellant’s arguments are to be rejected.

I have found that the requirement of “double criminality” is met both with respect to the computer fraud offense and with respect to the offense of transportation of stolen goods, and that there is a hold for a charge of the money laundering offense.

15. As is well known, one of the fundamental principles of extradition proceedings is the principle of “double criminality”, according to which a requested person may be extradited only for an act that is punishable both under the laws of the requesting State and under the laws of the requested State (in our case – the State of Israel).

The formal anchor of this principle is found in section 2(a) of the Extradition Law, which provides that an “extradition offense” is “any offense which, had it been committed in Israel, would be punishable by imprisonment for one year or a more severe penalty” (section 2(a) of the Extradition Law (emphasis added)).

On the international level, this principle plays a role in ensuring reciprocity in extradition relations between the requesting State and the requested State (see: CrimA 6717/09 [OMISSIS] v. Attorney General, para. 25 (Nevo) (6.12.2010) (hereinafter: the [OMISSIS] case); CrimA 7742/15 [OMISSIS] v. Attorney General, para. 8 (Nevo) (28.8.2016) (request for a further hearing denied in CrimFH 7108/16)).

No less important, the principle of double criminality is significant in protecting the requested person’s constitutional right to liberty, and in safeguarding the principles and values of the requested State. This principle ensures that a requested person will not be extradited for an act which, in the eyes of the requested State, is not perceived as warranting significant punishment ([OMISSIS], Extradition Law (Hebrew) 176 (1980); ExtrA 8013/21 Attorney General v. [OMISSIS], para. 26 (Nevo) (27.4.2022) (request for a further hearing denied in CrimFH 3009/22). For further discussion of the balance between these two purposes in extradition law, see: CrimA 2612/23 [OMISSIS] v. State of Israel, paras. 19–21 (Nevo) (11.11.2024)).

On the other hand, the double criminality requirement does not require complete overlap between all the elements of the parallel offenses in the two States. There is nothing wrong with legal systems defining similar criminal offenses differently, and the fact that there are certain differences between the definition of the offense in the requested State and its definition in the requesting State does not undermine the purposes of the double criminality principle described above.

Accordingly, it has been held that the double criminality requirement is not to be interpreted narrowly and strictly, and that the comparison between the various offenses is to be made “in a flexible and liberal manner” (CrimA 459/12 [OMISSIS] v. State of Israel, para. 32 (Nevo) (13.3.2013). See also: CrimA 205/73 [OMISSIS] v. State of Israel, IsrSC 27(2) 365, 373 (1973); ExtrA 6974/20 [OMISSIS] v. Attorney General, para. 13 (Nevo) (15.12.2020)).

16. The computer fraud offense: The Appellant’s main arguments were directed at the existence of an Israeli parallel to this offense. For convenience, I shall set out the offenses in the Computers Law on which the State relies, together with the relevant definitions:

Definitions

1. In this Law –

“computer material” – software or information;

“information” – data, signs, concepts or instructions, other than software, expressed in a computer-readable language, and stored in a computer or in another storage medium […]

“software” – a set of instructions expressed in a computer-readable language, capable of causing a computer to function or of causing an operation to be performed by a computer […] or which is embedded or integrated in the computer in any manner or is separate from it […]

Disruption of or interference with a computer or computer material

2. A person who unlawfully does any of the following is liable to three years’ imprisonment:

[…]

(2) deletes computer material, causes a change in it, disrupts it in any other way or interferes with its use.

Unlawful access to computer material

4. A person who unlawfully accesses computer material located in a computer is liable to three years’ imprisonment; for this purpose, “access to computer material” – access by means of communication or connection with a computer, or by operating it, but excluding access to computer material that constitutes wiretapping under the Wiretap Law, 5739-1979.

Access to computer material in order to commit another offense

5. A person who commits an act prohibited under section 4 in order to commit an offense under any law, other than under this Law, is liable to five years’ imprisonment.
17. The Appellant argues that the acts attributed to him do not constitute an offense under the Computers Law because the actions he took were carried out “in accordance with the internal logic of the smart contract”, and did not involve unauthorized entry into, or disabling of, the [OMISSIS] system.

In my view, this argument is mistaken. The explanation for this lies both on the legal level and on the technological-practical level.

18. First – the legal level. This Court has not yet conducted a comprehensive discussion of the interpretation of the offense of disruption of or interference with computer material, but in LCrimA 8464/14 State of Israel v. [OMISSIS] (Nevo) (15.12.2015) (hereinafter: the [OMISSIS] case), the interpretation of the additional offense to which the State seeks to equate the acts attributed to the Appellant – access to computer material in order to commit another offense – was discussed at length.

In that judgment, Deputy President [OMISSIS] clarified that the two elements defining the scope of the offense – “access to computer material” carried out “unlawfully” – are to be interpreted broadly, in order to prevent situations in which technological changes would negate the application of the offense even though the values it protects are still being harmed:

It seems to me that the prevailing view among scholars should be accepted, according to which the term “access” is to be given a broad interpretation. An interpretation faithful to the purpose of the Law, and particularly from a forward-looking perspective, requires a general definition of “access”, such that any information “entering” a computer – whether generated by another computer or generated as a result of the user’s activity on the computer – satisfies the conduct requirement of the offense.

This also seems to accord with common sense, which, in my view, seeks to narrow “escape routes”. If we give the term “access” an interpretation tied to a specific technology currently before our eyes, we will be compelled to take part, against our will, in a constant game of “cat and mouse”, and as is well known, present-day technology is by its nature many times faster than the law.

As for the interpretation of the term “unlawfully”, it seems that the proper interpretation of the term is use of a computer without its owner’s consent.
(ibid., para. 18. See also: CrimFH 1062/21 [OMISSIS] v. State of Israel, para. 30 of the opinion of President [OMISSIS] (Nevo) (11.1.2022)).

For similar reasons, and without deciding the matter definitively, it seems to me that rigid limitations on the nature of the conduct constituting the offense of disruption of or interference with computer material should be avoided.

Just as technological changes may alter the ways in which offenders seek to unlawfully access computers, they may also alter the means by which offenders seek to disrupt or interfere with the operation of computers (see and compare: [OMISSIS], “How Law Shapes the Information Environment on the Net” (Hebrew), in Technologies of Justice: Law, Science and Society 223, 259 ([OMISSIS] ed., 2003)).

19. The Appellant’s position is also mistaken on the technological-practical level. The Appellant seeks to draw a clear boundary between acts that exploit existing permissions in a computer system in order to achieve results not anticipated by the system’s programmers, and acts that achieve results of this kind through unauthorized intrusion into, or disruption of, that system. In practice, however, no such boundary exists.

The security vulnerabilities against which the Computers Law is designed to protect are, as a rule, situations in which an error was made in the way a computer system was configured by its programmers, such that an external attacker can exploit the faulty configuration in order to achieve an undesired result.

A situation in which a security vulnerability in software was caused by an error of the software’s owners is not exceptional. In fact – it is the ordinary state of affairs ([OMISSIS], Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PENN. L. REV. 1011, 1019–1025 (2014); [OMISSIS], The Secrets We Keep…: Encryption and the Struggle for Software Vulnerability Disclosure Reform, 25 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 105, 105–106 (2018); 6 U.S.C. § 650(25)).

By way of illustration, it is hard to suppose that no offense under the Computers Law would be committed where a person discovers that, owing to a defect in the manufacture of ATMs, banknotes can be withdrawn from them without inserting a credit card (say, by inserting a sheet of paper into the machine instead of a credit card).

Admittedly, in such a case the offense was made possible by a gross error on the part of the ATM manufacturer, but this does not detract from the criminal nature of exploiting the vulnerability.

In the [OMISSIS] case, the possibility of limiting the offense of unlawful access to a computer only to a person who circumvented a technological barrier was expressly rejected:

I see no reason why the law should protect [OMISSIS], whose computer requires a password in order to be used, but not [OMISSIS], who did not have the sense to install protection of this kind on his computer. A house without a lock is not ownerless property – and so too is the law with respect to a computer.
(ibid., para. 18. See also: ibid., paras. 2–4 of the opinion of Justice [OMISSIS] and para. 1 of the opinion of Justice [OMISSIS]).

Clearly, the Appellant’s proposal to restrict the offenses under the Computers Law even further, solely to a particular type of circumvention of technological barriers – circumvention of barriers that do not originate in the way the computer or computer material was configured by its owner – is not to be accepted.

Nor is the Appellant’s argument of principle to be accepted, according to which, owing to the autonomous nature of smart contracts, there is nothing wrong with knowingly exploiting errors in the way they were implemented (see, for example, paras. 14–15 of his supplementary argument).

Defining software as a “smart contract” does not strip it of the legal protections that the legislature has afforded to software, and exploiting security vulnerabilities in it is no different from exploiting security vulnerabilities in other software (for further discussion of legal policy with respect to flaws in smart contracts, see: [OMISSIS], “Blockchain Technology – Not What You Thought: Technological and Legal Considerations” (Hebrew), 16 Din uDevarim 511, 534–535 (2023); [OMISSIS], at pp. 360–362).

20. From the general to the particular. According to the extradition request, the Appellant exploited a security vulnerability in the [OMISSIS] system that enabled him to circumvent the “locking” mechanism essential to the operation of the smart contracts.

By sending the “process()” function call to the smart contracts, instead of the intended “proveAndProcess()” function, the Appellant received the consideration that the smart contracts offered users – tokens worth more than 2.8 million dollars – without performing his part of the transaction at all (“locking” digital currencies of equivalent value).

The Appellant’s actions exposed the security vulnerability to other users of the [OMISSIS] system, who exploited it as well, and drained [OMISSIS]’s digital wallet of digital currencies worth approximately 186 million dollars.

According to what is attributed to him, then, the Appellant knowingly exploited a security vulnerability in order to obtain unrestricted access to computer material ([OMISSIS]’s digital wallet), and to steal by means of that access tokens of high value, in a manner that impaired the proper functioning of the [OMISSIS] system (to the point of draining a digital wallet in which large sums of money had accumulated).

This was done without the consent of the operators of the [OMISSIS] system, and it emerges from the American indictment that the Appellant understood this well.

Proof of this is that, after carrying out the main transfers, the Appellant contacted a senior executive of [OMISSIS] and requested payment in return for having discovered a “bug” in the design of the smart contracts – that is, an error in their configuration, contrary to the intention of the programmers of the [OMISSIS] system (para. 51 of the federal agent’s affidavit. See also: para. 45 of the lower court’s judgment).

Note: Alongside the offense of disruption of or interference with computer material, the State relies on the offense of access to computer material in order to commit another offense (under section 5 of the Computers Law), where the other offense is obtaining a thing by fraud under aggravated circumstances or theft under special circumstances (see: para. 17 of the State’s supplementary argument).

As to the “obtaining” or “theft” elements of the other offense, I would note that what is stated in the American indictment suffices to attribute to the Appellant an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the tokens.

This is because, according to the American indictment and the federal agent’s affidavit, the Appellant did indeed negotiate the return of the tokens in exchange for payment, but changed his mind and cut off contact between himself and the representatives of [OMISSIS] – an indication that he ultimately decided to keep the tokens (paras. 51–54 of the federal agent’s affidavit. See and compare: LCrimA 11066/03 State of Israel v. [OMISSIS], para. D (Nevo) (28.5.2007); [OMISSIS], On Criminal Law, Part Two – Offenses against Property (Hebrew) 804–805 (2013)).

21. Admittedly, there are various differences between the American offense of computer fraud and the offenses under the Israeli Computers Law, but the substantive elements of the offenses parallel one another; they are designed to protect identical interests; and the acts attributed to the Appellant clearly satisfy the offenses under Israeli law.

For similar reasons, there is also no basis for the Appellant’s argument that the lower court ignored the fact that he is not charged with any active act of intrusion into the smart contract or of altering its code.

As to the Appellant’s argument that under United States case law his acts do not fall within the computer fraud offense – his arguments on this level will be examined in the criminal proceedings in the United States, and the present proceeding is not the place to address them (CrimA 9026/11 [OMISSIS] v. Attorney General, para. 29 (Nevo) (6.12.2012); CrimA 6003/19 [OMISSIS] v. Attorney General, para. 18 (Nevo) (3.9.2020)).

22. The money laundering and transportation of stolen goods offenses: With respect to these offenses, the Appellant argues, first, that the money laundering offense attributed to him has no hold in the evidentiary material; and second, that the State did not present an Israeli parallel to the offense of transportation of stolen goods, and therefore the double criminality requirement is not met with respect to it.

I have found no merit in these arguments either.

23. Section 9(a) of the Extradition Law provides that a court shall declare a requested person extraditable only if it finds that “there is evidence that would be sufficient to put him on trial for such an offense in Israel”.

This section has been interpreted narrowly, and it has been held that it suffices that there is evidence, not worthless on its face, sufficient to continue conducting the criminal proceedings against the requested person in the requesting State (see: CrimA 2490/18 [OMISSIS] v. State of Israel, para. 13 (Nevo) (8.1.2019); CrimA 4416/20 [OMISSIS] v. Attorney General, para. 10 (Nevo) (8.12.2020)).

In the course of this inquiry, no in-depth examination of the weight and credibility of the evidence presented is to be conducted, and there is no need to determine that the evidence presented is sufficient to lead to the conviction of the requested person (CrimA 8304/17 [OMISSIS] v. Attorney General, para. 22 (Nevo) (8.5.2018); CrimA 2542/19 [OMISSIS] v. Attorney General, para. 9 (Nevo) (3.12.2019)).

24. The evidentiary foundation presented in the affidavits of the prosecutor and the federal agent meets this condition.

According to the affidavits, the Appellant converted the tokens he took from [OMISSIS]’s digital wallet into other types of digital currencies, and thereafter converted some of the digital currencies back into the type of tokens he had originally taken from [OMISSIS]. Subsequently, he also split the tokens among a number of different accounts.

According to the affidavits, these actions – some of which have no economic purpose – are money laundering techniques whose purpose is to disguise the source of the digital currencies (paras. 41–50 of the federal agent’s affidavit and para. 28 of the prosecutor’s affidavit).

The Appellant argues, relying on the opinion he submitted, that the acts attributed to him give rise to no concern of money laundering, since all transfers on blockchain networks are visible to all, and since no techniques for obscuring the source of the digital currencies were used in the transfers in question.

The Appellant’s argument of principle that blockchain networks cannot be used to launder money is surprising – for it runs contrary to the position of financial regulators in Israel and around the world, who have found that these platforms in fact increase the risk of money laundering (Public Notice regarding Possible Risks Inherent in Decentralized Virtual Currencies, joint notice of the Bank of Israel, the Capital Market, Insurance and Savings Division, the Israel Tax Authority, the Israel Securities Authority and the Israel Money Laundering and Terror Financing Prohibition Authority, 2014 (Hebrew); [OMISSIS], “Unmasking the Identity of Electronic Currency Users” (Hebrew), 8 Regulation Studies 147, 184–188 (2025)).

The reason for this is that while the details of the digital wallets on blockchain networks are visible, the identities of the holders of those wallets are concealed, and blockchain networks make it difficult to uncover them.

The Appellant’s specific argument, according to which it was not alleged that he used techniques designed to obscure the source of the transfers, contradicts his previous argument that, as a rule, blockchain networks cannot be used to launder money, and in any event, it does not avail him.

It is of no consequence that, according to the extradition request, the Appellant used only some of the methods of money laundering, and did not use others.

In order to find that there is a hold for a charge, it suffices that the affidavits of the prosecutor and the federal agent presented actions carried out by the Appellant in property, the purpose of which was “to conceal or disguise its source” (section 3(a) of the Money Laundering Law. See and compare: my opinion in ExtrA 3463/24 [OMISSIS] v. Attorney General (Nevo) (6.3.2025) and ExtrA 1204-12-24 [OMISSIS] v. State of Israel, paras. 50–53 of the opinion of Justice [OMISSIS] (Nevo) (29.6.2025) (request for a further hearing denied in CrimFH 31931-07-25 (Nevo)) (hereinafter: the [OMISSIS] case)).

25. The Appellant’s final argument is that the double criminality requirement is not met with respect to the third offense in the American indictment – transportation of stolen goods. This is because Israeli law contains no offense comprising similar elements, and in particular, no element of transportation between states of the United States.

As the State emphasizes, the acts constituting this offense, according to the American indictment, are the very acts for which the money laundering offense under American law is attributed to him. Accordingly, I am of the view that the double criminality requirement is met with respect to this offense as well.

The acts for which the Appellant is charged with transportation of stolen goods clearly fall within the scope of the money laundering offense under Israeli law, as described above.

Moreover, there is a similarity between the values protected by the offenses. In both cases, the offenses are designed to prevent exploitation of the legitimate economic system for criminal purposes, and to reduce the incentive for economic crime by denying offenders the ability to enjoy or trade in the fruits of their acts (see, respectively: CrimA 2333/07 [OMISSIS] v. State of Israel, para. 233 (Nevo) (12.7.2010); the [OMISSIS] case, at para. 48 of the opinion of Justice [OMISSIS]. And compare: United States v. [OMISSIS], 329 U.S. 379, 385 (1946); [OMISSIS] v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (concerning another alternative of 18 U.S.C. § 2314)).

Admittedly, the offense of transportation of stolen goods contains an additional element, concerning transportation between states of the United States, but this is not one of the substantive elements of the offense, which are at the focus of the examination under the double criminality requirement (see para. 15 above), but rather an element intended to confer jurisdiction on the federal government (see: [OMISSIS] v. [OMISSIS], 578 U.S. 452, 456–457 (2016)).

In any event, the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Israel expressly provides that the presence of elements relating to federal jurisdiction in the definition of the American offense, including “interstate transportation”, shall not be taken into account for purposes of the double criminality requirement (Article 2(3) of the Treaty, as worded under the Protocol amending the Extradition Treaty between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the United States of America, Treaty Series 56 (1511) 1, 3 (signed in 2005). See also: the [OMISSIS] case, at para. 58).

26. Conclusion: For the reasons stated above, the Appellant’s arguments against the District Court’s judgment are to be rejected. Accordingly, and as stated in the District Court’s judgment, the conditions for declaring the Appellant extraditable to the United States with respect to the offenses attributed to him in the extradition request have been met.

[OMISSIS]
Justice

Justice [OMISSIS]:

I concur.

[OMISSIS]
Justice

Justice [OMISSIS]:

I concur.

[OMISSIS]
Justice

Decided as stated in the judgment of Justice [OMISSIS].

Given today, 19 Adar 5786 (8 March 2026).

[OMISSIS] — Justice
[OMISSIS] — Justice
[OMISSIS] — Justice

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Sharon Nahari
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