→ 🇹🇷 Turkey

Following certification of the requested person’s extradition from the United States to Türkiye, the requested person renewed her application for release, relying on the existence of special circumstances and the court’s general authority to consider bail before and after certification. The District Court held that an extradition court has no discretion to grant bail where the governing treaty expressly requires the requested person to remain detained until the extradition request is determined and, if granted, until surrender. It found that Article 9 of the United States–Türkiye Extradition Treaty was a self-executing provision binding on the court as the supreme law of the land under the Supremacy Clause. The court rejected the special-circumstances argument and distinguished earlier authority granting bail because that authority had not considered the treaty’s mandatory-detention clause.

The requested person, a Dutch national of Kurdish origin, opposed extradition to Türkiye for prosecution for a drug-trafficking offence, arguing that his political activities exposed him to a flagrant denial of justice and that the criminal charge was a pretext for political persecution. The District Court acknowledged serious concerns regarding judicial independence and the rule of law in Türkiye but found no sufficiently concrete indication that the proceedings against the requested person were politically motivated or that his surrender would expose him to a flagrant breach of Article 6 ECHR. Extradition was therefore declared admissible. The Court nevertheless advised the Minister to obtain assurances concerning detention conditions, taking account of the requested person’s Kurdish background and public activities, and to require a specific and unconditional guarantee that, if convicted, he could return to the Netherlands to serve his sentence.

The case concerned an extradition request submitted by Turkey, based on reciprocity, for the prosecution of a naturalized Brazilian citizen accused of membership in the armed terrorist organisation FETÖ/PDY. The Brazilian Supreme Federal Court refused extradition on two independent grounds. First, the Court held that the requested person had acquired Brazilian nationality in January 2012, whereas the alleged offence was said to have occurred in April 2017. Since the offence was allegedly committed after naturalization, and there was no allegation of prior common crime or drug trafficking, Article 5, LI, of the Brazilian Constitution created an absolute constitutional bar to extradition. Secondly, the Court found that the Turkish request did not clearly and precisely individualize the requested person’s conduct. The allegations referred generally to his links with cultural and educational activities, alleged use of ByLock, bank movements and alleged association with FETÖ/PDY, but failed to explain with sufficient specificity his role, hierarchy or concrete contribution to the alleged terrorist organisation. The Court held that such lack of individualization prevented verification of double criminality under Brazilian law. The extradition request was therefore unanimously refused.

If there is a current and concrete risk of a violation of the fundamental rights of the requested person, the extradition request must be refused. After reconstructing the procedural background and confirming that the formal requirements for extradition were met, the Court ruled out surrender on the ground that, if transferred to Turkey, the requested person would face a concrete risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. In particular, the Court relied on the updated picture of systemic concerns regarding the protection of fundamental rights in Turkey, with specific reference to detention conditions, the independence of the judiciary, the protection of fair trial rights, and the effectiveness of the guarantees arising under the ECHR. Referring to domestic and supranational case law, as well as several institutional and international sources, the Court held that any assurances provided by the requesting State were not sufficient, in the absence of objective, precise and up-to-date elements, to rule out the risk of violations of the requested person’s fundamental rights.

Where the 1957 European Convention on Extradition applies — which does not provide for an autonomous assessment of the evidentiary material by the authority of the requested State in cases of extradition for prosecution — the Italian judicial authority, on the one hand, must not confine itself to a merely formal review of the documentation attached to the surrender request and, on the other hand, is required to ascertain that the request sets out the reasons why, from the perspective of the requesting State, the commission of the offence attributed to the accused person was considered probable, without any possibility of directly examining the sources of evidence. Accordingly, even within the limits of a summary assessment as to the seriousness of the evidentiary indications, the requested authority must nevertheless assess, on the basis of the documents produced and the content of the request, the specificity of the charges and of the sources of evidence. That being clarified, where the evidentiary framework is sparse, Italian courts cannot rely on unsatisfactory and merely apparent reasoning, without specifying the allegations and the sources of evidence or investigative findings capable of linking the facts to the charges.

Article 714 requires, for the adoption of a coercive measure aimed at securing surrender, a prognostic assessment as to whether the conditions exist for a judgment granting extradition. This provision constitutes an unavoidable “safeguard” for the requested person, as it prevents the risk of unjustified restrictions on his personal liberty and introduces a threshold already at the moment when the Court must decide whether to impose the coercive measure — and also when it is called upon to decide on an application for revocation or replacement of the measure. Therefore, especially if the request comes from a State — Turkey — whose situation is extremely complex, in light of the circumstances specifically documented by the defence concerning the risk of violations of the requested person’s fundamental rights, the Court cannot omit the prognostic assessment.

In matters of flight risk, neither prior convictions nor the severity of the sentence can, in themselves, establish proof of a risk of absconding, as they are abstract considerations from which it is not possible to infer a genuine intention to evade the decision that the Court of Appeal will ultimately take at the end of the proceedings. In particular, while the severity of the sentence is an element of undeniable relevance, it cannot be regarded as the sole benchmark; rather, it must be assessed in conjunction with other specific factors capable of demonstrating a concrete likelihood that the requested person may clandestinely abscond.

With reference to extradition requests submitted by Turkey, in light of the situation—ascertained by various international institutions—of systematic violations by that State of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of detainees, particularly those belonging to the Kurdish ethnic group or to opposition parties, which persist notwithstanding the lifting of the suspension of the application of the European Convention on Human Rights adopted in that State following the attempted coup of 15 July 2016, it is necessary for the judicial authority to obtain unequivocal elements in order to verify, in concreto, that the person sought does not face a risk of being subjected, within Turkish detention facilities, to inhuman or degrading treatment.

The United States, acting on behalf of the Republic of Türkiye, sought the extradition of Eylem Tok, a Turkish national, on charges of destroying, concealing or altering evidence under Article 281 of the Turkish Criminal Code and protecting an offender under Article 283 of the same code. The charges arose not from the underlying fatal traffic accident — which the record attributes entirely to her minor son, T.C. — but from her conduct in the hours immediately following it: taking a victim’s cell phone from security officers under a false pretext and concealing it, removing her son and two other minors from the accident scene before police could observe or question them, and flying with her son out of Türkiye on one-way tickets within three hours of the collision.Following an extradition hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3184, Chief Magistrate Judge Cabell denied the relator’s motion to dismiss, denied her motion for release from custody, and certified her extraditability to the Secretary of State on both offences. The decision is a companion to In re Extradition of T.C., 740 F. Supp. 3d 10 (D. Mass. 2024), concerning the relator’s son, and it addresses in detail several recurring questions of U.S. extradition law: the minimum-gravity (one-year punishability) requirement and its interaction with treaty accessory clauses, the treatment of foreign-law expert evidence that contradicts the requesting State’s position, the dual criminality doctrine, the meaning of “charged with an offense” in a treaty that does not require a charging document, the probable cause standard, and the “special circumstances” test for bail pending extradition.

The applicant had been convicted in absentia in Türkiye. After it was discovered that he was located in Georgia, Turkish authorities sought extradition.To secure extradition, the Turkish trial court issued a formal assurance under Law No. 3732 implementing the Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition, guaranteeing the applicant a renewed trial upon return.Following extradition, however, the domestic court rejected his retrial request.The court reasoned that the ordinary grounds for reopening under the Criminal Procedure Code were not satisfied.The Constitutional Court found this interpretation incompatible with the statutory retrial guarantee specifically governing extradition-based surrender. It held that the refusal rendered the prior extradition assurance ineffective and violated access to court.

The applicant, an Iranian passport holder sought by Azerbaijani authorities for fraud-related offences, was detained in Türkiye for extradition purposes following an Interpol Red Notice. The applicant consented to extradition under the simplified surrender procedure.Although the extradition itself was accepted as lawful, the Constitutional Court held that Turkish judicial authorities failed to comply with the statutory requirement under Law No. 6706 to review detention at thirty-day intervals.The applicant remained detained for an extended period pending surrender without regular judicial supervision and without decisions on repeated release applications.The Court concluded that this omission rendered the detention unlawful under Article 19 of the Constitution. Compensation was awarded.

Turkey requested the extradition of the requested person for the enforcement of a sentence of six years and three months’ imprisonment for alleged membership in an armed terrorist organisation. The conviction was based mainly on the allegation that the requested person had downloaded and used the encrypted messaging application ByLock, which Turkish authorities associate with the Gülen movement. The Supreme Court of Sweden held that such conduct did not, in itself, amount to punishable participation in a terrorist organisation under Swedish law, and that the requirement of double criminality was therefore not satisfied. The Court further noted that the requested person had been granted refugee status in Sweden because Turkish authorities attributed to him a political opinion linked to the Gülen movement, and that the risk of persecution remained. Extradition was therefore barred under Sections 4 and 7 of the Swedish Extradition Act.

In extradition proceedings, a mandatory ground for refusal arises where the request, formally based on an ordinary offence, in fact conceals a purpose of political persecution, provided that the person concerned submits concrete elements showing that surrender would expose them to a violation of their fundamental rights.

The case arose from the killing of Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Istanbul.Turkish prosecutors initiated criminal proceedings and indicted Saudi suspects. Because:- Saudi Arabia refused extradition of its nationals;- the suspects could not be physically secured for trial in Türkiye,Saudi authorities requested transfer of proceedings under Article 24 of Law No. 6706.The Turkish Ministry of Justice approved transfer.The Istanbul Heavy Penal Court suspended domestic proceedings and transferred the case to Saudi Arabia.The applicant challenged the transfer.The Constitutional Court examined whether this transfer violated the procedural obligation to conduct an effective investigation under the right to life.The judgment analyzed:- the Ministry of Justice’s role as Central Authority;- conditions for transfer of proceedings;- judicial reviewability of transfer decisions;- and compatibility of the transfer mechanism with constitutional guarantees. The judgment provides significant analysis regarding the relationship between:- criminal jurisdiction;- extradition impossibility;- prosecution transfer mechanisms;- international cooperation constraints.The Constitutional Court found a violation of the procedural aspect of the right to life, holding that the transfer of criminal proceedings to Saudi Arabia and the termination of domestic prosecution failed to satisfy the State’s obligation to conduct an effective investigation into the killing of Jamal K..

The case concerned an extradition request submitted by Türkiye against a Turkish national accused of involvement in the Fethullah Gülen movement, terrorist financing, qualified fraud, membership of an armed organisation and offences against the Turkish constitutional order. The Supreme Federal Court of Brazil held that the request did not satisfy the requirements for extradition because the requesting State had failed to describe the facts with sufficient clarity and precision, without identifying the requested person’s specific functions, hierarchical position or role within the alleged criminal organisation. This lack of specificity prevented a proper assessment of double criminality. The Court also found that the factual context had a political connotation and that, in light of the institutional situation in Türkiye and concerns regarding judicial independence, there were insufficient guarantees that the requested person would receive a fair, impartial trial before an independent judge. In addition, Brazil’s refugee authority had recognised the requested person as a refugee on the basis of facts coinciding with those underlying the extradition request, triggering non-refoulement protection. The extradition request was therefore refused and the precautionary measures previously imposed were revoked.

The case concerned an extradition request submitted by Türkiye for the prosecution of a Turkish national suspected of membership in an armed terrorist organisation, allegedly based on his role as editor-in-chief of a newspaper, contacts with senior members of the Gülen movement and alleged activity as a mouthpiece for that organisation. The Supreme Court of Sweden held that the conduct described in the request — journalistic activity as editor-in-chief of a newspaper — did not correspond to an offence under Swedish law, even if it had links to a designated organisation. The Court further noted that the requested person had been granted refugee status in Sweden on account of a risk of persecution based on a political opinion attributed to him by the Turkish authorities in connection with the Gülen movement. Since the grounds for refugee status remained valid, the Court found that extradition was barred under Swedish extradition law due to the risk of persecution on political grounds. It therefore declared that there were legal obstacles to extradition to Türkiye.

Extradition to turkey and risk of inhuman or degrading treatment: in cases of passive extradition to turkey, the detention conditions to be afforded to the requested person must be assessed in concreto, given that, since july 2016, the application of the european convention on human rights has been formally suspended in that state, and that instances of arbitrary detention and widespread practices of torture within penitentiary facilities have been documented, giving rise to a high level of risk of inhuman or degrading treatment not limited to political detainees.

The case concerned a request by Turkey for the extradition of a Turkish national for prosecution for alleged membership of the FETÖ/PDY organisation. The conduct described in the extradition request consisted essentially of having greeted visitors during a Spanish-language training programme in Spain, participated in meetings in a student house allegedly linked to the organisation, and read books associated with FETÖ and the Risale-i Nur. The Audiencia Nacional held that, although the formal extradition documents had been submitted through diplomatic channels, the facts described did not amount to any criminal offence under Spanish law. It accepted the Public Prosecutor’s reasoning that neither the alleged reading of religious or ideological texts nor the alleged association with followers of Fethullah Gülen, without concrete terrorist acts or participation in criminal conduct, could satisfy the requirement of double criminality. The Court therefore refused extradition at the judicial stage, without examining the remaining grounds for refusal raised by the defence

The case concerned a Turkish extradition request for the prosecution of the requested person on allegations of setting up or running an armed criminal terrorist group linked to Fethullah Gülen. The Romanian court found that the factual basis of the accusation consisted mainly of the alleged use of the ByLock encrypted messaging application, sending emails and carrying out money transfers said to be connected to a terrorist organisation. The Court held that those allegations did not correspond to an offence under Romanian law, since mere use of ByLock and generic assertions of membership in the Gülen movement did not fall within the Romanian offence of setting up or running a terrorist organisation. It also considered that the way the allegations were formulated supported the conclusion that there were serious reasons to believe the request was aimed at prosecuting or punishing the requested person on political or ideological grounds, or because of membership of a particular social group, and that his situation could worsen if surrendered. The Court therefore found that the statutory and Convention conditions for extradition were not met and dismissed Türkiye’s request.

The case concerned an extradition request submitted by Türkiye against a naturalised Brazilian citizen of Turkish origin, accused of supporting the Fethullah Gülen movement by depositing money in Bank Asya and thereby allegedly financing a terrorist organisation. The Supreme Federal Court of Brazil first held that the requested person’s naturalised Brazilian citizenship did not, in itself, bar extradition, since the alleged conduct predated his naturalisation. However, the Court found that the double criminality requirement was not satisfied because the alleged acts occurred in 2013–2014, before Brazil enacted its anti-terrorism legislation in 2016, and the more severe criminal law could not be applied retroactively. It further held that, if the conduct were analysed under Brazil’s former National Security Law, it would amount to a political offence, for which extradition is constitutionally barred. Finally, the Court considered that the political and institutional situation in Türkiye created serious doubts as to whether the requested person would receive a fair trial with due process before an independent and impartial tribunal. The extradition request was therefore refused.

Turkey requested the extradition from Finland of a Lithuanian citizen for the enforcement of a custodial sentence, and the requested person opposed extradition on the ground that Turkish prison conditions exposed him to a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment. The Supreme Court first held that EU citizenship did not in itself prevent extradition because the requested person was merely visiting Finland and could not be regarded as permanently resident there. As regards prison conditions, however, the Court found that objective and reliable Council of Europe material supported the existence of a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 19 of the EU Charter and Article 3 ECHR, while Turkey failed to provide the requested individualised information concerning the prison in which the person would be detained and the conditions there. The Court therefore held that the extradition request could not be granted.