→ 🇹🇷 Turkey

Following certification of the requested person’s extradition from the United States to Türkiye, the requested person renewed her application for release, relying on the existence of special circumstances and the court’s general authority to consider bail before and after certification. The District Court held that an extradition court has no discretion to grant bail where the governing treaty expressly requires the requested person to remain detained until the extradition request is determined and, if granted, until surrender. It found that Article 9 of the United States–Türkiye Extradition Treaty was a self-executing provision binding on the court as the supreme law of the land under the Supremacy Clause. The court rejected the special-circumstances argument and distinguished earlier authority granting bail because that authority had not considered the treaty’s mandatory-detention clause.

Article 714 requires, for the adoption of a coercive measure aimed at securing surrender, a prognostic assessment as to whether the conditions exist for a judgment granting extradition. This provision constitutes an unavoidable “safeguard” for the requested person, as it prevents the risk of unjustified restrictions on his personal liberty and introduces a threshold already at the moment when the Court must decide whether to impose the coercive measure — and also when it is called upon to decide on an application for revocation or replacement of the measure. Therefore, especially if the request comes from a State — Turkey — whose situation is extremely complex, in light of the circumstances specifically documented by the defence concerning the risk of violations of the requested person’s fundamental rights, the Court cannot omit the prognostic assessment.

In matters of flight risk, neither prior convictions nor the severity of the sentence can, in themselves, establish proof of a risk of absconding, as they are abstract considerations from which it is not possible to infer a genuine intention to evade the decision that the Court of Appeal will ultimately take at the end of the proceedings. In particular, while the severity of the sentence is an element of undeniable relevance, it cannot be regarded as the sole benchmark; rather, it must be assessed in conjunction with other specific factors capable of demonstrating a concrete likelihood that the requested person may clandestinely abscond.