🇬🇧 United Kingdom → 🇺🇸 United States

The case concerned a request by the United States for the extradition of the requested person to stand trial for several bombing offences allegedly committed in California in 2003 against companies linked to animal testing activities. The defence argued that extradition should be barred because of the risk of prejudice connected to the requested person’s political beliefs, alleged defects in the superseding indictment, and potential violations of Articles 3 and 6 ECHR arising from detention conditions and possible political interference by the current U.S. administration. The Westminster Magistrates’ Court rejected those arguments, holding that the proceedings concerned ordinary violent criminal offences and that there was no concrete evidence of political motivation or improper executive interference. The Court further held that the requested person would benefit from the procedural guarantees of the U.S. federal justice system, including legal representation, independent judicial oversight, and appellate remedies. Extradition was therefore ordered, the Court finding no violation of Articles 3 or 6 ECHR.

The case concerned a Portuguese national facing two competing extradition claims for substantially overlapping cybercrime-related conduct: a United States extradition request under Part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003 and a Portuguese arrest warrant under Part 1. The requested person preferred extradition to Portugal and challenged the Home Secretary’s decision under section 179 of the 2003 Act to defer the Portuguese warrant until the United States request had been disposed of. The High Court held that the decision-making process was procedurally unfair because the Home Secretary had refused to receive representations from the requested person, the United States and Portugal, despite the significant consequences of choosing between competing extradition claims. Relying also on the CJEU judgment in OP v Procureur de la République, the Court interpreted section 179 consistently with the need to consider all the circumstances of the case, including the interests of the requested person. The Court further found that the decision was vitiated by material factual errors and by a failure to take relevant considerations into account, and therefore quashed the decision so that the matter could be reconsidered by the Home Secretary.

The United States sought the extradition of a dual British and Lebanese national to face charges arising from an alleged insider-dealing scheme involving confidential information about companies listed on US stock exchanges. The Supreme Court held that, for the purposes of section 137 of the Extradition Act 2003, the location of the conduct must be determined by identifying where the requested person’s relevant physical acts occurred, rather than where their effects were felt. As the substance of the alleged conduct occurred in the United Kingdom and not in the United States, the stricter test applicable to extraterritorial conduct under section 137(4) applied. Equivalent conduct in corresponding circumstances would not fall within the territorial scope of the relevant UK insider-dealing or money-laundering offences; the Court therefore allowed the appeal, discharged the requested person and quashed the extradition order.

Extradition may be subject to appeal where the requested person establishes an arguable risk of prejudice at trial by reason of nationality, including where such prejudice may affect access to fundamental constitutional protections in the requesting State. In such circumstances, issues under Article 10 ECHR (freedom of expression) may arise, but only insofar as they are consequential upon the risk of discriminatory treatment. Extradition may also be challenged where assurances provided by the requesting State are insufficient, particularly in relation to the death penalty and the rule of specialty, with the court entitled to require further guarantees before determining whether the appeal should proceed. By contrast, the prohibition of extradition for political offences contained in an unincorporated bilateral treaty does not confer directly enforceable rights in domestic law, nor can it operate as an independent bar to extradition under the Extradition Act 2003. The statutory framework constitutes an exhaustive code, and extradition must be ordered unless a specific statutory bar is established. Finally, at the leave stage, the appellate court is not concerned with determining the merits of the grounds, but only with whether they disclose a real prospect that the lower court’s decision was wrong.