Authenticated foreign investigative materials and hearsay may establish probable cause for extradition

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🇬🇧 Summary

The court certified extradition to Thailand after finding that a detailed affidavit from a Thai prosecutor, supported by hearsay summaries of witness statements and financial evidence, was sufficient to establish probable cause. The court emphasized that extradition proceedings are not trials, that hearsay is admissible, and that probable cause may rest on authenticated foreign investigative materials. The opinion also held that, once a court certifies extraditability, 18 U.S.C. § 3184 requires detention pending surrender, rejecting the view that courts retain discretion to continue bail after certification

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United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

IN THE MATTER OF THE EXTRADITION OF [OMISSIS]

No. 3:26-MJ-215-BW

|

Filed 06/22/2026

Attorneys and Law Firms

Sherylynn A. Kime-Goodwin, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender, Dallas, TX, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender, Dallas, TX, for [OMISSIS] [OMISSIS].

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BRIAN McKAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

*1 On March 6, 2026, the government presented a complaint seeking the extradition of [OMISSIS] [OMISSIS] based on a request by the Kingdom of Thailand to answer criminal charges there. (Dkt. No. 1.) The government filed its brief in support of extradition on May 5. (Dkt. No. 28 (“Govt. Br.”).) [OMISSIS] filed a brief in opposition of extradition on May 18. (Dkt. No. 30 (“Resp.”).) The government filed a reply on June 1. (Dkt. No. 32 (“Reply”).)

 

The Court conducted a hearing on June 18. (See Dkt. No. 35.) After considering the extradition materials, the parties’ arguments, and relevant authority, the Court stated in open court its findings and conclusions and certified that Ms. [OMISSIS] may be extradited to Thailand pursuant to the Kingdom’s request presented to the United States government. The Court enters this memorandum opinion to memorialize and supplement the findings and conclusions and, after reconsideration, to explain its decision rescinding [OMISSIS]’s release on bail.

 

I. BACKGROUND

The government has submitted several materials in support of its complaint in extradition. Among them is a declaration from Tom Heinemann, an attorney-adviser at the Department of State, who attests to the relevant extradition treaty between the United States and Thailand, the Kingdom’s request for [OMISSIS]’s extradition, and the fact that the charges brought against her are extraditable offenses under the treaty. (Dkt. No. 1 at 15-16.) [n.1: The Court cites the government’s complaint and supporting documents (Dkt. No. 1) by citing the blue page number at the top of each page assigned by the ECF filing system.] The government also submitted the extradition materials sent by Thailand, which include a photograph of [OMISSIS] (id. at 37), a summary of the facts supporting Thailand’s charges against her (id. at 39), an English translation of the relevant laws underlying her prosecution (id. at 42), and copies of the warrants for her arrest (id. at 44-54).

 

In further support of the extradition request, Thailand submitted an affidavit from Intranee Sumawong, a Senior Public Prosecutor in the International Affairs Department, Office of the Attorney General of Thailand. (See id. at 56.) The prosecutor testifies that the Prakanong Provincial Court of Thailand has issued two warrants for [OMISSIS]—one based on her own conduct and the other based on the conduct of an accomplice—both charging her with violating § 8 of the Offences of Officials in State Organizations or Agencies Act, B.E. 2502 (1959). (Id. at 57 ¶ 5.) That law provides criminal penalties for “any person who, being an official in charge of purchasing, making, managing, or keeping any thing, dishonestly exercises his official duty and thereby causes damage to an organization[.]” (Id.; see also id. at 42.)

 

The prosecutor’s affidavit summarizes the facts underlying [OMISSIS]’s prosecution. He attests that the evidence includes “documents and evidence gathered from the police and financial analysis compiled by [[OMISSIS]’s] employer, statements from [her] former colleagues including both subordinates and superiors, and statements by her customers and a co-conspirator.” (Id. at 57-58.) An overview of the factual summary drawn from that affidavit follows.

 

*2 Beginning in 1994, [OMISSIS] was employed by Krungthai Bank Public Company Limited (“KTB”), which was at all relevant times a state-owned enterprise licensed by the Thai Ministry of Finance. As an employee of KTB, [OMISSIS] was a state official. She worked in a department that transferred funds between KTB and banking institutions in Saudi Arabia for use by Thai nationals on pilgrimage there. (Dkt. No. 1 at 58-59 ¶¶ 8-12.) [n.2: By way of background, the prosecutor explained that the Thai Ministry of Culture, which oversees the Department of Religious Affairs, was established to administer the practice of religions other than Buddhism. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 58 ¶ 9.) One of its responsibilities is to prevent the exploitation of Thai Muslims who travel to Saudi Arabia as part of their Hajj pilgrimage obligations. (Id.) It does this by strictly regulating tour operators licensed to take Thai nationals on Hajj and banking institutions (like KTB) that facilitated payments necessary for travel to and in Saudi Arabia. (Id.)] Customers, such as tour operators, submitted funds to KTB plus the bank’s fee, and KTB created drafts authorizing the customer to receive those funds in Saudi Arabia. (Id. at 58-59 ¶¶ 9-10.) [OMISSIS] was a “long-time high-ranking and trusted” employee of KTB. (Id. at 59 ¶ 12.) Under her standard practices, she would follow one of three routines to facilitate the drafts and transfers:

1. she personally collected money from tour operators at their offices, delivered the funds to KTB, and had another staff member issue a bank draft (id. ¶ 12(a));

2. she directed a tour operator to sign a cash withdrawal, which another staff member used to withdraw cash from the operator’s account, and then issued a draft following the usual process (id. ¶ 12(b)); or

3. when [OMISSIS] knew precisely the amount needed for a draft, such as when it was based on standardized fees, she instructed staff to advance a bank draft for the tour operator’s use and later collected the money necessary to cover the amount of that draft (id. ¶ 12(c)).

Investigators later learned of a fourth process employed by [OMISSIS]. On occasion, she instructed tour operators to deposit funds into her personal bank account or an account belonging to a close relative, then she would withdraw the money and pass it on to bank staff to create the draft. (Id. at 59-60 ¶ 13.)

 

In November 2008, a tour operator encountered issues cashing its bank draft and reported the matter to the Department of Religious Affairs, which then notified KTB. (Dkt. No. 1 at 60 ¶ 16.) KTB conducted an internal review and later confronted [OMISSIS]. According to the affidavit, the bank “tried to negotiate with [her] to reimburse the funds, which 1) she acknowledged and 2) she started to reimburse.” (Id.)

 

The prosecutor further states that the investigation showed that KTB records prior to 2008 did not reveal any discrepancies between funds taken in and funds disbursed through drafts. (See id. at 60 ¶ 14 (“As part of the investigation, bank and law enforcement authorities learned that prior to 2008, [OMISSIS] was able to account for all the money owed to KTB for the issuance of the bank drafts[.]”).) But, from about October 2008 to December 2008, there were drafts drawn on KTB that were not reimbursed. (Id.) During this time, according to the affidavit, “[OMISSIS] fraudulently issued or directed to be issued 278 bank drafts for tour operators” without payments having been deposited into KTB “even though the tour operators paid [OMISSIS] what they believed were payments to KTB.” (Id.) The missing payments totaled more than $2.1 million dollars. (Id.) [n.3: The prosecutor’s affidavit states amounts of money in Thai currency, in most instances with an equivalent in U.S. dollars using a standard exchange rate. The Court refers only to the U.S. dollar equivalents. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1 at 60 ¶ 14.)] A review of personal banking records showed that [OMISSIS] deposited approximately $276,000 into her bank accounts around this time, and she deposited approximately $445,000 into accounts belonging to Laddawan Jamroensup (“Laddawan”), her alleged co-conspirator. (Id.) During November 2008, Laddawan transferred about $246,000 into [OMISSIS]’s account. (Id. at 62 ¶ 22.) Laddawan told investigators that she used to be a teacher at a school attended by [OMISSIS]’s son. (Id.) She also stated that she encountered financial difficulties and that [OMISSIS] loaned her about $14,000 to help her open a hair salon. (Id.)

 

*3 Investigators determined that [OMISSIS] authorized the advance issuance of bank drafts without having received the corresponding reimbursements by instructing subordinates to fill out and sign withdrawal forms in advance, saying the process would be “too rushed otherwise.” (Id. at 60 ¶ 15.) When a tour operator would contact [OMISSIS] to obtain a bank draft, she would use the pre-signed forms to withdraw the funds, and then other staff would, at her direction, issue the bank drafts without confirming that the funds were paid to KTB or that [OMISSIS] gave the drafts to the tour operator. (Id.)

 

The second warrant arises out of events on November 14, 2008. The prosecutor’s affidavit states that [OMISSIS] instructed subordinates to process more than $800,000 in transfers to the Thai Haj Delegation by canceling seven previously ordered bank drafts and using KTB’s cash instead. (Dkt. No. 1 at 61 ¶ 18.) She told staff that the Department of Religious Affairs had an urgent need to send the money and that a Department official would arrive later that day to deliver a cashier’s check to cover the transfers. (Id.) Staff processed the transfers based on [OMISSIS]’s statements about the urgency of the situation and the promised repayment. (Id.)

 

At the close of business, however, bank staff noticed that no Department official had come to provide the reimbursement. (Id. at 61 ¶ 19.) After the bank closed, though, Laddawan arrived and presented a personal check payable to KTB and signed by her. (Id. at 61-62 ¶ 19.) [OMISSIS] represented that Laddawan was an official from the Department of Religious Affairs. (Id. at 61 ¶ 19.) Bank staff, however, found it odd that she presented a personal check, not one issued by the Department of Religious affairs. (Id. at 62 ¶ 20.) When KTB attempted to cash the check, it was rejected because the account was closed. (Id.) Laddawan later told investigators that, in November 2008, [OMISSIS] asked to borrow a check from her to present to KTB. (Id. at 62 ¶ 22.) She provided [OMISSIS] a check made out to “cash,” but [OMISSIS] returned the following day and asked her to change it to “KTB” and instructed her on the amount to put on the check. (Id.)

 

When confronted by KTB, [OMISSIS] said she would repay the money. (Id. at 62 ¶ 21.) [OMISSIS] was suspended from her position on December 11, 2008. (Dkt. No. 1 at 61 ¶ 16.) With her brother’s help, she was able to repay the amounts relating to 278 bank drafts, approximately $76,000. (Id. at 60-61 ¶ 16.) With her sister’s help, [OMISSIS] and Laddawan repaid about one-quarter of the $800,000 arising out of the November 14 events. (Id. at 62 ¶ 21.)

 

[OMISSIS] departed Thailand for the United States on January 23, 2009. (Id.) A court issued the two warrants for her arrest on March 11, 2009. (Dkt. No. 1 at 57 ¶ 5.) Authorities arrested Laddawan later that month. (Id. at 62 ¶ 22.) Laddawan was convicted, sentenced to five years and four months imprisonment, and ordered to pay restitution. (Id.)

 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

“Extradition is the ‘surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside of its own territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other’ for prosecution or punishment.” Matter of Extradition of Guardado, No. 3:24-MJ-06-1, 2024 WL 5037017, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2024) (quoting Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902)). Extradition proceedings are sui generis, neither criminal nor civil in nature. In re Extradition of Vargas, 978 F. Supp. 2d 734, 744 (S.D. Tex. 2013). Because extradition is primarily a function of the executive branch, courts have a limited role in the process. In re Extradition of Risner, No. 3:18-MJ-765-BN, 2019 WL 6118377, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2019).

 

*4 The statutory authorization for extradition is found at 18 U.S.C. § 3184. The Fifth Circuit has outlined its procedures this way:

The substantive right of a foreign country to request the return of a fugitive and the duty of the United States to deliver the fugitive depends entirely on the existence of a treaty between the requesting nation and the United States. To invoke its right to extradite a fugitive, the requesting nation must submit its request to a state or federal court. The court determines whether the fugitive is subject to extradition and, if so, must order the fugitive’s commitment and certify the supporting record to the Secretary of State. The decision to surrender the fugitive then rests in the discretion of the Secretary of State.

In re United States, 713 F.2d 105, 107–08 (5th Cir. 1983) (citations and footnotes omitted). As this suggests, the Court’s role in extradition proceedings is primarily limited to determining whether the person is subject to extradition and whether they should be detained pending that decision. The Secretary of State ultimately makes the decision whether the person is extradited.

 

To certify that a person may be extradited, a court must find that the following requirements have been met: (1) the presiding judicial officer has jurisdiction to conduct the extradition proceeding; (2) the court has jurisdiction over the fugitive named in the extradition request; (3) the applicable extradition treaty is in full force and effect; (4) the extradition treaty covers the offense for which extradition is sought; and (5) there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that the fugitive committed the offense for which extradition is requested. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184; Guardado, 2024 WL 5037017, at *2. A determination of the person’s guilt or innocence is not part of the assessment of extraditability, Matter of Extradition of Ismail, No. 4:24-MJ-656-BP, 2025 WL 1043630, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2025) (citing Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 314-15 (1922)), nor is it generally the court’s role to scrutinize the fairness of the requesting country’s legal system, see United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1997).

 

The probable cause standard applied when assessing eligibility for extradition is the “familiar standard the Court applies to domestic criminal proceedings under the Fourth Amendment.” Matter of Extradition of Campbell, No. 3:25-MJ-218-BW, 2025 WL 1725315 (N.D. Tex. June 19, 2025), at *3 (citing In re Extradition of Garcia, 825 F. Supp. 2d 810, 828 (S.D. Tex. 2011); United States v. Ramnath, 533 F. Supp. 2d 662, 679 (E.D. Tex. 2008)); see also In re Extradition of Skaftouros, 643 F. Supp. 2d 535, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Probable cause is considerably less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Extradition of Diaz Medina, 210 F. Supp. 2d 813, 817 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (“Probable cause is … not convincing evidence of actual guilt.”). It has been described as “reasonable grounds to believe the accused committed the charged offense.” Garcia, 825 F. Supp. 2d at 828. “In making this determination, courts apply a totality of the circumstances analysis and make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances, there is a fair probability that the defendant committed the crime.” Id. (quoting In re Rodriguez Ortiz, 444 F. Supp. 2d 876, 884 (N.D. Ill. 2006)); see Skaftouros, 643 F. Supp. 2d at 542 (“[C]ourts apply a ‘totality of the circumstances analysis’ and use a ‘flexible, common-sense standard.’ ” (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-40 (1983))).

 

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Court certifies [OMISSIS]’s eligibility for extradition to Thailand.

*5 The government has established each of the requirements necessary for the Court to certify that [OMISSIS] may be extradited to Thailand. [OMISSIS] concedes that (1) this Court has jurisdiction to conduct the extradition proceedings, (2) the Court has jurisdiction over her, (3) she is the person who is the subject of the extradition request, and (4) there is an extradition treaty in full force and effect between the United States and Thailand. (Resp. at 2.) [n.4: At the hearing, [OMISSIS] also explained that she does not contest that the crimes for which extradition are sought is covered by the treaty. She noted a reference in the extradition packet to a fraud charge for which the limitations period has expired and stated that she would dispute that the treaty allows her to be extradited on that charge. Thailand, however, is not seeking extradition based on that charge.] The only matter in genuine dispute is whether the materials submitted by Thailand establish probable cause to believe [OMISSIS] committed the offenses for which her extradition is sought.

 

The Kingdom of Thailand has charged [OMISSIS] with violations of § 8 of the Offenses of Officials in State Organizations or Agencies Act, B.E. 2502 (1959). (Dkt. No. 1 at 55 ¶ 4.) That statute penalizes “[a]ny person who, being an official in charge of purchasing, making, managing or keeping any thing, dishonestly exercises his official duty and thereby causes damage to an organization, a limited company, a juristic-person partnership or any agency called by any other name[.]” (Id. at 42.)

 

[OMISSIS] first argues that the prosecutor’s affidavit is insufficient alone to establish probable cause. In her view, the affidavit provides only a conclusory summary of the investigation without supplying any of the underlying investigation materials—bank records, witness statements, and the like—to support the conclusions stated in the affidavit. This, she contends, is insufficient because “there is no way to judge the credibility of the witnesses who made statements to the police or to account for the accuracy of the financial analysis that was compiled by [her] employer.” (Resp. at 5.)

 

The Court disagrees that the affidavit is conclusory in its statement of relevant events and observations from the investigation. [n.5: Throughout the affidavit, the prosecutor uses incriminating terminology to discuss certain conduct or events. For example, he characterizes [OMISSIS] as having “embezzle[d],” (Dkt. No. 1 at 58 ¶ 8), describes her conduct as “criminal” (id.), and states that she “fraudulently” issued drafts (id. at 60 ¶ 14). The Court has ignored these characterizations, focusing instead on whether the objective facts stated establish probable cause.] As detailed above, the prosecutor has recounted specific events based on witness and co-conspirator statements, financial analysis conducted by KTB, and investigators’ observations. These factual averments enable the Court to perform its function of assessing probable cause. Cf. United States v. Morton, 46 F.4th 331, 336-38 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (discussing wholly conclusory statements in the context of evaluating search warrant affidavits). And courts have found probable cause based on affidavits by prosecutors recounting facts from the investigation. See, e.g., Emami v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of California, 834 F.2d 1444, 1450–52 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Extradition of Bowman, No. 19MJ5089-JLB, 2020 WL 6689807, at *7–9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2020); In re Extradition of Jarosz, 800 F. Supp. 2d 935, 944–49 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Joseph v. Hoover, 254 F. Supp. 2d 595, 601 (D.V.I. 2003). “Hearsay statements of witnesses summarized in the affidavit of a foreign official are admissible and may be sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.” In re Extradition of Blakeney, No. 10-MJ-635 SMG, 2010 WL 4457778, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2010); see also Vargas, 978 F. Supp. 2d at 747 (“[T]he Supreme Court has found that extradition may be predicated entirely on the ‘unsworn statements of absent witnesses.’ ” (quoting Collins, 259 U.S. at 317)). Here, the facts recounted by the prosecutor come from information provided by [OMISSIS]’s superiors and subordinates, Laddawan, and financial analysts, among others. The facts alleged evince sufficient indicia of reliability to support the Court’s probable-cause determination.

 

*6 The Court next determines whether the prosecutor’s affidavit establishes probable cause. The materials provided show that, at all relevant times, KTM was a state-owned enterprise. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 58.) They also allege that, as an employee of KTM, [OMISSIS] was an official in charge of managing KTM’s funds and that the bank incurred losses from a shortfall resulting from paid drafts that were not funded or reimbursed. [OMISSIS] does not appear to dispute that these allegations satisfy their corresponding elements of the offense charged.

 

[OMISSIS] instead aims her challenge to probable cause at facts suggesting that the loss or misapplication of bank funds resulted from criminal conduct as opposed to mismanagement. (See Resp. at 4-6.) She also asserts that there is insufficient evidence to establish that the loss resulted from her exercise of official duties. (See id. at 6.) The Court disagrees on both points.

 

The affidavit provides details that enable the Court to find probable cause that [OMISSIS] acted dishonestly or criminally. The senior prosecutor testifies in his affidavit that, prior to 2008, KTB’s drafts were fully funded. (Dkt. No. 1 at 60 ¶ 14.) That changed, however, in October 2008. (See id.) From about October to December 2008, [OMISSIS] authorized numerous bank drafts for tour operators without reimbursing the bank although the tour operators submitted funds to [OMISSIS]. (Id.) Bank records show that, in October and November 2008, [OMISSIS] deposited an amount equivalent to approximately $275,000 into her bank accounts and approximately $445,000 into accounts owned by Laddawan. (Id.) In November 2008, Laddawan transferred about $246,000 to [OMISSIS]. (Dkt. No. 1 at 62 ¶ 22.) This temporal alignment between the unfunded drafts and [OMISSIS]’s large deposits into personal accounts enables an inference that [OMISSIS] diverted money intended for KTB’s use. And, in the absence of any explanation why a bank official would deposit such large amounts of money intended for the bank’s use into personal accounts, the deposits strongly suggest that the diversion was done by deliberate dishonesty rather than being the product of inadvertence, mistake, or occupational incompetence. [n.6: [OMISSIS] points to the prosecutor’s statement that [OMISSIS] occasionally collected funds, deposited them into her bank account or accounts belonging to close relatives, and then reimbursed the bank. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 59-60 ¶ 13.) This does not undermine the Court’s finding of probable cause. There is nothing suggesting that the bank was aware of or blessed that process—rather, KTB and investigators learned of it during the investigation. (Id.) This practice still supports an inference of dishonesty, even though these instances did not violate the charged statute because they did not result in damage to KTB.]

 

According to the prosecutor’s affidavit, once the bank discovered [OMISSIS]’s “misconduct,” confronted her, and attempted to negotiate reimbursement of the funds, she “acknowledged” the funds and made efforts to repay them. The Court accepts [OMISSIS]’s assertion that the affidavit stops short of alleging that she admitted guilt or criminal culpability. But acknowledging the missing funds and undertaking an obligation to repay them suggests some acceptance of responsibility for the missing funds, even if it does not involve the acceptance of criminal responsibility. That is, [OMISSIS] did not dispute that a large amount of bank funds was unaccounted for or that she had responsibility for them.

 

*7 The prosecutor further states that, on November 18, 2008, [OMISSIS], using claims of urgency, directed subordinates to process transfers equivalent to more than $800,000 to a Saudi bank by canceling previously ordered drafts and using KTB’s cash instead. (Dkt. No. 1 at 61 ¶ 18.) She secured the cooperation of subordinates by saying that an official from the Department of Religious Affairs would arrive later that day and bring a cashier’s check to reimburse those transfers. (Id.) Instead, Laddawan—whom [OMISSIS] falsely represented was an officer of the Department of Religious Affairs—arrived after hours and presented a personal check. (Dkt. No. 1 at 61-62 ¶ 19.) That check was later declined because the account it was drawn on had been closed. (Dkt. No. 1 at 62 ¶ 20.) After Laddawan’s arrest, Laddawan stated that [OMISSIS] asked to borrow a check to present to KTB, directing her with respect to the identity of the payee and the amount. (Id. ¶ 22.) Laddawan was convicted for her part in the scheme. (Id.)

 

Finally, after having been made aware of the investigation and making an incomplete attempt to repay the funds, [OMISSIS] left Thailand. Her departure to a foreign country under these circumstances with no apparent plans to return enables the Court to find that she fled the country to avoid the possibility of prosecution. Her flight further supports an inference of guilty knowledge. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 119 F.4th 429, 435 (5th Cir. 2024) (“[E]vidence of an accused’s flight is generally admissible as tending to establish his guilt.” (quoting United States v. Williams, 775 F.2d 1295, 1300 (5th Cir. 1985))).

 

These facts, considered in their totality, support an inference that the loss of bank funds resulted from [OMISSIS]’s “dishonest[ ] exercise[ ]” of her official duties. The prosecutor’s affidavit provides facts from which one may infer that [OMISSIS] diverted funds equivalent to hundreds of thousands of dollars to personal accounts belonging to her and Laddawan and that Laddawan then transferred much of that money to [OMISSIS]. [OMISSIS] instructed subordinates at the bank to fund transfers outside of normal procedures by using false representations that an official would present a check to reimburse those transfers. Then she presented Laddawan as that government official. When confronted, [OMISSIS] acknowledged some responsibility or the missing funds and later fled the country.

 

Having determined that the government’s showing satisfies each of the requirements for extradition, the Court CERTIFIES that [OMISSIS] may be extradited to the Kingdom of Thailand to answer charges there.

 

B. Having certified [OMISSIS] for extradition, the Court is not authorized to continue her on conditional release.

After a bail hearing on April 17, the Court found that [OMISSIS] established her releasability by clear and convincing evidence and additionally showed exceptional circumstances warranting release during these extradition proceedings. (See Dkt. No. 25.) The Court authorized [OMISSIS]’s release on conditions that included a home curfew and electronic monitoring. (See Dkt. No. 27.) No allegation has been made that she has violated any of the conditions imposed.

 

After concluding at the June 18 hearing that the government established [OMISSIS]’s eligibility for extradition, the Court revoked her release and ordered that she be taken into custody. In doing so, the Court expressed agreement with the government’s argument that it is not authorized to release a person on bail once the certification of extraditability has been made. (See Reply at 8-12.) The controlling statutory language, under this view, is the portion of § 3184 providing that, once a person is certified as extraditable, the judicial officer “shall issue his warrant for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain until such surrender shall be made.” 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (emphasis added).

 

This language in § 3184 speaks in mandatory terms with respect to post-certification detention. There is no provision for confinement “if” or “unless” certain circumstances are present. Other courts—including some that ultimately reach a different conclusion with respect to the court’s authority—have read the statute as requiring detention once a certification for extradition has been made. See, e.g., Matter of Extradition of Manrique, No. 19MJ71055MAG1TSH, 2021 WL 5037680, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2021) (observing that § 3184 “seems clear enough: the word ‘shall’ is usually mandatory, and ‘there to remain’ sounds like the person has to stay in jail”); Matter of the Extradition of Markey, No. 3:09-MJ-75 CAN, 2010 WL 610975, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 18, 2010) (saying of § 3184 that “[t]he law is clear, and the parties agree, that this Court has no authority to release Markey after it issues the certificate of extraditability”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has read the same text as “inconsistent with … allow[ing bail] after committal.” Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 62 (1902). Even so, this Court received the parties’ arguments on the issue of bail at the hearing and promised to reconsider its conclusion while preparing this written opinion. Having done so, the Court reaches the same conclusion.

 

*8 The Court first addresses two aspects of [OMISSIS]’s arguments for post-certification bail. One relies on 18 U.S.C. § 3188, a statute that enables a person detained while awaiting extradition to apply for discretionary release if the government has not removed them within two months. [n.7: § 3188:

Whenever any person who is committed for rendition to a foreign government to remain until delivered up in pursuance to a requisition, is not so delivered up and conveyed out of the United States within two calendar months after such commitment, over and above the time actually required to convey the prisoner from the jail to which he was committed, by the readiest way, out of the United States, any judge of the United States, or of any State, upon application made to him by or on behalf of the person so committed, and upon proof made to him that reasonable notice of the intention to make such application has been given to the Secretary of State, may order the person so committed to be discharged out of custody, unless sufficient cause is shown to such judge why such discharge ought not to be ordered.] According to [OMISSIS], the possibility of release under § 3188 corroborates that post-certification detention is not mandatory in all circumstances. But allowing for discretionary release when extradition takes too long does not imply that the post-certification detention mandated by § 3184 is discretionary from the outset. See Manrique, 2021 WL 5037680, at *1 (“[F]rom the statute’s plain language, it seems that at least the first two months of custody are mandatory, but there is a safety valve if the government takes too long to actually accomplish the extradition.”).

 

A second argument for post-certification release relies on the sheer volume of caselaw rejecting the government’s position. See, e.g., Risner v. Fowler, 458 F. Supp. 3d 495, 499 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (citing cases and relying on “the weight of authority holding that a district court has authority to release a fugitive after certification”); Matter of Extradition of Blasko, No. 117MC00067DADSAB, 2019 WL 498986 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2019); In re Kapoor, No. 11-M-456 RML, 2012 WL 2374195 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2012); Wroclawski v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (D. Ariz. 2009). Indeed, the jurisprudence on this issue has been accurately described as a “slew of lower court decisions holding that bail is permitted in extradition cases post-certification.” Manrique, 2021 WL 5037680, at *2. The Fifth Circuit has not spoken on this issue, however, and these lower court decisions do not bind this Court, even if they collectively comprise a “slew.” And, to the extent they embrace the majority position merely because it is held by a majority, the Court declines to follow suit. See, e.g., Nezirovic, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 598-99 (relying on “the plain weight of authority” to conclude that a court may release an extraditee after certification); Wroclawski, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 1005 (finding persuasive three appellate decisions discussed infra note 8 and “the myriad district court cases”). [n.8: Some courts justify the availability of post-certification bail by pointing to three appellate court decisions. See, e.g., Manrique, 2021 WL 5037680, at *3 (citing Salerno v. United States, 878 F.2d 317, 317–18 (9th Cir. 1989) (quorum); Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 554 F.2d 1, 1–2 (1st Cir. 1977) (per curiam); and Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d 914, 920 (2d Cir. 1981)); Wroclawski, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 1005 (same). This Court discerns no guidance from these appellate decisions. Two of them are exceedingly brief opinions that affirm a district court’s denial of release post certification. See Salerno, 878 F.2d at 317–18; Beaulieu, 554 F.2d at 1–2. They do not analyze the availability vel non of post-certification release. They appear instead to have assumed the availability of release but affirmed district courts’ decisions to deny bail under the traditional pre-certification standards. The Second Circuit, in Hu Yau-Leung, was primarily focused on whether a person who was a juvenile at the time of the offense could be extradited, addressing releasability in the two concluding paragraphs. See Hu Yau-Leung, 649 F.2d at 916–20. There, a district court granted a writ of habeas corpus after a magistrate certified that a person was subject to extradition. See id. at 915. After concluding that the district court erred by granting the writ, the Second Circuit expressed agreement with the government’s position that release during extradition proceedings “is a more demanding standard than that for ordinary accused criminals awaiting trial” but determined that the district court had correctly applied the proper standards in releasing the subject. Id. at 920. The court’s agreement with the government that “the standard for release … is a more demanding standard” suggests that, like in Salerno and Beaulieu, the Second Circuit considered whether post-certification bail was properly granted assuming those standards applied. It did not—and was not asked to—consider whether bail was altogether unavailable.]

 

*9 After more thoughtfully considering the issue, the Court remains firm in its conclusion that § 3184’s mandate for detention controls in this circumstance. The Court declines to follow the majority position otherwise because it is premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903), which involved a court’s authority to grant release in extradition proceedings prior to certification. There, an American citizen held on a request for extradition to England sought bail based on his physician’s affidavit attesting to diagnoses and conditions that threatened to seriously impair the man’s health if he remained in jail. See id. at 40, 43. A commissioner—a forerunner of the contemporary magistrate judge—denied that request “on the ground that no power existed for admitting petitioner to bail[.]” Id. at 43.

 

The Supreme Court disagreed that the absence of statutory authority to grant bail meant there was none. See id. at 62–63. In reaching that conclusion, it considered an English decision that “held that the Queen’s Bench had, ‘independently of statute, by the common law, jurisdiction to admit to bail,’ ” in a case involving the rendition of fugitives between different parts of the kingdom. Id. at 63 (quoting Queen v. Spilsbury [1898], 2 Q. B. 615)). Based on this reading of English common law, the Supreme Court expressed an “unwilling[ness] to hold that the circuit courts possess no power in respect of admitting to bail other than as specifically vested by statute[.]” Id. That is, the Supreme Court recognized a court has authority to grant release in extradition proceedings notwithstanding the absence of any express statutory authority to do so.

 

Again, Wright was a pre-certification case. Courts that use Wright to find bail authority post certification do so based on a belief that the Supreme Court said its holding applies to both pre- and post-certification contexts. See, e.g., Manrique, 2021 WL 5037680, at *2 (“[T]he government tries to distinguish Wright by arguing that it was a pre-certification case, which it was, but the Supreme Court itself rejected that distinction.”); Garcia v. Benov, No. CV 08-07719 MMM CWX, 2009 WL 6498194, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2009) (concluding that “Wright drew no analytical distinction between pre- and post-certification bail applications”). This Court disagrees that Wright supports such a belief.

 

A closer examination of Wright demonstrates that it did not grant courts license to ignore a statute’s mandate for detention when it applies. Courts that consider Wright equally controlling in the pre- and post-certification context do so based on its reference to a then-existing statute that mirrored § 3184 in prohibiting post-certification bail:

Not only is there no statute providing for admission to bail in cases of foreign extradition, but § 5270 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3591), is inconsistent with its allowance after committal, for it is there provided that, if he finds the evidence sufficient, the commissioner or judge “shall issue his warrant for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain until such surrender shall be made.”

Wright, 190 U.S. at 62. A couple of paragraphs later, the Court, while explaining the importance of honoring treaty obligations, remarked that “the same reasons which induced the language used in [§ 5270] would seem generally applicable to release pending examination.” Id. at 62. Based on this one sentence, courts read Wright as holding that the inherent authority for release is the same before and after certification, regardless the terms of any statute. For example, one court draws this meaning from Wright based on its reference to § 5270:

The Court specifically cited the language that seemed to prohibit post-certification bail and said “the same reasons” that induced that “language used in the statute would seem generally applicable to release pending examination.” The Court did not think those situations were different. It would seem, therefore, that Wright stands for the proposition that both pre- and post-certification, the availability of bail is not limited to what is “specifically vested by statute.”

*10 Manrique, 2021 WL 5037680, at *2 (citations omitted); see also Kapoor, 2012 WL 2374195, at *3 (relying on the reference in Wright as “[m]ost important” to the court’s decision); Benov, 2009 WL 6498194, at *5 n.23 (concluding that Wright “applied the same statutory language”). Contrary to that proposition discerned from Wright, the Supreme Court did not identify an inherent power to grant bail that prevails over a statute stating otherwise.

 

Recognizing a court’s authority to grant bail in the absence of an empowering statute is far different from bestowing authority to grant bail where a statute prohibits it. Wright did the former, not the latter. It held that a court has a common law authority to grant release even though the “same reasons” animating Congress’s decision to eliminate that power in § 5270 are “generally applicable” in the pre-certification context. See Wright, 190 U.S. at 62. That is, the Supreme Court in Wright accepted that policy reasons for disallowing release at the post-certification stage generally apply equally prior to certification. But the Court did not consider these policy reasons in isolation—i.e., in the absence of a statutory prohibition—to preclude a court’s inherent power to grant bail. That is, the Supreme Court expressed its unwillingness to say a court’s authority is limited to what is “specifically vested by statute.” Wright, 190 U.S. at 62. It did not hold that a court continues to possess authority to grant release even when it has been specifically divested by statute.

 

For these reasons, the Court is unable to follow the majority in concluding that, after having certified [OMISSIS] for extradition, it can continue her bail based on the special circumstances previously found. To do so would contravene § 3184.

 

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court CERTIFIES that [OMISSIS] is extraditable to Thailand and DENIES her request for continuation on bail post-certification.

 

No later than June 30, 2026, the government shall submit to the undersigned’s orders inbox—copying [OMISSIS]’s counsel—a proposed extradition certification and order of commitment. Once that is done, the Court will order the Clerk of Court to forward certified copies of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Certification of Extradition, and the Order of Commitment, together with a copy of all the testimony and evidence taken before the Court and all memoranda of law filed on the issue of extradition, to the Secretary of State, Department of State, to the attention of the Office of Legal Adviser.

 

Ms. [OMISSIS] is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal and shall remain confined in a proper facility until surrender is made to a duly qualified agent of the Kingdom of Thailand or until further order of this Court or direction from the Secretary of State.

 

SO ORDERED on June 22, 2026.

 

All Citations

Slip Copy, 2026 WL 1786771