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Two Bahraini pro-democracy activists brought civil proceedings alleging that agents of Bahrain had remotely infected their computers in the United Kingdom with spyware, conducted intrusive surveillance and caused them psychiatric injury. By a majority, the Supreme Court held that section 5 of the State Immunity Act 1978 applies where legally causative acts occur in the United Kingdom, even though the operation was initiated abroad and the foreign State’s agents were never physically present there. The installation and operation of spyware on computers located in the United Kingdom, including the accessing and exfiltration of data and activation of cameras and microphones, constituted causative acts within the jurisdiction. Bahrain was therefore not entitled to State immunity, and its appeal was dismissed; Lord Leggatt dissented, considering that an act occurs where the human actor is located rather than where its effects are produced.

The High Court dismissed two appeals against extradition orders to Romania and confirmed that, in conviction cases involving multiple offences, the four-month threshold is assessed by reference to the single aggregate, merged or cumulated sentence imposed by the requesting State. The executing court is not required to disaggregate that sentence or determine the portion attributable to each individual offence, even where some underlying conduct does not satisfy double criminality, provided that the specialty principle protects the requested person after surrender. The Court held that Pilecki v Poland remains binding after Brexit and is consistent with both sections 10 and 65 of the Extradition Act 2003 and Article 599 of the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement. It also rejected the Article 8 challenges and recorded that two non-existent authorities, apparently originating from unverified use of generative artificial intelligence, had been cited in earlier prosecution submissions but had no effect on the appeal.

Greece sought the surrender of a married couple to serve sentences imposed in their absence for grievous bodily harm with intent and assisting the offender. The Court held that the issuing judicial authority had not proved that the requested persons deliberately absented themselves from trial, since there was insufficient evidence that they knew of the scheduled proceedings or had unequivocally waived their right to attend. Their possibility of obtaining a retrial was also insufficient under section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003 because it depended on the Greek court first determining that specified procedural conditions, a breach of procedural rules or force majeure had been established. The Court additionally found that assurances concerning their detention could not be relied upon in light of two significant previous breaches and that surrender would therefore expose them to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR; both requested persons were discharged.

Regular assistance and emotional support provided to a former partner suffering from mental health issues are insufficient, absent stable de facto family ties, to establish “family life” protected under Article 8 ECHR in extradition proceedings; furthermore, only exceptionally severe interference with private or family life may justify refusal of extradition on proportionality grounds.

The case concerned an appeal against an order for extradition to Norway to serve a sentence of three and a half years’ imprisonment for an aggravated drug offence involving the storage of a large quantity of heroin. The appellant, a Norwegian national with settled status in the United Kingdom, argued that extradition would disproportionately interfere with his and his family’s Article 8 ECHR rights, relying in particular on the serious developmental needs of his youngest child, the health needs of other children, and the practical and emotional burden that would fall on his wife. The High Court admitted fresh evidence concerning the child’s autism diagnosis and the family’s updated circumstances, and carried out a fresh Article 8 balancing exercise. It accepted that extradition would have a serious detrimental impact on the family, especially the youngest child, but held that the public interest in extradition carried very substantial weight because the appellant was a fugitive, had deliberately avoided serving a lengthy sentence, and had been convicted of a serious Class A drugs offence. The appeal was dismissed, although the Court deferred the date on which the extradition order would take effect to allow statutory services time to put support in place for the child.

The case concerned an application by the requested person to reopen his extradition appeal against surrender to India, following an earlier dismissal of his Article 3 ECHR and health-based objections. He argued that the later judgment in Bhandari v Government of India revealed a real risk of torture or ill-treatment during custodial interrogation by Indian investigative agencies, and that this risk also applied to him because several agencies might seek to question him after extradition. The Divisional Court accepted that, without adequate assurances, the application to reopen would have had considerable force, given the findings in Bhandari concerning the use of proscribed treatment to obtain confessions. However, the Court held that India had provided comprehensive, detailed and reliable assurances that the requested person would not be interrogated by the CBI, the ED or any other investigative agency without prior recourse to the United Kingdom authorities, and that those assurances were given in good faith and were binding at the diplomatic level. Since the assurances were sufficient to remove any real practical risk of interrogation and ill-treatment, the Court refused permission to reopen the extradition appeal.

The case concerned a request by Ukraine for the extradition of a sitting Ukrainian Member of Parliament to stand trial for alleged violent offences committed in 2022 and 2023. The requested person resisted extradition on several grounds, arguing that the proceedings were politically and religiously motivated, that he had previously been ill-treated by Ukrainian security officers, that the ongoing armed conflict created risks under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, and that he would face unfair trial, arbitrary detention, religious persecution and oppression due to ill health. The Westminster Magistrates’ Court rejected the objections based on political motivation, Articles 2, 3, 5, 6 and 9 ECHR, ill health and abuse of process, holding in particular that Ukraine’s specific and verifiable assurances were sufficient to neutralise the identified risks. However, the Court accepted that the requested person had previously been subjected to ill-treatment in SBU custody and considered that this, together with his public perception as sympathetic to Russia, the residual risks arising from the armed conflict, his family circumstances, and the comparatively limited seriousness and likely penal consequences of the alleged offences, created an exceptional cumulative picture. The Court therefore held that extradition would amount to a disproportionate interference with private and family life under Article 8 ECHR and ordered discharge under section 87(2) of the Extradition Act 2003.

The case concerned a request by the United States for the extradition of the requested person to stand trial for several bombing offences allegedly committed in California in 2003 against companies linked to animal testing activities. The defence argued that extradition should be barred because of the risk of prejudice connected to the requested person’s political beliefs, alleged defects in the superseding indictment, and potential violations of Articles 3 and 6 ECHR arising from detention conditions and possible political interference by the current U.S. administration. The Westminster Magistrates’ Court rejected those arguments, holding that the proceedings concerned ordinary violent criminal offences and that there was no concrete evidence of political motivation or improper executive interference. The Court further held that the requested person would benefit from the procedural guarantees of the U.S. federal justice system, including legal representation, independent judicial oversight, and appellate remedies. Extradition was therefore ordered, the Court finding no violation of Articles 3 or 6 ECHR.

The case concerned a Portuguese national facing two competing extradition claims for substantially overlapping cybercrime-related conduct: a United States extradition request under Part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003 and a Portuguese arrest warrant under Part 1. The requested person preferred extradition to Portugal and challenged the Home Secretary’s decision under section 179 of the 2003 Act to defer the Portuguese warrant until the United States request had been disposed of. The High Court held that the decision-making process was procedurally unfair because the Home Secretary had refused to receive representations from the requested person, the United States and Portugal, despite the significant consequences of choosing between competing extradition claims. Relying also on the CJEU judgment in OP v Procureur de la République, the Court interpreted section 179 consistently with the need to consider all the circumstances of the case, including the interests of the requested person. The Court further found that the decision was vitiated by material factual errors and by a failure to take relevant considerations into account, and therefore quashed the decision so that the matter could be reconsidered by the Home Secretary.

The UK Supreme Court considered whether, in extradition cases based on conviction warrants, courts may take into account the possibility of early release under the law of the requesting State when assessing proportionality under Article 8 ECHR.The appellant was sought by Poland to serve a two‑year sentence for fraud. She argued that extradition would disproportionately interfere with her private and family life, partly because she might be eligible for early release under Polish law.The Court reviewed conflicting approaches in domestic case law and held that the mere possibility of early release is relevant but carries little weight. Courts in the requested State should not attempt to predict the likelihood of early release, as this would involve speculative assessment of foreign law and undermine principles of international comity.Only in rare and exceptional cases, supported by clear evidence, may a court attach greater weight to early release prospects. Ultimately, the Court endorsed a cautious approach: acknowledging early release as a factor but generally giving it minimal significance in the Article 8 proportionality balancing exercise.Although the extradition warrant was withdrawn (as the sentence had effectively been served), the Court ruled on the legal issues due to their general importance.

The High Court of England and Wales allowed the appeal against an extradition order to India in relation to financial offences, finding that surrender would expose the requested person to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court relied on detailed evidence concerning detention conditions and the use of coercion by investigative authorities, concluding that the diplomatic assurances provided were insufficient to mitigate that risk. The Court further held that the applicant would face a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice, in light of procedural features of the criminal system, including provisions capable of reversing the burden of proof. On this basis, extradition was barred under Articles 3 and 6 ECHR, and the appellant was discharged.

The United States sought the extradition of a dual British and Lebanese national to face charges arising from an alleged insider-dealing scheme involving confidential information about companies listed on US stock exchanges. The Supreme Court held that, for the purposes of section 137 of the Extradition Act 2003, the location of the conduct must be determined by identifying where the requested person’s relevant physical acts occurred, rather than where their effects were felt. As the substance of the alleged conduct occurred in the United Kingdom and not in the United States, the stricter test applicable to extraterritorial conduct under section 137(4) applied. Equivalent conduct in corresponding circumstances would not fall within the territorial scope of the relevant UK insider-dealing or money-laundering offences; the Court therefore allowed the appeal, discharged the requested person and quashed the extradition order.

The case concerned appeals by Japan against the discharge of two requested persons whose extradition was sought for prosecution for an alleged robbery in Tokyo. The first-instance judge had found, in one case, that there was no prima facie case and, in both cases, that extradition would be incompatible with Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 ECHR because of risks arising from Japanese detention conditions, interrogation practices, access to lawyers, compulsory prison labour and the absence of bail during the pre-indictment period. The Divisional Court held that there was sufficient admissible evidence to establish a prima facie case against the first requested person and that the detailed assurances provided by Japan in March 2024, supplemented by further assurances in October 2024, were sufficient in practice to remove the risks identified under Articles 3 and 6 ECHR. It also held that compulsory prison work in Japan fell within work required in the ordinary course of detention under Article 4(3)(a) ECHR, and that the alleged Article 5 issue did not amount to a flagrant breach in the extradition context. The appeals were therefore allowed and the discharge orders were set aside.

Extradition may be subject to appeal where the requested person establishes an arguable risk of prejudice at trial by reason of nationality, including where such prejudice may affect access to fundamental constitutional protections in the requesting State. In such circumstances, issues under Article 10 ECHR (freedom of expression) may arise, but only insofar as they are consequential upon the risk of discriminatory treatment. Extradition may also be challenged where assurances provided by the requesting State are insufficient, particularly in relation to the death penalty and the rule of specialty, with the court entitled to require further guarantees before determining whether the appeal should proceed. By contrast, the prohibition of extradition for political offences contained in an unincorporated bilateral treaty does not confer directly enforceable rights in domestic law, nor can it operate as an independent bar to extradition under the Extradition Act 2003. The statutory framework constitutes an exhaustive code, and extradition must be ordered unless a specific statutory bar is established. Finally, at the leave stage, the appellate court is not concerned with determining the merits of the grounds, but only with whether they disclose a real prospect that the lower court’s decision was wrong.

The case concerned a European Arrest Warrant issued by the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Court of Pordenone, Italy, seeking the surrender of the requested person to serve a one-year sentence imposed after a trial held in his absence. The requested person had been informed in 2015 that he was under investigation and had elected an address in Italy, but he later moved to the United Kingdom without notifying the Italian judicial police; he was never officially informed that prosecution had commenced, nor notified of the date and place of trial. The Supreme Court held that “deliberately absented himself from his trial” under section 20(3) of the Extradition Act 2003 must be understood consistently with Article 6 ECHR as requiring an unequivocal waiver of the right to be present at trial. Mere lack of diligence in failing to keep the authorities informed of an address was not enough, especially where the requested person had not been charged, had not been told that proceedings had begun, and had not been warned that trial could proceed in his absence. The appeal was allowed, the extradition order was quashed, and the requested person was discharged.

The case concerned judicial review challenges to the Secretary of State’s certification of Japan’s first extradition request to the United Kingdom, made under special extradition arrangements because no extradition treaty existed between the two States. The requested persons argued that the request was invalid because it had been issued by the Japanese National Police Agency rather than by the Government of Japan, contrary to the Memorandum of Cooperation, and because the diplomatic notes from the Japanese Embassy could not themselves constitute a valid extradition request. The Divisional Court rejected those arguments, holding that the Embassy notes expressly made or renewed a request for extradition on behalf of the Government of Japan and that the supporting police documents could properly be relied upon as part of the request. The Court further held that a formal diplomatic note issued by the Embassy could be treated as emanating from the Ambassador, acting as the diplomatic representative of Japan, and therefore satisfied the “approved way” requirement under section 70 of the Extradition Act 2003. The judicial review claim was dismissed, leaving the certification of the extradition request in place.

SUMMARY (English) The case concerned three joined European Arrest Warrant appeals in which the requested persons resisted extradition on the basis that surrender would disproportionately interfere with the Article 8 ECHR rights of their dependent children. The Supreme Court clarified that, although there is a constant and weighty public interest in extradition, there is no separate test of exceptionality and the court must carefully assess the actual impact of extradition on family life. Children’s best interests must be treated as a primary consideration, but they are not paramount and may be outweighed by the public interest in extradition, particularly where the offences are serious. On the facts, the Court allowed the appeal of the Polish mother, whose extradition for relatively minor and old dishonesty offences would cause severe harm to her youngest children. By contrast, the appeals of the parents sought by Italy for serious drug-trafficking offences were dismissed, the mother unanimously and the father by majority, because the public interest in extradition outweighed the Article 8 interference.