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Two Bahraini pro-democracy activists brought civil proceedings alleging that agents of Bahrain had remotely infected their computers in the United Kingdom with spyware, conducted intrusive surveillance and caused them psychiatric injury. By a majority, the Supreme Court held that section 5 of the State Immunity Act 1978 applies where legally causative acts occur in the United Kingdom, even though the operation was initiated abroad and the foreign State’s agents were never physically present there. The installation and operation of spyware on computers located in the United Kingdom, including the accessing and exfiltration of data and activation of cameras and microphones, constituted causative acts within the jurisdiction. Bahrain was therefore not entitled to State immunity, and its appeal was dismissed; Lord Leggatt dissented, considering that an act occurs where the human actor is located rather than where its effects are produced.

The High Court dismissed two appeals against extradition orders to Romania and confirmed that, in conviction cases involving multiple offences, the four-month threshold is assessed by reference to the single aggregate, merged or cumulated sentence imposed by the requesting State. The executing court is not required to disaggregate that sentence or determine the portion attributable to each individual offence, even where some underlying conduct does not satisfy double criminality, provided that the specialty principle protects the requested person after surrender. The Court held that Pilecki v Poland remains binding after Brexit and is consistent with both sections 10 and 65 of the Extradition Act 2003 and Article 599 of the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement. It also rejected the Article 8 challenges and recorded that two non-existent authorities, apparently originating from unverified use of generative artificial intelligence, had been cited in earlier prosecution submissions but had no effect on the appeal.

Regular assistance and emotional support provided to a former partner suffering from mental health issues are insufficient, absent stable de facto family ties, to establish “family life” protected under Article 8 ECHR in extradition proceedings; furthermore, only exceptionally severe interference with private or family life may justify refusal of extradition on proportionality grounds.

The case concerned an appeal against an order for extradition to Norway to serve a sentence of three and a half years’ imprisonment for an aggravated drug offence involving the storage of a large quantity of heroin. The appellant, a Norwegian national with settled status in the United Kingdom, argued that extradition would disproportionately interfere with his and his family’s Article 8 ECHR rights, relying in particular on the serious developmental needs of his youngest child, the health needs of other children, and the practical and emotional burden that would fall on his wife. The High Court admitted fresh evidence concerning the child’s autism diagnosis and the family’s updated circumstances, and carried out a fresh Article 8 balancing exercise. It accepted that extradition would have a serious detrimental impact on the family, especially the youngest child, but held that the public interest in extradition carried very substantial weight because the appellant was a fugitive, had deliberately avoided serving a lengthy sentence, and had been convicted of a serious Class A drugs offence. The appeal was dismissed, although the Court deferred the date on which the extradition order would take effect to allow statutory services time to put support in place for the child.

The case concerned an application by the requested person to reopen his extradition appeal against surrender to India, following an earlier dismissal of his Article 3 ECHR and health-based objections. He argued that the later judgment in Bhandari v Government of India revealed a real risk of torture or ill-treatment during custodial interrogation by Indian investigative agencies, and that this risk also applied to him because several agencies might seek to question him after extradition. The Divisional Court accepted that, without adequate assurances, the application to reopen would have had considerable force, given the findings in Bhandari concerning the use of proscribed treatment to obtain confessions. However, the Court held that India had provided comprehensive, detailed and reliable assurances that the requested person would not be interrogated by the CBI, the ED or any other investigative agency without prior recourse to the United Kingdom authorities, and that those assurances were given in good faith and were binding at the diplomatic level. Since the assurances were sufficient to remove any real practical risk of interrogation and ill-treatment, the Court refused permission to reopen the extradition appeal.

The case concerned a request by Ukraine for the extradition of a sitting Ukrainian Member of Parliament to stand trial for alleged violent offences committed in 2022 and 2023. The requested person resisted extradition on several grounds, arguing that the proceedings were politically and religiously motivated, that he had previously been ill-treated by Ukrainian security officers, that the ongoing armed conflict created risks under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, and that he would face unfair trial, arbitrary detention, religious persecution and oppression due to ill health. The Westminster Magistrates’ Court rejected the objections based on political motivation, Articles 2, 3, 5, 6 and 9 ECHR, ill health and abuse of process, holding in particular that Ukraine’s specific and verifiable assurances were sufficient to neutralise the identified risks. However, the Court accepted that the requested person had previously been subjected to ill-treatment in SBU custody and considered that this, together with his public perception as sympathetic to Russia, the residual risks arising from the armed conflict, his family circumstances, and the comparatively limited seriousness and likely penal consequences of the alleged offences, created an exceptional cumulative picture. The Court therefore held that extradition would amount to a disproportionate interference with private and family life under Article 8 ECHR and ordered discharge under section 87(2) of the Extradition Act 2003.

The case concerned a request by the United States for the extradition of the requested person to stand trial for several bombing offences allegedly committed in California in 2003 against companies linked to animal testing activities. The defence argued that extradition should be barred because of the risk of prejudice connected to the requested person’s political beliefs, alleged defects in the superseding indictment, and potential violations of Articles 3 and 6 ECHR arising from detention conditions and possible political interference by the current U.S. administration. The Westminster Magistrates’ Court rejected those arguments, holding that the proceedings concerned ordinary violent criminal offences and that there was no concrete evidence of political motivation or improper executive interference. The Court further held that the requested person would benefit from the procedural guarantees of the U.S. federal justice system, including legal representation, independent judicial oversight, and appellate remedies. Extradition was therefore ordered, the Court finding no violation of Articles 3 or 6 ECHR.

The case concerned a Portuguese national facing two competing extradition claims for substantially overlapping cybercrime-related conduct: a United States extradition request under Part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003 and a Portuguese arrest warrant under Part 1. The requested person preferred extradition to Portugal and challenged the Home Secretary’s decision under section 179 of the 2003 Act to defer the Portuguese warrant until the United States request had been disposed of. The High Court held that the decision-making process was procedurally unfair because the Home Secretary had refused to receive representations from the requested person, the United States and Portugal, despite the significant consequences of choosing between competing extradition claims. Relying also on the CJEU judgment in OP v Procureur de la République, the Court interpreted section 179 consistently with the need to consider all the circumstances of the case, including the interests of the requested person. The Court further found that the decision was vitiated by material factual errors and by a failure to take relevant considerations into account, and therefore quashed the decision so that the matter could be reconsidered by the Home Secretary.

The UK Supreme Court considered whether, in extradition cases based on conviction warrants, courts may take into account the possibility of early release under the law of the requesting State when assessing proportionality under Article 8 ECHR.The appellant was sought by Poland to serve a two‑year sentence for fraud. She argued that extradition would disproportionately interfere with her private and family life, partly because she might be eligible for early release under Polish law.The Court reviewed conflicting approaches in domestic case law and held that the mere possibility of early release is relevant but carries little weight. Courts in the requested State should not attempt to predict the likelihood of early release, as this would involve speculative assessment of foreign law and undermine principles of international comity.Only in rare and exceptional cases, supported by clear evidence, may a court attach greater weight to early release prospects. Ultimately, the Court endorsed a cautious approach: acknowledging early release as a factor but generally giving it minimal significance in the Article 8 proportionality balancing exercise.Although the extradition warrant was withdrawn (as the sentence had effectively been served), the Court ruled on the legal issues due to their general importance.

The case concerned appeals by Japan against the discharge of two requested persons whose extradition was sought for prosecution for an alleged robbery in Tokyo. The first-instance judge had found, in one case, that there was no prima facie case and, in both cases, that extradition would be incompatible with Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 ECHR because of risks arising from Japanese detention conditions, interrogation practices, access to lawyers, compulsory prison labour and the absence of bail during the pre-indictment period. The Divisional Court held that there was sufficient admissible evidence to establish a prima facie case against the first requested person and that the detailed assurances provided by Japan in March 2024, supplemented by further assurances in October 2024, were sufficient in practice to remove the risks identified under Articles 3 and 6 ECHR. It also held that compulsory prison work in Japan fell within work required in the ordinary course of detention under Article 4(3)(a) ECHR, and that the alleged Article 5 issue did not amount to a flagrant breach in the extradition context. The appeals were therefore allowed and the discharge orders were set aside.

SUMMARY (English) The case concerned three joined European Arrest Warrant appeals in which the requested persons resisted extradition on the basis that surrender would disproportionately interfere with the Article 8 ECHR rights of their dependent children. The Supreme Court clarified that, although there is a constant and weighty public interest in extradition, there is no separate test of exceptionality and the court must carefully assess the actual impact of extradition on family life. Children’s best interests must be treated as a primary consideration, but they are not paramount and may be outweighed by the public interest in extradition, particularly where the offences are serious. On the facts, the Court allowed the appeal of the Polish mother, whose extradition for relatively minor and old dishonesty offences would cause severe harm to her youngest children. By contrast, the appeals of the parents sought by Italy for serious drug-trafficking offences were dismissed, the mother unanimously and the father by majority, because the public interest in extradition outweighed the Article 8 interference.