🇮🇹 Italy → 🇺🇸 United States

The case concerned a United States request for extradition from Italy for prosecution on a charge of conspiracy to commit money laundering. The Court of Appeal had declared the conditions for extradition satisfied, subject to the condition that any extradition detention served in Italy be credited against a sentence eventually imposed in the United States. The requested person appealed, raising several objections, including alleged defects in the extradition request, the subsequent substitution of the extradition title following a Grand Jury indictment, lack of United States jurisdiction, insufficient evidentiary basis, breach of speciality, disproportionate punishment and the risk of inhuman or degrading detention conditions. The Italian Supreme Court rejected all grounds except the complaint concerning detention conditions. It held that the replacement or formal development of the extradition title during the proceedings did not bar extradition where the factual basis remained the same and the new title was submitted before the Court of Appeal’s decision. It also held that Italian courts are not required, in extradition to the United States, to review the existence of United States jurisdiction as a ground for refusal, and that the “reasonable basis” requirement under the Italy–US extradition treaty does not require an autonomous assessment of serious evidence of guilt. The Court further rejected the argument that the maximum penalty of twenty years for money laundering conspiracy was, in itself, manifestly disproportionate. However, it found that the Court of Appeal had failed to properly address the defence submissions on detention conditions. The defence had relied not only on NGO material but also on official United States prison standards suggesting that personal space could ordinarily fall below three square metres per detainee. This was a qualified source capable of raising a potential Article 3 ECHR issue. The Court therefore held that the Court of Appeal should have sought complete, current and individualized information from the United States on the specific detention conditions that would apply in case of surrender. The judgment was annulled with remand for a new assessment limited to that issue.

The United States requested the extradition of a Russian-German national from Italy for offences connected with the operation of a cryptocurrency exchange platform and money laundering. Germany subsequently issued a European Arrest Warrant concerning conduct allegedly overlapping with the facts underlying the extradition request. The Supreme Court quashed the decision authorising extradition because the Court of Appeal had relied on a decision issued in the separate EAW proceedings without formally introducing it into the extradition case or allowing the parties to comment on it, thereby breaching the adversarial principle. The Court further held that the requested judicial authority must activate the Petruhhin notification mechanism by informing the member state of nationality and allowing it a reasonable period to take appropriate action. In addition, where an EAW and a third-country extradition request coexist, the judicial authority must seek the prior opinion of the Minister of Justice under the EU-US Extradition Agreement before deciding which request should take precedence. The case was remitted for a new decision.

In extradition matters, the seizure of the corpus delicti and of items pertaining thereto, ordered on an urgent basis by the judicial police within the framework of an extradition procedure, must be validated by the Court of Appeal. The latter is required to provide reasons—on the basis of the applicable conventional framework, as well as Article 714(1) of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, insofar as not derogated—regarding the existence of a nexus of pertinence between the seized assets and the offence underlying the extradition request, through an assessment of the evidentiary needs put forward by the requesting foreign authority (in the present case, a seizure carried out by the judicial police in the context of an extradition procedure initiated by the United States of America).

In matters of extradition of a national of a Member State of the European Union to a third State, the requested Member State, in application of the notification mechanism outlined in the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber, 6 September 2016, C-182/15), is required to inform the State of nationality also where that State’s domestic law alone provides nationality as a ground for refusing surrender. This is in order to enable that State to issue, in turn, a European Arrest Warrant and request surrender for the purpose of prosecuting the same acts.

Traditional extradition treaties refer to institutions of the criminal law of individual States — such as double criminality — for the specific purpose of allowing the requested State to assess the 'recognisability' and therefore the acceptability of the punitive claim of the requesting State, thereby ensuring the requirement of reciprocity. As regards criminal thresholds, the bilateral treaty with the United States contains no specific provisions on this point, which means that the double criminality requirement must be assessed according to the ordinary rules — that is, by way of a concrete, in concreto verification.

Under the framework governed by the bilateral treaty of 13 october 1983, the possibility that a life sentence may be imposed does not constitute a bar to the issuance of a favourable extradition decision. this is due to the existence, within the united states legal system, of various mechanisms which, in relation to individuals sentenced to life imprisonment, may allow for early release—albeit on the basis of discretionary assessments by different public authorities—or, in any event, for commutation where humanitarian grounds or progress in the rehabilitative process are established. this is without prejudice to the situation where the requested person specifically alleges the existence of a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, contrary to article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.