United Arab Emirates

The High Court of Kerala considered the procedure to be followed in India when an international arrest warrant issued by a treaty State is transmitted through Interpol before any formal extradition request has been received through diplomatic channels. Although the underlying proceedings had become infructuous, the Court clarified that a formal extradition request is not required merely to initiate provisional arrest proceedings. It held that, upon receiving such a warrant through Interpol, the Indian Nodal Agency must forward the information both to the Central Government for possible action under Section 34-B of the Extradition Act 1962 and to the competent Magistrate for possible action under Section 9; these two mechanisms may operate in parallel. The Court emphasised, however, that the Nodal Agency cannot itself arrest the fugitive solely on the basis of the international arrest warrant without judicial intervention.

The Delhi High Court held that Article 17 of the India–UAE Extradition Treaty allows the prosecution of an extradited person not only for the offences for which extradition was granted, but also for “offences connected therewith” arising from the same factual background. The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that his prosecution for additional offences violated the principle of speciality and Section 21 of the Indian Extradition Act, finding that the requested State’s consent to prosecute connected offences is effectively incorporated into the treaty itself.

Flight risk which justifies the application of a measure restricting personal liberty, may be understood as the risk that the requested person may leave the territory of the requested State, thereby jeopardizing compliance with the international obligation to secure their surrender to the requesting State. However, the existence of such a risk must be duly reasoned and grounded on concrete, specific, and indicative elements demonstrating a genuine propensity and a real possibility of clandestine departure by the requested person. Such elements must have a close connection to the factual circumstances and must not be based on presumptions, preconceived general assessments, or merely possible and hypothetical scenarios according to abstract human contingencies.

The issuance of bounced cheques does not, in itself, constitute fraud under Italian law, as it is no longer a criminal offence, unless it forms part of a broader scheme aimed—through deceit or misrepresentation—at obtaining an undue financial advantage. Accordingly, for violation of the principle of double criminality, the order of the Court of Appeal must be quashed with remittal where it validates an arrest for extradition purposes and orders pre-trial detention in relation to a request for provisional arrest concerning the purchase of goods paid for with uncovered cheques, if such conduct is classified as fraud without establishing the existence of deceitful acts or misrepresentations.