Extradition detention maintained: no special circumstances justifying bail pending surrender
FULL TEXT (original language, anonymized)
2026 WL 1455318
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United States District Court, C.D. California.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
[OMISSIS], Defendant.
Case No. 2:26-cv-02074-SB-MAA
Filed 04/29/2026
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REVOKE DETENTION ORDER [DKT. NO. 38]
Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., United States District Judge
*1 Defendant [OMISSIS] is subject to extradition proceedings under the U.S. extradition treaty with Germany. On January 20, 2026, U.S. Magistrate Judge Maria A. Audero granted the government’s request for detention pending extradition. Dkt. No. 37. Defendant moves to revoke the detention order, arguing that special circumstances justify his release and that he is not a flight risk. In its de novo review, this Court has considered the evidence and arguments presented in connection with both the motion to detain and the motion to revoke. See United States v. Koenig, 912 F.2d 1190, 1191 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring de novo review). The motion to revoke is denied.
I.
Defendant is a 51-year-old man with no criminal history. He has lived in this district for decades, most recently with his partner, Jennifer Rosenblatt, and their seven-year-old daughter for whom he serves as primary caregiver. Defendant also cares for his 85-year-old mother, who primarily speaks Arabic, by taking her to medical appointments and providing other support. Defendant suffers from high cholesterol and has a heightened risk of cardiovascular disease and heart attack.
Defendant is under criminal investigation for his alleged involvement in a global fraud scheme that used shell companies to collect payments for fictitious pornographic websites resulting in more than €195 million in financial harm. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 6. A German court issued a warrant for his arrest on May 13, 2025. Id. ¶ 3. The German government made a formal request for extradition on October 14, 2025. See Dkt. No. 33-1. He was arrested in this district on November 4, 2025 and detained at the Los Angeles Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC).
At Defendant’s initial appearance, the government requested detention pending extradition. Dkt. No. 14. Judge Audero ordered Defendant to be temporarily detained and set a hearing for December 12, 2025. [1. The hearing date was continued to December 12 after multiple continuance requests by the parties. Dkt. Nos. 15–17.] Following the hearing, Judge Audero continued the proceedings and ordered a medical examination for Defendant’s cholesterol and white blood count. See Dkt. No. 30 (abstract of proceeding). She also ordered Defendant to file declarations addressing (1) his wife’s capacity to care for their daughter (Dkt. No. 25), and (2) his medical treatment, diet, and ability to exercise at MDC (Dkt. No. 31). The government also provided information regarding MDC’s ability to provide him with his prescribed medications and an appropriate diet. Dkt. No. 35.
On January 20, 2026, after reviewing the parties’ supplemental submissions, Judge Audero granted the government’s detention request. Dkt. No. 37. Defendant then moved to revoke the detention order. Dkt. No. 38. The government subsequently commenced extradition proceedings. Dkt. No. 44.
II.
“There is a presumption against bail in an extradition case and only ‘special circumstances’ will justify bail.” Salerno v. United States, 878 F.2d 317, 317 (9th Cir. 1989). This presumption is based on “an overriding national interest in complying with treaty obligations” and concerns for “foreign relations and the ability of the United States to obtain extradition of its fugitives.” United States v. Taitz, 130 F.R.D. 442, 444 (S.D. Cal. 1990).
*2 Special circumstances must “be extraordinary and not factors applicable to all defendants facing extradition.” Matter of Extradition of Maniero, 950 F. Supp. 290, 294 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Extradition of Smyth, 976 F.2d 1535, 1535–36 (9th Cir. 1992)). While each case requires an individualized assessment, In re Extradition of Santos, 473 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2006), the Ninth Circuit has identified as examples of special circumstances “a serious deterioration of health while incarcerated” and “unusual delay in the appeal process,” Salerno, 878 F.2d at 317. The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating special circumstances. [2. The parties dispute whether a preponderance-of-the-evidence or clear-and-convincing standard of review applies. See, e.g., In re Extradition of Beresford-Redman, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (collecting cases applying differing standards of proof). The Court need not resolve this dispute because it finds that Defendant fails to meet even the preponderance standard.] See id. “Once special circumstances are shown, the fugitive must also demonstrate that he or she will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community.” Matter of Extradition of Antonowicz, 244 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1068 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (cleaned up).
III.
Defendant identifies three special circumstances in support of his release: his medical condition; delays in his extradition proceedings; and family circumstances.
A.
Defendant asserts that his medical condition has worsened while in custody and is not being properly addressed. Specifically, he raises concerns with his increasing levels of cholesterol-carrying lipoproteins, his access to medication, his diet, and his ability to exercise.
Defendant has a history of elevated low-density lipoprotein (LDL) and lipoprotein(a) (Lp(a)) levels, placing him at increased risk of cardiovascular disease, heart attack, and stroke. In May 2025, his LDL level was at 165 mg/dL, exceeding the recommended level of 100 mg. See Dkt. No. 42-4. His doctor, Dr. Gary Tanouye, prescribed Crestor and Zetia, and his LDL level dropped to 56 mg/dL by October 2025, resulting in a decrease in his Crestor dosage. In July 2025, Defendant’s Lp(a) was over 600 nmol/L, significantly higher than the recommended level of 75 nmol/L. Between July and October 2025, his Lp(a) decreased to 429 nmol/L. Since his detention, however, his Lp(a) has increased to 507 nmol/L. See Dkt. No. 42-10 (January 2026 diagnostic report).
Dr. Tanouye states that “it is critical that [Defendant] do everything he can to control his risk factors for cardiovascular disease, including taking medication to keep his LDL level under control and lower his Lp(a) level, following a heart-healthy diet of lean protein, fresh fruits and vegetables while limiting carbohydrates and exercising regularly.” Dkt. No. 42-4 at 4 (cleaned up). He also notes that Defendant has a low white blood-cell count—2.8 compared to the normal range of 3.8 to 10.8—which makes him more susceptible to infection when “in a crowded group setting” that “exposes him to higher levels of bacteria, viruses, fungi, and parasites.” Id.
While the increase in his Lp(a) levels is concerning, the Court cannot conclude that it constitutes a “serious deterioration of health while incarcerated” warranting relief. Salerno, 878 F.2d at 317. The Court recognizes that a custodial setting is not ideal for managing Defendant’s condition, but the record does not show that MDC doctors cannot address Defendant’s elevated lipid levels, a commonly treated condition. Defendant’s prescribed medications—Crestor and Zetia—were refilled and approved for continued use, and any brief gaps in the past appear avoidable in the future with timely refill requests. Dkt. No. 35 at 3–4. Even assuming Repatha is unavailable, Defendant has not shown that it is medically necessary, that no alternatives are adequate, or that MDC cannot otherwise meet his needs. [3. The government has submitted a report from one of its chief pharmacists that calls into question the medical necessity of Repatha. Dkt. No. 58.] As for diet and exercise, it is no doubt true that Defendant’s options in custody are more limited than those available outside. Even so, MDC provides a heart-healthy diet with substitution options and regular opportunities for physical activity. Dkt. No. 35 at 4; Dkt. No. 35-1 (sample Bureau of Prisons menus). Defendant offers no authority that such limitations, without more, constitute special circumstances or demonstrate a serious deterioration in his condition.
*3 Taken together, the circumstances do not show a serious deterioration in Defendant’s health or an inability of MDC to provide appropriate care that rise to the level of special circumstances. [4. In a footnote, Defendant expresses safety concerns based on a November incident in which his cellmate “became very violent and started screaming and trying to break things.” Dkt. No. 42 at 11 n.6. But he concedes MDC officials responded promptly and removed the individual. Id. Speculation that a similar incident could recur does not constitute a special circumstance.] See Matter of Extradition of Rouvier, 839 F. Supp. 537, 542 & n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (denying request for release based on evidence of a “potentially” serious heart condition that could be treated with daily medication and where tests demonstrated that Defendant’s condition had not deteriorated while in custody); Matter of Extradition of Hamilton-Byrne, 831 F. Supp. 287, 290–91 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (denying release where defendants failed to demonstrate that their “health problems [were] unique or [could not] be dealt with while in custody”).
B.
Defendant also contends that delays in prosecuting him warrant his release. While delay may constitute a special circumstance, “the normal passage of time inherent in the litigation process” is typically insufficient to demonstrate a special circumstance. United States v. Kin-Hong, 83 F.3d 523, 525 (1st Cir. 1996); see Kirby, 106 F.3d at 863 (noting delay prior to extradition hearings and delays “as a result of the actual extradition proceedings themselves and the appeals therefrom” may be a special circumstance). Instead, “[c]ourts generally consider delay a factor where the extradition hearing itself was significantly delayed or the defendant’s liberty interests were greatly affected.” Matter of Extradition of Budrys, No. 19-M-179, 2019 WL 1958566, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 2019) (citing Matter of Extradition of Morales, 906 F. Supp. 1368, 1375 (S.D. Cal. 1995)). The extent to which the defendant is responsible for the delay is also relevant to determining whether it constitutes a special circumstance. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 863; Kin-Hong, 83 F.3d at 525.
Here, Defendant contends that three types of delay constitute a special circumstance.
First, he relies on delays by Germany in issuing an arrest warrant and the United States in initiating the extradition proceedings. Any pre-arrest delay is immaterial, however, because Defendant was not in custody during that period, distinguishing cases in which delay prolongs detention. See, e.g., Morales, 906 F. Supp. at 1375 (defendant already in custody when Mexican government restarted the extradition proceedings by amending its extradition request).
Second, Defendant challenges the delay purportedly caused by the failure to comply with treaty deadlines. This challenge lacks merit. The treaty permits provisional arrest before the requesting state formally requests extradition, provided the request is made within 60 days of the arrest. Dkt. No. 42-13 at 21–22 of 51 (U.S.–Germany Extradition Treaty, Article 16). The requested state may seek additional evidence related to the request and set deadlines for its production. Id. at 20 of 51 (Article 15(1)). Here, Germany formally requested extradition on October 14, 2025 (see Dkt. No. 33-1 (U.S. Department of State letter)), and Defendant was arrested on November 4. The United States then requested additional evidence that Germany timely provided, after a brief extension, on January 16, 2026. On these facts, Defendant has not shown any treaty violation. Even assuming a short delay in producing supplemental materials, courts have held that only unusual or excessive delays—far beyond routine scheduling or minor extensions—may qualify as a special circumstance. See, e.g., Antonowicz, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1070 (finding four-month delay not “unusual or excessive” as required to be a special circumstance). Defendant does not demonstrate any extraordinary delay here.
*4 Third, Defendant’s reliance on the anticipated timing and length of the extradition proceedings is unavailing. The government represented at the hearing that it intends to proceed in August 2026. Defendant’s need to review and translate foreign materials, coordinate with overseas counsel, and navigate access to evidence are ordinary features of those proceedings. See Smyth, 976 F.2d at 1535–36; see also Kin-Hong, 83 F.3d at 525. Extradition proceedings require only a showing of probable cause and are limited in scope. See Santos v. Thomas, 830 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 2016). Defendant does not identify any likely obstacle outside his control that would prolong the proceedings beyond the normal course.
Thus, Defendant has not shown that delays in the prosecution of the extradition proceedings constitute special circumstances warranting release. [5. Defendant cites another district court’s order granting his alleged co-participant’s motion to revoke based in part on “the anticipated length of the extradition proceedings.” Dkt. No. 42 at 17. In that case, however, the court considered “extraordinary delay” together with the defendant’s unique circumstances not present here—namely, the recent death of his wife and lack of alternative caregiver for their minor children, including one with special needs. In re Extradition of Guy Mizrachi, Case No. 2:25-mj-06751, Dkt. No. 46 at 9–10.]
C.
Defendant asserts that his family circumstances justify release, citing his role as primary breadwinner, the risk of losing his job and health insurance, the absence of a caregiver for his minor daughter while his wife works, the impact of his detention on his wife and daughter, and the lack of a caregiver for his mother. The record does not support a finding of special circumstances.
As to financial hardship, Defendant conceded at the December 12 detention hearing that his concerns were overstated, and he does not dispute Judge Audero’s finding that the family has substantial assets, including significant cash and real estate equity. See Dkt. No. 37 at 12. In light of those resources, potential loss of employment or insurance does not establish an extraordinary circumstance.
Nor has Defendant shown that his wife is unable to care for herself and their daughter. Indeed, he certified that his detention would not result in inadequate care (Dkt. No. 27-1), and he acknowledged that his wife can manage household responsibilities (Dkt. No. 28 at 28:4–13). The difficulties he identifies reflect the ordinary burdens faced by many working families and do not distinguish his situation. Although the Court does not minimize the emotional strain on his family, such hardship is not a basis for release. And his assertion that his wife suffered a “heart-related medical emergency” is unsupported and appears inconsistent with the record, which reflects an anxiety-related episode. See Dkt. No. 42-7.
Finally, Defendant fails to demonstrate the absence of alternative care for his mother. The record indicates that other family members may assist, and that language barriers can be addressed through translation services.
In sum, the Court does not doubt that the hardship on Defendant and his family is serious and not to be minimized. But Defendant identifies no hardship that is unique or extraordinary. Rather, the circumstances he describes are those commonly attendant to detention, and do not constitute special circumstances warranting release. See Maniero, 950 F. Supp. at 294.
IV.
*5 Because Defendant has not identified special circumstances justifying his release, the Court need not determine whether he is a flight risk or a danger to the community. See Antonowicz, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1068.
The motion is denied.