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Greece sought the surrender of a married couple to serve sentences imposed in their absence for grievous bodily harm with intent and assisting the offender. The Court held that the issuing judicial authority had not proved that the requested persons deliberately absented themselves from trial, since there was insufficient evidence that they knew of the scheduled proceedings or had unequivocally waived their right to attend. Their possibility of obtaining a retrial was also insufficient under section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003 because it depended on the Greek court first determining that specified procedural conditions, a breach of procedural rules or force majeure had been established. The Court additionally found that assurances concerning their detention could not be relied upon in light of two significant previous breaches and that surrender would therefore expose them to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR; both requested persons were discharged.

The High Court of England and Wales allowed the appeal against an extradition order to India in relation to financial offences, finding that surrender would expose the requested person to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court relied on detailed evidence concerning detention conditions and the use of coercion by investigative authorities, concluding that the diplomatic assurances provided were insufficient to mitigate that risk. The Court further held that the applicant would face a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice, in light of procedural features of the criminal system, including provisions capable of reversing the burden of proof. On this basis, extradition was barred under Articles 3 and 6 ECHR, and the appellant was discharged.

The United States sought the extradition of a dual British and Lebanese national to face charges arising from an alleged insider-dealing scheme involving confidential information about companies listed on US stock exchanges. The Supreme Court held that, for the purposes of section 137 of the Extradition Act 2003, the location of the conduct must be determined by identifying where the requested person’s relevant physical acts occurred, rather than where their effects were felt. As the substance of the alleged conduct occurred in the United Kingdom and not in the United States, the stricter test applicable to extraterritorial conduct under section 137(4) applied. Equivalent conduct in corresponding circumstances would not fall within the territorial scope of the relevant UK insider-dealing or money-laundering offences; the Court therefore allowed the appeal, discharged the requested person and quashed the extradition order.

The case concerned a European Arrest Warrant issued by the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Court of Pordenone, Italy, seeking the surrender of the requested person to serve a one-year sentence imposed after a trial held in his absence. The requested person had been informed in 2015 that he was under investigation and had elected an address in Italy, but he later moved to the United Kingdom without notifying the Italian judicial police; he was never officially informed that prosecution had commenced, nor notified of the date and place of trial. The Supreme Court held that “deliberately absented himself from his trial” under section 20(3) of the Extradition Act 2003 must be understood consistently with Article 6 ECHR as requiring an unequivocal waiver of the right to be present at trial. Mere lack of diligence in failing to keep the authorities informed of an address was not enough, especially where the requested person had not been charged, had not been told that proceedings had begun, and had not been warned that trial could proceed in his absence. The appeal was allowed, the extradition order was quashed, and the requested person was discharged.

The case concerned judicial review challenges to the Secretary of State’s certification of Japan’s first extradition request to the United Kingdom, made under special extradition arrangements because no extradition treaty existed between the two States. The requested persons argued that the request was invalid because it had been issued by the Japanese National Police Agency rather than by the Government of Japan, contrary to the Memorandum of Cooperation, and because the diplomatic notes from the Japanese Embassy could not themselves constitute a valid extradition request. The Divisional Court rejected those arguments, holding that the Embassy notes expressly made or renewed a request for extradition on behalf of the Government of Japan and that the supporting police documents could properly be relied upon as part of the request. The Court further held that a formal diplomatic note issued by the Embassy could be treated as emanating from the Ambassador, acting as the diplomatic representative of Japan, and therefore satisfied the “approved way” requirement under section 70 of the Extradition Act 2003. The judicial review claim was dismissed, leaving the certification of the extradition request in place.