Russia

In extradition proceedings, a decision refusing to revoke or replace detention must be translated into a language understood by the requested person where their lack of knowledge of Italian has already been established. Translation of the operative part alone is insufficient where the reasons are filed later, since the person must be able to understand the grounds for the continued deprivation of liberty and exercise their defence rights effectively. Moreover, when deciding any application concerning the imposition, revocation or modification of detention, the court must assess whether objective, reliable and up-to-date evidence indicates a real risk that the requested person would be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment in the requesting State. Such an assessment cannot be deferred exclusively to the merits stage of the extradition proceedings.

In matters of extradition to a foreign State, when assessing the existence of grounds precluding the issuance of a decision in favor of surrender - which, pursuant to Article 714(3) of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, also bar the adoption of coercive measures aimed at securing its execution - the Court of Appeal is required to determine whether, on the basis of objective and reliable elements, there is a risk that the person sought will be subjected, in the requesting State, to inhuman or degrading treatment (also considering the impact of Russia - Ukraine war).

The interest in obtaining a ruling on appeal against a pre-trial detention order persists even where such order has been revoked during the course of the de libertate proceedings, provided that a decision annulling the measure may constitute, pursuant to Article 314(2) of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, a prerequisite for claiming compensation for wrongful detention, where the coercive measure was issued or maintained in the absence of the legal conditions for its application. On the one hand, where personal liberty has been restricted in the context of a passive extradition procedure that has concluded without a final decision granting extradition, the right to compensation may arise. On the other hand, for the applicant’s interest in pursuing the appeal to be recognised—specifically in view of relying on a favourable decision for the purposes of a future compensation claim—it is necessary that such interest be expressly and duly substantiated by the person concerned. This requires a specific and reasoned submission demonstrating, in concrete terms, the prejudice that would result from the failure to obtain such a ruling, and must be made personally by the applicant.

risk of inhuman or degrading treatment: for the purposes of assessing the ground for refusal provided for by article 698(1) of the italian code of criminal procedure, the court of appeal must verify whether the penalty provided for under the law of the requesting state—regardless of its formal designation—effectively amounts to treatment that violates the fundamental rights of the individual.

The case concerned the requested extradition of a Ukrainian national to Russia for organised drug-related offences carrying a possible sentence of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court was required, even beyond the grounds expressly raised on appeal, to examine whether a life sentence would be reducible de jure and de facto through a realistic review and release mechanism compatible with Article 3 ECHR. The mere existence of a formal parole provision was insufficient without assessing its practical accessibility, governing criteria and actual operation. The decision permitting extradition was therefore quashed and the case remitted for a comprehensive reassessment.

Russia requested the extradition of the requested person from Denmark for prosecution, and the person was detained in Denmark while the extradition request was being examined. At the same time, the Danish immigration authorities decided that he should be transferred to France under the Dublin Regulation for examination of his asylum application. The Supreme Court held that the planned Dublin transfer did not in itself preclude continued detention for extradition purposes. At the time of the District Court’s decision, the extradition proceedings had not been concluded and it remained legally possible for the Danish prosecution authority to decide in favour of extradition to Russia. Having regard to the nature of the case and the requested person’s lack of ties to Denmark, the Court therefore held that the statutory conditions for continued detention remained satisfied. The subsequent release and transfer to France did not deprive the requested person of a legal interest in obtaining judicial review of the earlier detention decision.