Habeas corpus in extradition: detention upheld after independent review of statutory and treaty safeguards
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF BELIZE A.D. 2026
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
[OMISSIS]
Appellant
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL
First Respondent
and
SUPERINTENDENT OF PRISONS
Second Respondent
Before:
The Hon. Mme. Louise Esther Blenman Chief Justice
The Hon. Mme. Minnet Hafiz Bertram President
The Hon. Mr. E. Andrew Marshalleck, SC Justice of Appeal (Ag.)
Appearances:
Mr. Bryan Neal for the Appellant
Mrs. Cheryl-Lynn Vidal SC, Director of Public Prosecutions and
Ms. Stacey Martinez, Senior Crown Counsel for the First and Second
Respondents
———————————————————–
2026: June 16;
August 18.
———————————————————–
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
[1] BLENMAN, C.J.: Mr. [OMISSIS] (“[OMISSIS]”) has appealed against the
order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Mohamed Mansoor (“learned trial judge”)
dated 3 January 2025 whereby the learned trial judge refused to grant [OMISSIS]’s application for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum (habeas
1
corpus). [OMISSIS] sought habeas corpus directing his release from the Belize
Central Prison (“the Prison”)1 where he is awaiting a decision of the Honourable
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Immigration (the “Honourable
Minister”) in relation to his extradition.
[2] Indeed, [OMISSIS], who remains detained at the Prison, applied for the writ of
habeas corpus on the ground that his detention arising from the Chief
Magistrate’s committal decision was unlawful, a contention which he continues
to maintain. [OMISSIS], who is both the applicant for the writ and the appellant
in this appeal, contends that the learned trial judge erred in refusing him the
relief sought. The Attorney General and the Superintendent of Prisons
(collectively, the “State”) resist his appeal.
[3] To provide greater context on the matter, it is apposite to briefly outline the
background.
BACKGROUND
[4] The underlying facts are in relation to extradition proceedings instituted pursuant
to a request made by the Government of the United States of America (“the
USA”) for the surrender of [OMISSIS] to stand trial in the State of Texas on
charges of intoxication manslaughter and intoxication assault. Following
committal proceedings before the Chief Magistrate, [OMISSIS] was committed
to custody pending extradition. The gravamen of his appeal concerns the legality
of the continued detention.
[5] The extradition proceedings originated in September 2018, when the
Government of the USA made a formal request of the Government of Belize for
the extradition of [OMISSIS] to stand trial in the State of Texas for offences
which he is alleged to have committed in Texas, in or about the year 1998. The
request arose out of events that occurred on 23 March 1998, when an
1 Section 4 of the Extradition Act, 2020 provides that: “The committal and detention of any fugitive criminal
in Belize under the Extradition Acts shall be in and to the prison at Hattieville.”
2
ambulance transporting Mr. Claude Hughes (“Mr. Hughes”) to the Huguley
Hospital in Keene, Texas, in the USA was involved in a collision. The ambulance
was driven by Mr. Bruce Baker II (“Mr. Baker II”), an Emergency Medical
Technician, with Mr. Scott Reasor (“Mr. Reasor”), a fireman, and Mr. Michael
Harrison (“Mr. Harrison”), an engineer and EMT, travelling as passengers.
[6] According to the evidence contained in the extradition request, Mr. Baker II was
driving north on FM 2280 while [OMISSIS] was driving a truck in the opposite
direction. [OMISSIS] encroached into the northbound lane in which Mr. Baker II
was travelling, causing Mr. Baker II, in an attempt to avoid a collision, to steer
the ambulance into the southbound lane. [OMISSIS] then also swerved into the
southbound lane, where his vehicle collided with the ambulance. The force of
the impact caused the ambulance to overturn at least three times which resulted
in the death of Mr. Hughes and occasioned serious injury to Mr. Baker II, Mr.
Reasor and Mr. Harrison. Mr. George Lee Aguilar (“Mr. Aguilar”), a passenger
in the truck which [OMISSIS] was driving, also died as a consequence of the
collision. [OMISSIS] failed two of three field sobriety tests which were
administered to him, the result of the third proved inconclusive. His breath
sample, upon analysis, registered a reading within the range indicative of
intoxication.
[7] On 3 April 1998, a Grand Jury sitting in the 18th District Court in Johnson County,
Texas (“18th Judicial District Court”), returned a bill of indictment against [OMISSIS] on two counts of intoxication manslaughter and three counts of
intoxication assault. [OMISSIS] was released on bonds in the sums of
$100,000.00 and $5,000.00, respectively, and a trial date was fixed for 10
August 1998. [OMISSIS] did not appear in the 18th Judicial District Court on 10
August 1998. His bond was forfeited and on 25 August 1998, the 18th Judicial
District Court issued a warrant for his arrest. Following these events, [OMISSIS]
fled the USA. For a considerable period, his whereabouts remained unknown.
The record indicates that in 2000, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“the FBI”)
had reason to believe [OMISSIS] was residing in [OMISSIS].
According to the extradition bundle, this belief was confirmed in 2016, when the
3
FBI, by reference to an open-source social media post, ascertained that [OMISSIS] was indeed residing in [OMISSIS].
[8] On 25 January 2022, the Honourable Minister, signified to the Chief Magistrate
that the Government of the USA had made an extradition request. The
Honourable Minister requested that the Chief Magistrate issue a Warrant of
Apprehension for the arrest of [OMISSIS].
[9] On 1 February 2022, the Chief Magistrate issued the Warrant of Apprehension.
On 7 February 2022, [OMISSIS] was detained and arrested by members of the
Belize Police Department in [OMISSIS], and thereafter appeared before the
Chief Magistrate, where he was arraigned.
[10] On 7 February 2022, [OMISSIS] raised a Preliminary Objection pursuant to
section 6(2) of the Belize Constitution2 alleging that his constitutional rights
were violated. The matter was referred to the High Court as a ‘case stated’.
Following the determination of the issue, on 23 August 2023, the Honourable
Mme. Justice Patricia Farnese held that the extradition proceedings had neither
infringed his right to a hearing within a reasonable time nor constituted an abuse
of process and ordered that the extradition proceedings continue before the
Chief Magistrate, with costs to the State.
Issues in Magistrate’s Court – Extradition
[11] On 25 April 2024, the Chief Magistrate heard the committal proceedings. The
nucleus of the Chief Magistrate’s considerations was whether [OMISSIS] ought
to be surrendered to the Government of the USA. In determining that question,
the Chief Magistrate considered the statutory regime governing extradition in
Belize; namely the relevant provisions of the Extradition Act, 20203 and the
2 Cap. 4 of the Substantive Laws of Belize (Revised Edition 2020).
3 Cap. 112 of the Substantive Laws of Belize (Revised Edition 2020). This is a revised edition of the
Substantive Laws, prepared by the Law Revision Commissioner under the authority of the Law Revision
Act, Chapter 3 of the Substantive Laws of Belize, Revised Edition 2020. This edition contains a
consolidation of amendments made to the law by Act No. 10 of 2016 which was gazetted on 14th April
2016.
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Extradition Agreement between the Government of Belize and the
Government of the United States of America4 (the “Extradition Treaty”) to
answer the charges of intoxication manslaughter and intoxication assault
preferred against him. The Chief Magistrate also addressed the several
objections advanced on behalf of [OMISSIS] concerning, among other matters,
the sufficiency of the evidence, compliance with the Extradition Treaty
requirements, the admissibility of the documentary evidence, delay, and his
identification as the person named in the request.
[12] It is necessary, before outlining the evidence considered by the Chief
Magistrate, to state the statutory and treaty framework within which the
extradition request fell to be determined.
Legislative Framework
[13] At the time of the committal proceedings, extradition proceedings in Belize were
governed principally by the Extradition Act, 2020; and the Extradition Treaty.
Section 2 of the Extradition Act, 2020 incorporated the statutory framework
which was applicable in the United Kingdom; particularly: the Extradition Act,
1870, c. 52; the Extradition Act, 1873, c. 60; the Extradition Act, 1895, c. 33;
the Extradition Act, 1906, c. 15; the Extradition Act, 1932, c. 39; and the
Counterfeit Currency (Convention) Act, 1935, c. 25 (collectively, the
“Extradition Acts, 1870 to 1935, of England”). These instruments established the
legal framework regulating the apprehension, committal and surrender of
persons sought for prosecution or punishment by the requesting State.
[14] Subsequently, the legislative framework was revised by the enactment of the
Extradition Act, 2023,5 which repealed the Extradition Act, 2020, including
the Extradition Acts, 1870 to 1935, of England.6 However, as the proceedings
in the present appeal pre-date the 2023 Act, they fall to be determined in
4 Treaty signed at Belize March 30, 2000; Ratified by Belize August 31, 2000; Entered into force March
27, 2001.
5 Act No. 31 of 2023.
6 Section 37 of the Extradition Act, 2023
5
accordance with the earlier statutory regime.7
Extradition Act, 1870
[15] The application of the Extradition Act, 1870 in Belize is well established. The
Act was extended to what was then British Honduras by Order in Council and
remained part of the law of Belize. Its continuing force was recognised by the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Rhett Allen Fuller v Attorney
General of Belize.8
[16] Section 10 of the Extradition Act, 1870 is of particular significance. It provides
that a fugitive criminal accused of an extradition crime shall be committed to
prison where the foreign warrant is duly authenticated and the evidence
produced would, according to the law of the Requested State, justify committal
for trial had the offence been committed within that State. In the absence of such
evidence, the person sought must be discharged.
Extradition Act, 2020
[17] The Extradition Act, 2020 complemented that framework by regulating
extradition arrangements entered into by Belize and providing for the
implementation of treaty obligations within the municipal legal system.
[18] Section 9 of the Extradition Act, 2020 which regulates the extradition of
‘fugitive criminals’ between Belize and the USA provides that:
“The extradition of fugitive criminals between Belize and the United
States of America shall be as directed in accordance with the
Extradition Treaty between the Government of Belize and the
Government of the United States of America…”
Treaty Obligations
[19] The Extradition Treaty prescribes both the substantive and procedural
requirements governing extradition requests. The Chief Magistrate identified
7 Section 38 of the Extradition Act, 2023.
8 [2011] UKPC 23 at [15].
6
Articles 2, 6 and 7 of the Extradition Treaty as being of particular relevance
to the proceedings.
Article 2 — Extraditable Offences
[20] Article 2 of the Extradition Treaty provides, in material part:
1. An offense shall be an extraditable offense if it falls within any of the
descriptions listed in the Schedule annexed to this Treaty, which is an
integral part of the Treaty, or any other offense, provided that in either
case the offense is punishable under the laws in both Contracting
States by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year or by
a more severe penalty.
2. An offense shall also be an extraditable offense if it consists of an
attempt or a conspiracy to commit, aiding or abetting, counseling or
procuring the commission of, or being an accessory before or after the
fact to, any offense described in paragraph 1.
3. For the purposes of this Article, an offense shall be an extraditable
offense: (a) whether or not the laws in the Contracting States place the
offense within the same category of offenses or describe the offense by
the same terminology; or (b) whether or not the offense is one for which
United States federal law requires the showing of such matters as
interstate transportation, or use of the mails or of other facilities affecting
interstate or foreign commerce, such matters being merely for the
purpose of establishing jurisdiction in a United States federal court.
4. If the offense was committed outside the territory of the Requesting
State, extradition shall be granted in accordance with this Treaty if the
laws of the Requested State provide for the punishment of an offense
committed outside its territory in similar circumstances.
5. If extradition has been granted for an extraditable offense, it shall also
be granted for any other offense specified in the request, even if the
latter offense is punishable by one year’s deprivation of liberty or less,
provided that all other requirements for extradition are met.”
[21] Article 2 of the Extradition Treaty defines an extraditable offence. In
substance, it requires that the conduct for which extradition is sought be
punishable under the laws of both Contracting States by imprisonment
exceeding one year or by a more severe penalty. It further provides that
differences in legal classification or terminology between the respective
jurisdictions do not preclude extradition where the underlying conduct satisfies
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the principle of dual criminality.
[22] There were no objections raised on behalf of [OMISSIS] in relation to Articles
3, 4, and 5 of the Extradition Treaty; therefore, the Chief Magistrate did not
find it necessary to elaborate on these Articles (and neither does this Court) in
the appeal at bar.
Article 6 — Extradition Procedures and Required Documents
[23] The Chief Magistrate placed particular reliance on Article 6 of the Extradition
Treaty, which set out the procedures and requirements for determining whether
the conditions for extraditing [OMISSIS] had been satisfied.
[24] Article 6 of the Extradition Treaty provides, in material part, that all requests
for extradition are to be submitted through the diplomatic channel, and are to be
supported by: documents, statements, or other evidence describing the identity
and probable location of the person sought; evidence describing the facts of the
offence and the procedural history of the case; evidence as to the provisions of
law describing the essential elements of the offence, the punishment therefor,
and any applicable limitation period; and, where the person sought is wanted for
prosecution, a copy of the relevant warrant or order of arrest, a document setting
forth the charges, and such evidence as would, under the law of the Requested
State, justify the committal for trial of the person sought had the offence been
committed within that State.
Article 7 – Admissibility of Documents
[25] Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty provides:
“The documents which accompany an extradition request shall be
received and admitted as evidence in extradition proceedings if,
(a) in the case of a request from the United States, they are
authenticated by an officer of the United States Department of State
and are certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of Belize
resident in the United States;
8
(b) in the case of a request from Belize, they are certified by the principal
diplomatic or consular officer of the United States resident in Belize, as
provided by the extradition laws of the United States; or
(c) they are certified or authenticated in any other manner accepted by
the law of the Requested State.”
[26] Article 7 governs the admissibility of documents accompanying an extradition
request. It provides, in substance, that documents duly authenticated and
certified in accordance with the Extradition Treaty are admissible in extradition
proceedings before the courts of the requested State.
Article 10 – Decision and Surrender
[27] Article 10 of the Extradition Treaty is also relevant. While Article 6 prescribes
the evidence and documents required to support a request for extradition,
Article 10 governs the determination of that request. It provides that extradition
shall be granted only where the evidence is sufficient, according to the law of
the Requested State, to justify the committal for trial of the person sought. In this
respect, Article 10 mirrors the evidential threshold contained in section 10 of
the Extradition Act, 1870.
Sufficiency of Evidence
[28] The Chief Magistrate also considered section 34(7)(a) of the Indictable
Procedure Act,9 which outlines the test to be applied at the close of a
preliminary inquiry: whether the evidence tendered discloses sufficient grounds
to commit the accused for trial. This provision was relevant to the extradition
proceedings insofar as it supplied the evidentiary threshold against which the
sufficiency of the evidence adduced against [OMISSIS] had to be measured. In
determining whether that threshold had been satisfied, the Chief Magistrate
considered the statutory provision along with the case of Said Musa v Jones
(Crown),10 in which the High Court described the duty of a magistrate in a
preliminary inquiry under section 34 of the Indictable Procedure Act. Against
9 Cap. 96 of the Substantive Laws of Belize (Revised Edition 2020).
10 Claim No. 155 of 2009.
9
this legislative and treaty framework, the Chief Magistrate undertook an analysis
of the evidence contained within the extradition request in order to determine its
sufficiency.
Affidavit Evidence
[29] The material affidavit evidence which the Government of the USA and the
Government of Belize submitted to support the extradition request comprised
exhibits in relation to [OMISSIS]’s identity, his admissions, and the
circumstances and consequences of the collision. For ease of reference, some
of the material affidavit evidence considered by the Chief Magistrate is
summarised in the paragraphs which follow.
[30] In Exhibit P, Sergeant Mark Reinhardt (“Sgt. Reinhardt”) deposed to his
observations at the scene of the collision. He stated that he had approached a
male person who identified himself as [OMISSIS] and that [OMISSIS] admitted
to him that:
“[H]e had been southbound on FM2280 and that he had been drinking
four or five beers approximately two hours before the crash. [OMISSIS] has
also stated that he and the passenger in his vehicle began to argue and
that he drove his car into the northbound lane of FM 2280. [OMISSIS] has
also admitted to the affiant that he observed an ambulance coming
towards him in the northbound lane.”
[31] The Chief Magistrate held that the admission made by [OMISSIS] to Sgt.
Reinhardt at the crime scene was prima facie admissible pursuant to section
90 of the Evidence Act.11
[32] In Exhibit Q, Mr. Michel Gaudet, a Peace Officer attached to the Criminal
Investigation Division and trained in the comparison and identification of
fingerprint impressions, confirmed i) that the fingerprint impressions appearing
on a standard fingerprint card dated 23 March 1998 matched those appearing
11 Cap. 95 of the Substantive Laws of Belize (Revised Edition 2020).
10
on a photocopy of a standard fingerprint card dated 26 April 1995, and ii) that
both sets of impressions belonged to [OMISSIS].
[33] Exhibit O also confirmed that the date of birth appearing on the fingerprint report,
together with the name recorded therein, corresponded with the date of birth
which [OMISSIS], through his attorney-at-law, had provided when queried by
the Chief Magistrate.
[34] In Exhibit U, Mr. Marshall William Hicks (“Mr. Hicks”) deposed that he had
assisted the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office in locating and apprehending [OMISSIS] in respect of an unrelated matter in 1997 and had been present at the
scene of the collision in 1998, where he observed [OMISSIS] being placed in
the back of a police vehicle. Mr. Hicks stated that his subsequent investigations
led him to locate [OMISSIS]’s Facebook profile, by means of which he confirmed
that [OMISSIS] had fled to Belize and was residing in [OMISSIS].
[35] Exhibits W and X comprised the affidavits of Ms. Garcia Nunez, Custodian of
Records for the Tarrant County Medical Examiner’s Office, and Mr. Logan
Littlejohn, Custodian of Records for the Johnson County Medical Examiner’s
Office, to which were attached the autopsy reports of the two deceased persons,
Mr. Hughes and Mr. Aguilar. The autopsy reports disclosed that the cause of
death of Mr. Hughes was thoracic blunt force injuries sustained in a motor
vehicle collision, and that the cause of death of Mr. Aguilar was multiple crush
injuries sustained in the same collision.
Decision of the Chief Magistrate
[36] Having assessed the totality of the evidence presented against the requirements
set out above, the Chief Magistrate was satisfied that: (i) the Government of the
USA had adduced sufficient evidence, by way of affidavits and reports, to
establish a prima facie case against [OMISSIS]; and (ii) the documents
comprising the extradition request bundle were duly authenticated in
accordance with Article 7(a) of the Extradition Treaty, and were admissible in
11
the committal proceedings; and (iii) had the offences been committed in Belize,
the evidence would have been sufficient to justify his committal, in accordance
with Article 10 of the Extradition Treaty.
[37] The Chief Magistrate accordingly granted the request for the extradition of [OMISSIS] and issued a Warrant of Committal dated 25 April 2024 which identified
the equivalent domestic offences as manslaughter, contrary to section 116(1)
read together with section 108(1)(b) of the Criminal Code,12 along with
grievous harm, contrary to section 81 read together with section 94 of the
Criminal Code. [OMISSIS] was thereupon remanded to prison to await his
extradition.
Habeas Corpus Application
[38] As alluded to earlier, [OMISSIS] applied to the High Court for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to section 37 of the Senior Courts Act.13 He contended that
his detention was unlawful and in breach of section 5(1)(i) of the Constitution
of Belize and section 10 of the Extradition Act, 1870. He sought orders
quashing the Chief Magistrate’s committal order and directing his discharge and
release from prison, together with compensation under section 5 of the
Constitution and costs.
[39] He advanced fifteen (15) grounds of challenge, which I have crystallised into
four principal grounds; namely that:
i. the Chief Magistrate’s written ruling failed to identify the offences under
Belizean law for which sufficient evidence existed to justify committal,
rendering the committal order unlawful;
ii. the evidence before the Chief Magistrate was insufficient to establish that
the applicant was the person sought by the US authorities, and that
identification evidence had been improperly admitted;
iii. the Chief Magistrate’s written decision did not, as required by section 11
12 Cap. 101 of the Substantive Laws of Belize (Revised Edition 2020).
13 Act No. 27 of 2022.
12
of the Extradition Act, 1870, inform [OMISSIS] of his right to seek
habeas corpus within fifteen (15) days of committal; and
iv. the Magistrate’s court’s delay in furnishing the warrant impeded [OMISSIS]’s ability to file his application in time.
[40] The State strenuously resisted his application for habeas corpus.
Evidence/Affidavits – Evidence on Record
[41] [OMISSIS] and the State relied primarily on the exhibits and affidavit evidence
which were relied on in the committal proceedings. The parties did not call any
evidence at the hearing of the application. The parties made oral submissions
before the learned trial judge and filed supporting authorities.
[42] [OMISSIS], in effect, submitted that the Chief Magistrate did not properly
discharge her functions in accordance with the Extradition Act, 2020. The State
opposed [OMISSIS]’s application on the basis that the Chief Magistrate
discharged her duty to see whether a prima facie case was made out against
[OMISSIS] and determine whether there was sufficient evidence, according to
the laws of Belize, to justify [OMISSIS]’s committal to stand trial.
[43] The learned trial judge considered the parties’ submissions and authorities on
the scope of the court’s function in extradition and habeas corpus proceedings.
[44] Very shortly, I will treat with the learned judge’s decision in detail.
Decision of the learned judge
[45] I will address the critical authorities which the learned trial judge engaged in
determining whether to grant [OMISSIS]’s application for a writ of habeas
corpus.
[46] First, the learned trial judge outlined the function of the Chief Magistrate in
extradition proceedings, as well as the scope of the authority derived from the
13
Extradition Act, 2020. The learned trial judge affirmed that the Chief
Magistrate’s role was confined to determining whether, on the evidence before
the court, the person sought can be extradited as outlined in Atkinson v United
States of America,14 and affirmed in Rhett Fuller v The Attorney General of
Belize,15 and Mark Seawell v The Attorney General.16
[47] The learned trial judge directed himself on the distinction of the role of the court
in extradition proceedings and a habeas corpus application. The learned trial
judge accepted the authority of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court in Cecil
Boatswain v The Superintendent of Prisons and The Attorney-General,17
which stated that the court does not rehear the magistrate’s case or hear an
appeal from it but ensures only that sufficient evidence was before the
magistrate as domestic authority to the same effect.
[48] The learned trial judge found that the Chief Magistrate had before her the
evidence of Sgt. Reinhardt and Mr. Hicks, the undisputed passport bio page,
and the fingerprint evidence; and that the exercise of comparing [OMISSIS] in
court against the photographic evidence had been undertaken and addressed
in the Chief Magistrate’s decision.
[49] The learned trial judge noted that the Chief Magistrate had considered that [OMISSIS]’s alleged conduct constituted manslaughter and assault under the
criminal laws of Belize, both extraditable under the Treaty schedule, although
the Warrant of Committal identified the corresponding domestic offence as
grievous harm. This minor misstatement in the trial judge’s reference to the
offences specified in the Warrant of Committal is not, in the Court’s view,
material as the Chief Magistrate correctly identified the corresponding domestic
offences and their statutory provisions, and it is this identification that governs
the sufficiency of the committal.
14 [1969] 3 W.L.R. 1074.
15 Civil Appeal No. 11 of 2009.
16 Claim No. 817 of 2009.
17 Claim No.130 of 2006.
14
[50] It falls to this court to ascertain whether in the committal warrant, the Chief
Magistrate correctly identified the corresponding domestic offences and their
statutory provisions, since it is that identification that ultimately will determine
whether there is sufficiency of evidence for committal and compliance with the
legal and treaty requirements for committal. I have no doubt that the learned
Chief Magistrate accurately referred to the relevant statutory and treaty
provisions; and offences. The trial judge’s misstatement of the nature of the
offences in the judgment cannot be a basis for impugning the Chief Magistrate.
Had the trial judge correctly stated what the Chief Magistrate said, he would
have concluded as he did.
[51] The learned trial judge found that, although the Chief Magistrate’s written
decision did not expressly address [OMISSIS]’s right to apply for habeas corpus,
the record of proceedings of 25 April 2024 showed that he had been informed,
orally, that he would not be surrendered for fifteen (15) days and had the right
to apply within that period. The learned trial judge held this to be substantial
compliance, causing no prejudice, and noted that section 11 of the Extradition
Act, 1870 requires that the requested person be informed, not that the
information be given in writing.
[52] The learned trial judge accepted that personal liberty warranted the utmost
consideration but held that the administrative delay disclosed on the
correspondence of 7 June 2024 and 18 June 2024 did not, without more, render
the extradition proceedings irregular so as to defeat the extradition request.
[53] The learned trial judge concluded that the decision to extradite was an executive
act reserved to the responsible Minister, exercisable only once the Chief
Magistrate’s proceedings had concluded, and that the Chief Magistrate had
properly exercised her judicial function in accordance with the Extradition Act,
2020 and the Extradition Treaty.
[54] By way of emphasis, the learned trial judge refused [OMISSIS]’s habeas corpus
application as he found no basis to grant any of the remedies sought and
ordered [OMISSIS] to pay the respondents’ costs.
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[55] [OMISSIS] appealed against the decision of the learned trial judge. He asserts
that the learned trial judge’s decision is unsafe as the learned trial judge made
several errors in law in refusing to grant his application for habeas corpus. On
this basis, [OMISSIS] challenges the lawfulness of his detention.
THE APPEAL
[56] Learned Counsel, Mr. Bryan Neal (“Mr. Neal”) filed an original Notice of Appeal,
on behalf of [OMISSIS], which contains eight (8) grounds of appeal. Mr. Neal
filed amended Grounds of Appeal,18 which contained ten (10) grounds of appeal;
namely:
“1. The learned trial judge erred in law in circumstances where the
transcript of the habeas corpus hearing is unavailable which is a serious
procedural irregularity, thereby depriving the Appellant of a fair right of
appeal and preventing proper appellate review of the basis of the
decision, and rendering the decision unsafe.
2. The learned trial judge erred in law by failing to give adequate reasons,
merely reciting principles and submissions without application, reaching
unsupported conclusions, and in the absence of a transcript, rendering
the decision incapable of proper appellate review.
3. The learned trial judge erred in law in making findings of fact and law
without evidential basis, including as to section 11 compliance,
identification, and statutory compliance; and in the absence of a transcript
or reliable record, such findings were speculative and render the decision
unsafe.
4. The learned trial judge erred in law by applying the wrong test, namely
whether a reasonable magistrate could have made the committal order,
instead of whether the Appellant’s detention was strictly lawful and the
statutory preconditions satisfied, thereby misunderstanding his function in
habeas corpus.
5. The learned trial judge erred in law in finding compliance with section
11 of the Extradition Act in the absence of any record that the Appellant
was informed of his right to apply for habeas corpus, and thereby wrongly
concluded that there was substantial compliance with a mandatory
statutory requirement.
6. The learned trial judge erred in law by failing to properly assess the
sufficiency and admissibility of the identification evidence, instead
18 filed 27 April 2026.
16
deferring to the Chief Magistrate without independent scrutiny, and
thereby failing to discharge the Court’s duty to examine the legality of the
detention.
7. The learned trial judge erred in law by failing to assess whether the
evidence was sufficient to justify committal, merely reciting the test and
adopting the Chief Magistrate’s conclusions without analysis, and thereby
failing to apply the correct legal standard.
8. The learned trial judge erred in law in holding the Appellant’s committal
as lawful notwithstanding the failure of the Chief Magistrate’s decision to
specify the offences for which he was being extradited, thereby
undermining the legality of his detention and wrongly concluding that the
warrant alone was sufficient.
9. The learned trial judge erred in law in holding that procedural
irregularities, including delay in providing the warrant of committal, did not
affect the legality of the detention, without considering their impact on the
Appellant’s right to challenge his detention or applying the strict standard
required in cases involving deprivation of liberty.
10. In light of the cumulative effect of the absence of a record, the
inadequacy of reasons, and the reliance on unsupported findings, the
decision of the learned trial judge is unsafe and cannot stand.”
[57] In his original Notice of Appeal, [OMISSIS] seeks:
(1) An order that the decision of the trial Judge and the Chief Magistrate
be set aside.
(2) An order that the reliefs sought in the application for Habeas
Corpus be granted.
(3) An order or declaration that the Appellant is being held in violation
of the Extradition Act, the Constitution of Belize and the Extradition
Treaty.
(4) An order for an immediate release of the Appellant.
(5) An order that damages be awarded to the Appellant.
(6) An order that the costs of the appeal and the costs in the High Court
be awarded to the Appellant.
17
(7) Any or further orders as may be just.
ISSUES
[58] Learned Counsel Mr. Neal helpfully narrowed the grounds of appeal to six (6)
issues in his written submissions. Mr. Neal submitted that the issues arising for
determination before this Honourable Court are:
i) whether the absence of the transcript makes the appeal unfair and the
decision unsafe;
ii) whether the trial judge failed to give adequate reasons;
iii) whether the trial judge applied the correct test in habeas corpus
proceedings;
iv) whether the findings of the judge were supported by the evidence
before him;
v) whether the statutory safeguards under the extradition act were
complied with;
vi) whether the cumulative effect of the foregoing makes the decision
unsafe.
[59] In my respectful view, the gravamen of this appeal is whether the learned trial
judge erred in law in determining that [OMISSIS] was lawfully detained, and in
refusing to grant [OMISSIS]’s application under section 37 of the Senior
Courts Act. On assessment of the Grounds of Appeal and Orders in [OMISSIS]’s Notice of Appeal, amended Grounds of Appeal and the written
submissions filed on his behalf, I have distilled the following issues:
Procedural Fairness
(1) Whether the absence of the transcript of the habeas corpus application
hearing compromises the procedural fairness of the appellate process; and
(2) Whether the learned trial judge erred in failing to give adequate reasons for
his decision, such that proper appellate review of the basis for his findings
was rendered impossible.
18
Propriety of the Trial Judge’s Assessment of the Legality of Detention
(3) Whether the learned trial judge erred in law in applying the wrong test in
habeas corpus proceedings; and
(4) If so, whether the learned trial judge further erred in finding that his
conclusions were supported by the evidence before him.
(5) Whether, independently of the foregoing, the statutory safeguards under the
Extradition Act, 2020 were complied with.
Safety of the Decision
(6) Whether the learned trial judge was wrong in refusing to grant habeas
corpus.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF [OMISSIS]
[60] Mr. Neal, learned counsel representing [OMISSIS], advanced several points in
support of [OMISSIS]’s assertion that the learned trial judge erred in law in
refusing to grant the application for habeas corpus, and therefore, the decision
was unsafe and should be set aside.
Procedural Fairness
[61] First, Mr. Neal contended that the absence of a transcript of the proceedings
before the learned trial judge deprived this Court of the ability to conduct a
meaningful appellate review.
[62] Mr. Neal submitted that, in the absence of a record of the oral submissions, the
exchanges between the Bench and counsel, and the reasoning that informed
the learned trial judge’s determination, this Court is unable to ascertain whether
relevant matters were taken into account or whether irrelevant considerations
influenced the decision.
19
[63] Mr. Neal also argued that the absence of the transcript increased the trial judge’s
duty to provide a ‘clear well-reasoned decision to explain why the applications
was dismissed’ [sic]. Mr. Neal submitted that the learned trial judge failed to do
so as the judgment is merely a summary of the legal principles without proper
application to the relevant issues raised in the application.
[64] Mr. Neal argued that the absence of the transcript along with the inadequacy of
the judgment, rendered the appeal incapable of proper appellate scrutiny of the
learned trial judge’s reasoning. Therefore, Mr. Neal submitted, the learned trial
judge’s decision is unsafe.
Propriety of the Trial Judge’s Assessment
[65] Mr. Neal submitted that the learned trial judge misdirected himself as to the
proper function of the Court on an application for habeas corpus. The correct
inquiry, Mr. Neal contended, was not whether a reasonable magistrate would
have made the committal order, rather whether [OMISSIS]’s detention was
lawful and whether the statutory requirements authorising his detention had
been satisfied. Mr. Neal submitted that, as the learned trial judge applied the
former test rather than the latter, he failed to discharge the Court’s function on
an application for habeas corpus.
[66] Mr. Neal also contended that the judge failed to undertake an independent
assessment of the admissibility, sufficiency and reliability of the identification
evidence. Instead, it was submitted, the learned trial judge merely adopted the
conclusions of the Chief Magistrate without analysing whether the evidence
disclosed a sufficient basis for committal under the Extradition Act, 2020. Mr.
Neal contended that this approach was inconsistent with the duty of a judge of
the High Court to independently examine the legality of the detention in habeas
corpus proceedings.
[67] In support of this submission, Mr. Neal adverted this Court’s attention to section
10 of the Extradition Act, 1870. Mr. Neal submitted that, while the learned trial
20
judge correctly outlined the applicable test, he failed to satisfy the statutory
requirement to independently assess the evidence, relying instead on the Chief
Magistrate’s conclusions without conducting his own analysis. Mr. Neal referred
more specifically to, what he asserted was, the learned trial judge’s failure to
review the statutes in Belize and independently determine whether [OMISSIS]’s
detention was in accordance with the Extradition Act, 2020 and the
Extradition Treaty.
[68] Relying on the Caribbean Court of Justice’s decision in AG of Barbados v
Joseph & Boyce,19 Mr. Neal emphasised that the courts are the guardians of
constitutional rights and must ensure that any interference with an individual’s
liberty is strictly justified in law. Mr. Neal asserted that the present appeal
concerns the lawfulness of [OMISSIS]’s detention which engages fundamental
constitutional principles relating to personal liberty and the rule of law; and is a
matter for the courts, as affirmed by the Privy Council in Fuller v AG of Belize.20
In this regard, Mr. Neal contended, since the detention interferes with [OMISSIS]’s liberty, the learned trial judge was obligated to strictly adhere to the
statutory framework governing extradition, however, he failed to.
[69] Mr. Neal further argued that the delay in producing the warrant of committal
raised a fundamental issue as to the legality of [OMISSIS]’s detention. Mr. Neal
maintained that section 10 of the Extradition Act, 1870 allowed the magistrate
to detain a fugitive only where there is sufficient evidence to justify committal
and section 11 of the Extradition Act, 1870 imposed a mandatory obligation
to inform the committed person of his right to apply for a writ of habeas corpus.
[70] Mr. Neal submitted that the warrant of committal constituted the legal authority
for detention and that its non-production at the material time required careful
scrutiny. In further support of this point, Mr. Neal relied on Gary Seawell v
Superintendent of Prisons21 which, he asserted, established that the
19 CCJ Appeal No CV 2 of 2005.
20 2011 UKPC 23.
21 Civil Appeal No 20 of 2014.
21
committal order constitutes the legal foundation of detention. He contended that
where there is no valid and demonstrable committal order, there is no lawful
basis upon which a person may be detained pending extradition.
[71] Mr. Neal argued that the subsequent production of the warrant did not cure the
defect as the sequence which the Extradition Act, 2020 contemplated was
infringed and that the learned trial judge failed to consider whether the delay had
impaired [OMISSIS]’s ability to challenge the legality of his detention.
Safety of the decision
[72] Mr. Neal submitted that the several deficiencies identified should be considered
cumulatively. He argued that the combined effect of the absence of a transcript,
the inadequacy of the learned trial judge’s reasons, the alleged misdirection as
to the applicable legal test, the failure to independently assess the evidence,
and the issues surrounding the committal warrant rendered the decision unsafe.
[73] Mr. Neal submitted that extradition proceedings are governed by a strict
statutory regime, and that the Court must be affirmatively satisfied that each
statutory requirement has been complied with before a person may lawfully be
deprived of his liberty. Mr. Neal relied on Re Nielsen,22 which he asserted,
emphasised that the function of the court is to determine whether the evidence
and procedure justify committal according to the law of the requested state; an
inquiry said to be one of legality, and not of assumption or deference to the
decision below. Mr. Neal further relied on In re Arton,23 where, he said, the
Court recognised that extradition is entirely a creature of statute and treaty, such
that the conditions authorising committal must be strictly satisfied, leaving no
scope for informal or approximate compliance.
[74] Mr. Neal submitted that the Privy Council’s decision in Kossekechatko v
22 [1984] AC 606.
23 (No. 2) [1896] 1 QB 509
22
Attorney General of Trinidad24 affirms that the consequence of non-
compliance with the statutory requirements governing extradition proceedings
may render detention unlawful and justify discharge on habeas corpus, the
legality of the detention having to be clearly established rather than presumed.
[75] Mr. Neal contended that the cumulative effect of the defects, identified in [OMISSIS]’s appeal, was decisive. Mr. Neal submitted that, taken individually, each
of these matters raises serious concern as to the safety of the decision below,
and that, taken together, they render it impossible for the Court to be satisfied
that [OMISSIS]’s detention was lawful. Accordingly, it was submitted that the
statutory and constitutional safeguards governing deprivation of liberty have not
been shown to have been complied with.
[76] Mr. Neal therefore urged this Court to allow the appeal; set aside the order
dismissing the application for habeas corpus; grant the writ or remit the matter
for rehearing before a different judge of the High Court; and award [OMISSIS]
his costs of this appeal and the proceedings in the court below.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE
[77] The learned Director of Public Prosecutions Mrs. Chery-Lynn Vidal SC (“Mrs.
Vidal SC”) made written and oral submissions on behalf of the State. Mrs. Vidal
SC advanced submissions to support the State’s assertion that there was no
basis upon which the learned trial judge could have found that [OMISSIS]’s
detention was unlawful; therefore, the writ of habeas corpus could not have been
properly issued.
[78] Mrs. Vidal SC contextualised the State’s written submissions by summarising
the extradition request, the committal proceedings, the affidavit evidence which
was before the Chief Magistrate, and the statutory framework governing the
committal proceedings.
24 (1932 AC) 78.
23
Procedural Fairness
[79] First, Mrs. Vidal SC contended that, in the circumstances, the absence of a
transcript occasioned no prejudice because no oral evidence had been received
before the learned trial judge. Mrs. Vidal SC asserted that the habeas corpus
application was determined on affidavit evidence and documentary exhibits, all
of which form part of the Record of Appeal, together with the written judgment
under appeal. Further, Mrs. Vidal SC submitted that as the appeal is against the
decision of the learned trial judge, the judgment is sufficient for this Court to
consider whether the learned trial properly considered the lawfulness of [OMISSIS]’s detention and rightfully refused to issue the writ. Therefore, Mrs. Vidal
SC submitted that [OMISSIS] is not prejudiced by the absence of a transcript of
the hearing of the habeas corpus application.
[80] In a similar vein, Mrs. Vidal SC, asserted that the learned trial judge sufficiently
analysed the issues raised in [OMISSIS]’s application. Mrs. Vidal SC referred
this Court to the portions of the judgment in which the learned trial judge referred
to supporting affidavit evidence, identified his function supported by the decision
of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court in Cecil Boatswain v The
Superintendent of Prisons and The Attorney-General, properly considered
the parties’ submissions and ultimately concluded that the Chief Magistrate had
exercised her judicial function in accordance with the statutory and Treaty
framework.
[81] Accordingly, Mrs. Vidal SC submitted that Mr. Neal’s submissions were
inaccurate, as the learned judge had given sufficient reasons for concluding that
that the detention was lawful and that the application is refused.
Propriety of the Learned Trial Judge’s Decision on the Lawfulness of
Detention
[82] Mrs. Vidal SC challenged Mr. Neal’s submission that the learned trial judge
applied the wrong test in the habeas corpus proceedings. Mrs. Vidal SC referred
24
this Court to the lower court’s decision in Carlos Higgins v Attorney-General
and Ors25 in which Goonetilleke J stated that a habeas corpus application calls
upon the custodian of the applicant to justify his detention and the court to
determine whether the basis of the detention is lawful.
[83] During the delivery of her oral submissions, Mrs. Vidal SC conceded that the
learned trial judge did not properly word a sentence of the judgment as he
referred to the request for extradition as a discretion that is exercised by the
Magistrate. Mrs. Vidal SC contended that, notwithstanding this misstatement,
this sentence does not detract from the decision ultimately made by the trial
judge that there was in fact compliance and that the evidence was sufficient and
the detention was not unlawful. Mrs. Vidal SC asserted that, as illustrated in his
judgment, the learned trial judge properly considered whether [OMISSIS]’s
detention was lawful and concluded that the procedural requirements were
satisfied.
[84] Mrs. Vidal SC also emphasised that Mr. Neal failed to demonstrate the basis on
which he submitted that the learned trial judge erred and arrived at an incorrect
result.
[85] Mrs. Vidal SC maintained that, in relation to the identification evidence and
sufficiency of the evidence, [OMISSIS]’s challenge to the identification evidence
is unsubstantiated and, in certain respects, borders on disingenuity. Mrs. Vidal
SC noted that while Mr. Neal contends the learned trial judge erred in agreeing
with the Chief Magistrate’s finding on identification, he has not at any point
demonstrated why that conclusion was incorrect, nor explained why the
identification evidence was, as he asserts, insufficient.
[86] Mrs. Vidal SC pointed out that the Chief Magistrate set out clearly the
identification evidence before her, comprising the affidavit evidence provided by
the Government of the USA together with [OMISSIS]’s bio-data page, which was
25 Claim No CV 748/2023.
25
admitted without objection. The learned trial judge, Mrs. Vidal SC asserted,
having considered that evidence, found no error in the Chief Magistrate’s
conclusion that [OMISSIS] was the person sought by the Government of the
USA.
[87] Mrs. Vidal SC submitted that [OMISSIS] has, at no stage, denied being the
individual sought pursuant to the extradition request from the USA. Mrs. Vidal
SC asserted that, in his affidavit sworn in support of the Case Stated, [OMISSIS]
acknowledged that he is the person being sought and contended only that the
lapse of time since his departure from the USA rendered his return unfair. Mrs.
Vidal SC also noted that, when asked to confirm his personal details at the
preliminary inquiry, [OMISSIS] confirmed his name and date of birth. Mrs. Vidal
SC submitted that the extradition bundle contained more than one photograph
of [OMISSIS], and the Chief Magistrate compared him against one such
photograph, a method of identification, Mrs. Vidal SC, submitted is well
established as permissible, relying on Re Bradshar’s Application for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum,26 R v Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex
parte Rodriguez, Subnom Re Rodriguez’s application for a writ of habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum27 R v Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte
Voets28 and Sealy v The Government of the United States of America.29
[88] In these circumstances, Mrs. Vidal SC submitted that it is unarguable that the
identification evidence was insufficient; and that the learned trial judge did not
err in finding the Chief Magistrate’s conclusion on this point to be sound.
[89] As to the related submission that the learned trial judge merely adopted the
Chief Magistrate’s conclusions without independently analysing the sufficiency
of the evidence or the question of dual criminality, Mrs. Vidal SC submitted that
this mischaracterises the function of the Court below, which was not sitting in an
appellate capacity over the Chief Magistrate’s order. Having recited the
26 [1984] Lexis Citation 1578.
27 [1984] Lexis Citation 983.
28 [1986] 2 All ER 630.
29 BB 1992 CA 8.
26
evidence, the learned trial judge’s decision, Mrs. Vidal SC submitted, reflects
independent agreement rather than an abdication of the judicial function.
[90] In reference to the committal warrant, Mrs. Vidal SC submitted that Mr. Neal’s
submission related only to the delay in providing [OMISSIS] with a copy of the
warrant and not to its validity. Mrs. Vidal SC argued that the Clerk of Court
sufficiently justified the delay as she informed Mr. Neal that she had been on
vacation leave and provided the warrant of committal on the day that she
returned to office. Further, Mrs. Vidal SC maintained that the warrant was in
proper form, and that [OMISSIS] had failed to establish any non-compliance with
the statutory safeguards governing extradition proceedings.
[91] Mrs. Vidal SC submitted that the factual circumstances of the present case were
distinguishable from those in Gary Seawell and Deon Bruce v Attorney
General and Superintendent of Prisons30 and urged this Court to disregard
Mr. Neal’s reliance on what Mrs. Vidal SC characterised as inapplicable
authorities.
Safety of the Decision
[92] Mrs. Vidal SC submitted that there was no cumulative error capable of rendering
the learned trial judge’s decision unsafe and invited this Court to dismiss the
appeal.
COURT’S ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
[93] At the outset, I state that I have deliberately considered all the submissions that
were advanced before this Court. I turn now to address the issues which have
been raised. I will treat with Issues 1 and 2 together since they are inextricably
linked.
30 Civil Appeal No 31 of 2018.
27
ISSUES 1 and 2: Procedural Fairness
Whether the absence of the transcript of the habeas corpus application hearing
compromises the procedural fairness of the appellate process
[94] It is common ground that no transcript of the lower court’s proceedings is
available. However, this Court’s inquiry at this stage is not focused on the
absence of a transcript, without more, but whether its impact serves to vitiate
the proceedings. It is essential to determine whether the absence of the
transcript has deprived this Court of its ability to discharge its appellate function
of review or has otherwise occasioned a miscarriage of justice which would
compromise the fairness of the appellate process.
[95] Although decided in a criminal context, in Lionel Daley v The Queen,31 this
Court, relying upon the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
in Roberts and Roberts v The State;32 and the English Court of Appeal in R v
Le Caer,33 reaffirmed that the mere absence of a transcript does not, without
more, render a conviction or decision unsafe. The significance of the missing
record depends upon whether the appellant can point to something to suggest
that there was an irregularity at the trial or a misdirection. I find these authorities
persuasive to the civil appeal at bar and helpfully apply them.
[96] [OMISSIS] must therefore do more than point to the absence of the transcript.
He must identify the respect in which the omission prevents meaningful
appellate review or gives rise to a real possibility that the proceedings below
were affected by error. Thus, I will move directly to determine whether the
absence of the transcript results in any unresolvable gaps.
[97] [OMISSIS] was obliged to point to particulars, not merely invoke the absence of
the record in general terms. Mr. Neal’s submission does not, in its present form,
identify any specific submission, exchange, or ruling made by the learned trial
31 BZ 2018 CA 23.
32 [2003] UKPC 1
33 1972) 56 Cr App R 727.
28
judge which is unknown and material to a live issue on this appeal.
[98] Moreover, it is taken as common ground, based on an assessment of the record
of appeal and Mr. Neal’s omission to respond to Mrs. Vidal SC’s assertion, that
no oral evidence was called before the learned trial judge. I accept that no oral
evidence was called before the learned trial judge. All the evidence and
documents before the learned trial judge is contained in the record of appeal
before this Court. Therefore, this Court is not deprived of material necessary to
test the correctness of the decision of the learned trial judge under appeal.
Consequently, there was no prejudice. The issue of lack of transcript, as raised
by Mr. Neal, does not render the procedure unfair or the decision of the trial
judge unsafe.
[99] I will now continue to interrogate [OMISSIS]’s complaint of the procedural
fairness of the habeas corpus application in the context of the learned trial
judge’s reasoning.
Whether the learned trial judge erred in failing to give adequate reasons for his
decision, such that proper appellate review of the basis for his findings was
rendered impossible.
[100] The duty of a judicial officer to give reasons has long been recognised as an
indispensable incident of the administration of justice. It serves not merely to
explain the outcome reached but to demonstrate that the decision has been
arrived at by the proper application of legal principle to the facts. In Flannery v
Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd,34 the English Court of Appeal recognised that a
trial judge’s failure to give adequate reasons may constitute a ground of appeal.
However, delivering the judgment of the Court, Henry LJ observed that, “It is not
a useful task to attempt to make absolute rules as to the requirement for the
judge to give reasons…because issues are so infinitely various.” 35 Therefore,
the sufficiency of reasons will depend upon the circumstances of the particular
case. The Court further explained that the content of the duty varies according
34 [2000] 1 WLR 377.
35 ibid at 381.
29
to the nature of the dispute before the court. The appellate court will only
intervene where:
“[T]he reasons given by the trial judge are not satisfactory, or because
it unmistakably so appears from the evidence, may be satisfied that he
has not taken proper advantage of having seen and heard the
witnesses, and the matter will then become at large for the appellate
court.”36
[101] These principles were reaffirmed shortly thereafter by the English Court of
Appeal in English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd.37 Giving the judgment of
the Court, Lord Phillips MR observed that the requirement to give reasons
serves a number of important functions within the common law, but its essential
purpose is simple: “justice will not be done if it is not apparent to the parties why
one has won and the other has lost.”38 The obligation is therefore directed not
only to facilitating appellate review but also to maintaining public confidence in
the administration of justice.
[102] Equally, the authorities make clear that the duty is not without limits. In Eagil
Trust Co Ltd v Pigott-Brown,39 Griffiths LJ explained that a judge is under no
obligation to address every submission advanced by counsel. It is sufficient if
the reasons disclose the principles upon which the judge acted and the basis
upon which the decision was reached. The judgment need not be elaborate; it
must simply be sufficient to enable the parties and an appellate court to
understand the route by which the decision was reached. For emphasis, I find it
necessary to extract a critical portion of the observations of Griffiths LJ:
“[T]here is no duty on a judge, in giving his reasons, to deal with every
argument presented by counsel in support of his case. It is sufficient
if what he says shows the parties and, if need be, the Court of
Appeal the basis on which he has acted and if it be that the judge
has not dealt with some particular argument but it can be seen that
there are grounds on which he would have been entitled to reject
it, this court should assume that he acted on those grounds unless
the appellant can point to convincing reasons leading to a contrary
36 ibid at 382.
37 [2002] 1 WLR 2409.
38 ibid at 2417.
39 [1985] 3 All ER 119.
30
conclusion.”40 (Emphasis mine)
[103] This Court adopted those principles in Astry Galvez v Ramon Galvez,41 where,
after reviewing the English authorities, it reiterated that the adequacy of judicial
reasons depends upon the circumstances of the individual case. Drawing upon
the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Sun Alliance
Insurance Ltd v Massoud,42 the Court accepted that reasons will ordinarily be
inadequate where the appellate court is unable to ascertain the reasoning upon
which the decision is based or where the reasons are such that justice is not
seen to have been done.
[104] Culled together these authorities establish a coherent body of principles which
guide the appellate inquiry into the adequacy of judicial reasons. A trial judge is
not required to address every argument advanced by counsel nor to produce an
exhaustive judgment detailing every legal minutia. All that is necessary is that
the reasons be sufficient to disclose the process by which the court reached its
conclusion, thereby enabling the parties to understand the decision and
permitting, if so called upon, an appellate court to determine whether the
applicable principles of law have been correctly applied. Whether that standard
has been met depends upon the issues which the judge was required to
determine in the particular case.
[105] As with all categories of matters which the courts consider, extradition matters
are ‘infinitely various’, to adopt the parlance of Henry LJ in Flannery. This Court
observes that in the circumstances, the learned trial judge quite properly
identified the governing statutory and treaty framework, detailed the evidence
before the Chief Magistrate on each contested point, and stated his conclusion
and basis for each of the grounds advanced on behalf of [OMISSIS]. I am of the
considered view that the reasons given by the learned trial judge were adequate
in the circumstances of this case.
40 ibid at 122.
41 Civil Appeal No 29 of 2016.
42 (1989) VR 8.
31
[106] The learned trial judge was not required to address every argument which Mr.
Neal advanced nor produce an exhaustive judgment dedicated to every legal
minutia. Being cognisant of the underlying purposes of the trial judge’s duty to
give reasons, and applying the standard in Flannery and Emery Reimbold, I
am satisfied that the parties were not in doubt as to who the successful and
unsuccessful party was. A perusal of the decision of the learned trial judge
makes it manifest that [OMISSIS] was the unsuccessful party and adequately
delineated in unornamented fashion the reasons for coming to that view. I am
of the view that the reasons prove sufficient in elucidating the learned trial
judge’s process of arriving at his conclusion. Accordingly, [OMISSIS] does not
succeed on Issues 1 and 2.
[107] I will treat with Issues 3, 4 and 5 together.
ISSUES 3, 4 AND 5: Propriety of the Trial Judge’s Assessment of the
Legality of Detention
[108] In order to answer the next three issues raised, an appropriate starting point is
closer review of the applicable legislative framework governing habeas corpus
applications generally and in relation to extradition proceedings.
Whether the learned trial judge erred in law in applying the wrong test in habeas
corpus proceedings
[109] Section 5(2)(d) of the Constitution confers the express right to seek habeas
corpus ‘where the fundamental right to liberty has been infringed by detention’.
The interpretation of this provision has been affirmed by the Privy Council in
Fuller v AG (Privy Council).43 A person who has been committed to custody by
a magistrate to await the outcome of a request for their return to another state
has a right to apply for a writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of testing the
validity of their committal.
43 Fuller v AG at [50].
32
[110] Section 37 of the Senior Courts Act provides that:
“37. The common law right to the writ of habeas corpus, as confirmed
and regulated by the Habeas Corpus Act 1679, c. 2, and extended by
the Habeas Corpus Act 1816, c. 100, shall be part of the law and
procedure of Belize and, subject to any rules of court, shall be granted
and issued as nearly as possible in accordance with the practice and
procedure for the time being in force in regard to that writ in the High
Court of Justice in England.”
[111] This section expressly incorporates the English Habeas Corpus Act 1679 and
Habeas Corpus Act 1816 into part of Belizean law and procedure, meaning
writs are issued in line with the High Court of Justice in England.
[112] Halsbury’s Laws of England44 states the writ of habeas corpus for release is:
“[A] prerogative process for securing the liberty of the subject by
affording an effective means of immediate release from unlawful or
unjustifiable detention whether in prison or in private custody…
It is a prerogative writ by which the Sovereign has a right to inquire into
the causes for which any of the Sovereign’s subjects are deprived of
their liberty. By it the High Court and the judges of that court, at the
instance of a subject aggrieved, command the production of that
subject. If there is no legal justification for the detention, the party is
ordered to be released.”
[113] As was recently reaffirmed by the United Kingdom Supreme Court in The Father
v Worcestershire County Council,45 the function of habeas corpus is confined
to determining the legal authority for detention. The United Kingdom Supreme
Court,46 in approving the strictures of enquiry as it relates to the writ of habeas
corpus, relied on the dictum of Lord Donaldson MR in R v Secretary of State
for the Home Department, ex p Cheblak47 which noted:
“A writ of habeas corpus will issue where someone is detained without
any authority or the purported authority is beyond the powers of the
person authorising the detention and so is unlawful…”
44 Halsbury’s Laws of England (2025) vol 88, para 666.
45 [2025] UKSC 1 at [67].
46 Ibid (Lord Sales and Lord Stephens (with whom Lord Reed, Lord Leggatt and Lady Simler agreed)
47 [1991] 1 WLR 890.
33
[114] The ability to obtain relief by way of habeas corpus is as of right in
contradistinction to being discretionary as in an application for judicial review;
as stated in B v Barking, Havering and Brentwood Community Healthcare
NHS Trust48 and by Lord Schieman in Ian Abdul Raheem Sheikh v Secretary
of State for the Home Department.49
[115] The burden rests on the detainer to justify the legality of the detention. In R (on
the application of M) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,50 the
Court held that “[O]nce the Applicant shows that he is detained by the
Respondent, it is for the Respondent to show that the detention is lawful.”
[116] It is settled law that, on an application for habeas corpus arising out of extradition
proceedings, the function of the High Court is to review the case as it was
presented before the magistrate. This brings into sharp focus the complaints
made against the judge in relation to his refusal to grant [OMISSIS] habeas
corpus.
[117] Consistent with the limited function of this court of review, I turn closely to
analyse whether the learned trial judge erred in law in applying the wrong test
in habeas corpus proceedings. It is well settled that the role of the trial judge in
an application for habeas corpus is limited to an examination of whether the
detention is authorised by law, having regard to the statutory scheme governing
extradition and the applicable treaty obligations.51
[118] In accordance with section 37 of the Senior Courts Act, [OMISSIS] invoked
his right to apply for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that he was being
unlawfully detained at the Prison as the Chief Magistrate did not properly
discharge her duties as authorised by the Extradition Act, 2020. The burden
rested on the State, as the detainer to justify the legality of [OMISSIS]’s
48 [1999] 1 FLR 106 at 116.
49 [2001] INLR 98 at [8] to [12].
50 [2012] EWCA Civ 1349 at [22].
51 R (on the application of M) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 1349 at
[24] and [25].
34
detention.
[119] The learned trial judge was then required to review the case before the Chief
Magistrate and determine whether [OMISSIS]’s detention was lawful. As
outlined in The Father v Worcestershire, the learned trial judge must consider
whether the Chief Magistrate made the order for the detention of [OMISSIS]
without the authority to do so or acted beyond the scope her powers.
[120] First, the learned trial judge outlined the scope and functions of the Chief
Magistrate and referred to section 3 of the Extradition Act, 2020 which
granted her authority to hear extradition proceedings. I find it necessary to note
that in recalling the scope of the function and authority of the Chief Magistrate,
the learned trial judge referenced the Belize Extradition Act of 2000 (Cap 112)
when the applicable legislation was the Extradition Act, 2020. However, upon
a closer examination, I am of the considered view that this is an immaterial error
as the relevant sections are materially the same. Accordingly, the learned trial
judge’s citation of the earlier edition did not affect the correctness of his
conclusion.
[121] In outlining the scope and function of the Chief Magistrate at the outset of his
judgment, the learned trial judge properly equipped himself with the necessary
framework against which to assess whether the Chief Magistrate had acted
without authority, or beyond the scope of her powers, in ordering [OMISSIS]’s
detention.
[122] Having so equipped himself, the learned trial judge then turned to articulate the
test which, in his view, governed his function on the application for habeas
corpus. At paragraph [15] of his judgment, the learned trial judge stated:
“The role of the court in extradition matters is very limited. It is limited to
determining whether on the evidence before the court, the person
sought can be extradited. This position was recognised by the Belize
Court of Appeal in Rhett Fuller v the Attorney General of Belize and
by the Supreme Court in Mark Se[a]well v the Attorney General. The
court must consider whether on the material a reasonable magistrate
could have made an order of committal. The court cannot, however,
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retry the case to substitute its discretion for that of the magistrate.”
(Emphasis mine)
[123] Habeas corpus is unlike the prerogative orders available on judicial review as
its grant is not discretionary. In habeas corpus, the right to redress has nothing
to do with the exercise of discretion. Authority for this proposition is found in B
v Barking Havering and Brentwood Community Healthcare NHS Trust at
116 and Ian Abdul Raheem Sheikh v Secretary of State at [8] to [12] which
show habeas corpus is as of right, not discretion.
[124] Quite properly, as conceded by Mrs. Vidal SC, I accept that the judge misspoke
in the sentence when he referred to ‘discretion’, which is properly applicable to
an application for judicial review, and distinguishable from the nature of relief on
habeas corpus. That said, for the reasons which follow, I do not consider this
misstatement to be material.
[125] It was clear from the entirety of the judgment that the trial judge was aware that
his role was to determine whether the Chief Magistrate complied with the
statutory and treaty requirements and properly considered the sufficiency of the
legal and evidentiary basis for committal. In consequence, the trial judge
properly recognised that he was not required to retry the extradition
proceedings, but to satisfy himself that [OMISSIS]’s detention was lawful.
Ultimately, the trial judge examined the committal proceedings and warrant of
committal and so concluded.
[126] Extradition requires interrogation as to whether the law, statutory and evidence
have been complied with as illustrated in the House of Lords’ decision in Re
Guisto.52 It is a statutory process in which the court is required to determine
whether in view of the evidence, the conditions prescribed by the governing
legislation and treaty obligations have been satisfied. The legality of the
committal therefore depends upon compliance with those statutory and treaty
requirements. However, an isolated infelicity of language by the learned trial
52
[2003] UKHL 19 at [27] to [33] and [64].
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judge, unaccompanied by any corresponding error in the analytical exercise the
judge in fact undertook, does not, without more, vitiate the judgment.
[127] Given the circumstances that were before him, I am persuaded that the learned
trial judge was seised of his proper role and properly concluded that the Chief
Magistrate’s order for committal was lawful. There is no basis upon which this
Court can impugn this judge’s decision.
If so, whether the learned trial judge further erred in finding that his conclusions
were supported by the evidence before him
[128] Second, and more significantly, the substantive analysis of the learned trial
judge clearly demonstrates that he considered underlying evidentiary record
himself and independently concluded that the evidence was sufficient. Where,
as here, the body of the judgment demonstrates that the judge went beyond the
Chief Magistrate’s reasoning and made his own independent findings on each
of the statutory safeguards said to be in issue, this Court is satisfied that the
learned trial judge discharged the function properly required of him on an
application for habeas corpus.
[129] I am satisfied that the learned trial judge applied the correct test and his
conclusions were supported by the evidence before him.
Whether, independently of the foregoing, the statutory safeguards under the
Extradition Act were complied with
[130] The trial judge is required to determine whether the statutory preconditions and
procedural requirements to committal and continued detention were satisfied.
This includes considering whether the evidence before the Chief Magistrate was
sufficient to justify committal for trial had the alleged offence been committed in
Belize, and whether the procedures prescribed by the Extradition Act, 2020
and the Extradition Treaty were observed.
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[131] It follows from this principle that the exercise undertaken by the learned trial
judge could not properly be confined to asking whether the Chief Magistrate had
before her some evidence capable of sustaining committal, or whether she had
acted within the four corners of her jurisdiction. Habeas corpus being a
supervisory jurisdiction directed at the legality of detention itself, the learned trial
judge was required to go further: to satisfy himself, independently, that each of
the statutory and treaty safeguards attending [OMISSIS]’s detention had in fact
been observed, rather than to ask only whether the Chief Magistrate’s
conclusion was one reasonably open to her on the material before her.
[132] It is against that standard that this Court now turns to consider whether the
statutory safeguards under the Extradition Act, 2020 were, in substance,
complied with.
[133] Three safeguards fall for consideration under this head, in these circumstances.
First, whether the evidence before the Chief Magistrate was sufficient, according
to the law of Belize, to justify [OMISSIS]’s committal, as required by section 10
of the Extradition Act, 1870 and Article 10 of the Extradition Treaty. Second,
whether [OMISSIS] was informed, as section 11 of the Extradition Act, 1870
requires, of his right to apply for habeas corpus and of the fifteen-day period
before which he could not be surrendered. Finally, whether the warrant of
committal was produced and made available to him without such delay as to
impair his ability to invoke that right. I will now address each in turn.
(i) Sufficiency of the Evidence for Committal
[134] The first safeguard requires that, in accordance with section 10 of the
Extradition Act, 1870, the evidence before the Chief Magistrate was sufficient
to commit [OMISSIS] for trial in Belize, in accordance with section 34(7)(a) of
the Indictable Procedure Act and Article 10 of the Extradition Treaty. I am
satisfied that Chief Magistrate’s decision discloses that she precisely undertook
this exercise. The evidence before the Chief Magistrate met the threshold
prescribed by section 10 of the Extradition Act, 1870 and Article 10 of the
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Extradition Treaty.
[135] The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court in the Court of Appeal in Cecil
Boatswain v The Superintendent of Prisons and Attorney General,53
supports this approach. Adopting the observations of Saunders JA (as he then
was), applying Noel Heath v The Government of the United States of
America, the Court confirmed that an extradition hearing is not a trial, but a
hearing directed only to whether there is sufficient evidence of an extradition
crime to warrant surrender, and that the magistrate is not required to weigh the
evidence or assess witness credibility as would a trial court. It follows that the
sufficiency of the identification evidence falls to be measured against this lesser,
prima facie threshold, and not against the standard which would attend proof of
the underlying offence at trial.
[136] For completeness, I must add, that Mr. Neal’s eighth ground of appeal; namely,
that the Chief Magistrate’s written decision did not itself specify the domestic
offences for which sufficient evidence existed does not affect this Court’s
findings on this issue or the appeal. The equivalent domestic offences of
manslaughter and grievous harm were expressly identified in the Warrant of
Committal issued contemporaneously with the Chief Magistrate’s decision on 25
April 2024. [OMISSIS] accordingly received adequate notice of the offences
underlying his committal, and no authority has been placed before this Court for
the proposition that the offences must additionally be recited in the body of the
written decision, as distinct from the warrant itself, in order for the committal to
be lawful.
[137] Based on the affidavit evidence which the Chief Magistrate considered, had [OMISSIS]’s alleged conduct occurred in Belize, the evidence would have justified
his committal for trial on the domestic offences of manslaughter and grievous
harm, in accordance with section 34(7)(a) of the Indictable Procedure Act.
(ii) Notification under Section 11 of the Extradition Act, 1870
53 Civil Appeal No. 6 of 2006 at [4].
39
[138] Mr. Neal’s fifth ground of appeal contends that the learned trial judge erred in
finding that the Chief Magistrate complied with section 11 of the Extradition
Act, 1870 in the absence of any documentary record that [OMISSIS] was
informed of his right to apply for habeas corpus. Section 11 of the Extradition
Act, 1870, does not, on its face, prescribe the form which notification must take;
it requires only that the person be informed.
[139] Paragraph [23] of the decision of the learned trial judge states that the record of
proceedings before the Chief Magistrate on 25 April 2024 show that [OMISSIS]
was in fact informed, orally, that he would not be surrendered for fifteen (15)
days and that he had the right to apply for the writ within that period. Mr. Neal
has neither rebutted this position nor provided any evidence to further support
this assertion.
[140] Therefore, I am of the view that, in addition to being unsubstantiated on the
merits, there is no prejudice flowing from the absence of written notice as [OMISSIS] was duly notified in accordance with section 11 of the Extradition Act,
1870.
(iii) Delay in Producing the Warrant of Committal
[141] The third safeguard concerns whether the warrant of committal was made
available to [OMISSIS] without such delay as to impair his ability to invoke his
right to apply for habeas corpus.
[142] The learned trial judge addressed this delay at paragraph [24] of his judgment.
He examined the correspondence directly, noted that the Clerk of Court had
apologised for the delay and explained it by reference to a period of leave, and
found that the warrant was produced within a short period of the renewed
request. On that basis, he concluded that the administrative delay, without more,
did not render the extradition proceedings irregular to the extent of defeating the
extradition request.
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[143] I am satisfied that this finding was properly open to the learned trial judge on the
material before him. The delay in question, which was administrative in nature,
was explained, and did not extend to any suggestion that the warrant, once
produced, was other than regular and in proper form. The authorities of Seawell
and Bruce do not assist [OMISSIS] on the facts of this case as those authorities
are concerned with the absence or invalidity of a warrant, not with administrative
delay in transmitting a warrant that was issued in proper form on the very date
of committal.
[144] For these reasons, I find that each of the three statutory and treaty safeguards
under the Extradition Act, 2020 was, in substance, observed, and that the
learned trial judge, in reaching that conclusion, discharged the independent
supervisory function required of him on an application for habeas corpus. The
fifth issue raised by Mr. Neal is resolved against [OMISSIS].
ISSUE 6: Whether the learned trial judge was wrong in refusing to grant
habeas corpus
[145] This is a very short point. I reiterate that whether or not the trial judge grants a
habeas corpus does not engage any exercise of the judge’s discretion.
[146] Having addressed Issues 1 through 5 individually and found no appealable error
established under any of them, I turn finally to Mr. Neal’s submission that, even
if no single ground succeeds on its own, the cumulative effect of the matters
raised renders the learned trial judge’s decision unsafe. Before addressing that
submission, it is apposite to reaffirm the standard by which this Court reviews a
trial judge’s findings on an application of this kind.
[147] Section 201(6) of the Senior Courts Act confers jurisdiction on this Court to
hear an appeal from the decision of the High Court granting or refusing an
application for a writ of habeas corpus. Section 201(6) of the Senior Courts
Act provides that:
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“(6) Notwithstanding sub-section (4)(a), an appeal shall lie to the
Court from the decision of the High Court, with the leave of that
court or of the Court of Appeal, against any decision of the High
Court granting or refusing a writ of habeas corpus.”
[148] The existence of that jurisdiction does not, however, convert the appeal into a
rehearing of the extradition proceedings. Rather, this Court is concerned with
reviewing the High Court’s decision by determining whether the learned trial
judge erred in concluding that [OMISSIS]’s detention was lawful or unlawful.
[149] In the appeal at bar, in reviewing the learned trial judge’s decision not to grant
habeas corpus, this Court is concerned with whether he erred in so doing. The
learned trial judge was required was required to consider the evidence that was
before the Chief Magistrate and determine whether she had acted in accordance
with the governing statutory and treaty requirements and, consequently,
whether [OMISSIS]’s detention was authorised by law. Having undertaken that
inquiry, the learned trial judge concluded that the committal and detention were
lawful. It therefore falls to this Court to consider whether any error has been
demonstrated in that conclusion.
[150] On the Record before this Court, there is no discernible error made by the
learned trial judge in the determination of the writ of habeas corpus. I am not
persuaded that the learned trial judge erred in concluding that [OMISSIS]’s
detention was lawful. Consequently, there is no basis upon which this Court can
properly impugn his decision.
Conclusion
[151] Given the totality of the circumstances, it was clearly open to the learned trial
judge to conclude that the committal order was properly given and that the
detention was lawful. As no error has been established under any of the
preceding grounds, I am therefore satisfied that the learned trial judge
committed no error warranting appellate intervention and that [OMISSIS]’s
detention pending extradition remains authorised by law.
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ORDER
[152] For the foregoing reasons, I hereby dismiss [OMISSIS]’s appeal and affirm the
order of the learned trial judge in refusing [OMISSIS]’s application for habeas
corpus.
[153] I gratefully acknowledge the helpful assistance of all learned counsel.
Louise Esther Blenman
Chief Justice
[154] I concur.
Minnet Hafiz Bertram
President
[155] I concur.
E. Andrew Marshalleck, SC
Justice of Appeal (Ag.)
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