The case concerned an Albanian request for execution extradition based on a final one-year prison sentence for escape and possession and manufacture of false identification documents. The requested person challenged the decision granting extradition, arguing that he had already fully served the sentence in Italy through extradition custody and that the Albanian authorities had themselves indicated that they no longer had an interest in surrender. The Italian Supreme Court upheld the appeal. It held that, where the sentence for which extradition is sought has already been entirely served in Italy through precautionary custody in the extradition proceedings, surrender for execution is barred, since crediting pre-surrender detention against the sentence is a fundamental principle of the Italian legal order and a fundamental right of the person. The Court therefore annulled the surrender decision without remand, declared the existing precautionary measure terminated, and ordered the requested person’s release unless detained on other grounds.

The requested person challenged the refusal to revoke pre-extradition detention or replace it with house arrest in proceedings concerning an Albanian extradition request based on a conviction for bodily injury. The Court of Appeal had relied mainly on the requested person’s lack of employment, limited command of Italian, recent arrival and weak social integration in Italy. The Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the order, holding that flight risk must be supported by specific, concrete and symptomatic elements showing a genuine propensity and real possibility of clandestine departure. Considerations relating merely to the degree of social integration in the requested State are not sufficient unless connected to a predictive assessment based on the requested person’s conduct.

Whereas, on the one hand, the restriction of personal liberty is functionally—and therefore also temporally—limited to the fulfilment of such obligations, on the other hand the risk of flight typically arises, in practice, in broader terms than in ordinary matters, with the consequence that the balancing of interests (protection of personal liberty vs. the fulfilment of the demands of justice) inherently entails an assessment of broader scope than under the ordinary framework of values within our legal system, this being associated with a different standard of reasoning required from the court.

The Court of Appeal cannot merely assert the adequacy of a non-custodial measure (such as an obligation to report to the police) without providing any reasoning—even in concise terms—on the existence of a risk of absconding. This is all the more so where the same Court highlights factors—such as the limited overall sentence to be served in the requesting State, the requested person’s strong ties to the territory, the availability of a fixed residence in Italy, a lease agreement, and a permanent employment contract—which not only fail to support such a risk, but in fact mitigate it.