🇮🇹 Italy → 🇺🇸 United States

The case concerned a United States request for extradition from Italy for prosecution on a charge of conspiracy to commit money laundering. The Court of Appeal had declared the conditions for extradition satisfied, subject to the condition that any extradition detention served in Italy be credited against a sentence eventually imposed in the United States. The requested person appealed, raising several objections, including alleged defects in the extradition request, the subsequent substitution of the extradition title following a Grand Jury indictment, lack of United States jurisdiction, insufficient evidentiary basis, breach of speciality, disproportionate punishment and the risk of inhuman or degrading detention conditions. The Italian Supreme Court rejected all grounds except the complaint concerning detention conditions. It held that the replacement or formal development of the extradition title during the proceedings did not bar extradition where the factual basis remained the same and the new title was submitted before the Court of Appeal’s decision. It also held that Italian courts are not required, in extradition to the United States, to review the existence of United States jurisdiction as a ground for refusal, and that the “reasonable basis” requirement under the Italy–US extradition treaty does not require an autonomous assessment of serious evidence of guilt. The Court further rejected the argument that the maximum penalty of twenty years for money laundering conspiracy was, in itself, manifestly disproportionate. However, it found that the Court of Appeal had failed to properly address the defence submissions on detention conditions. The defence had relied not only on NGO material but also on official United States prison standards suggesting that personal space could ordinarily fall below three square metres per detainee. This was a qualified source capable of raising a potential Article 3 ECHR issue. The Court therefore held that the Court of Appeal should have sought complete, current and individualized information from the United States on the specific detention conditions that would apply in case of surrender. The judgment was annulled with remand for a new assessment limited to that issue.

The request by the Minister of Justice for the revocation of the custodial measure leaves no room for discretion, as the law provides that “revocation shall always be ordered if the Minister of Justice so requests.” In such cases, where the proceedings are pending before the Court of Cassation, that Court has jurisdiction to decide on the revocation of the measure, and the immediate release of the person sought for extradition must be ordered.

The United States requested the extradition of a Russian-German national from Italy for offences connected with the operation of a cryptocurrency exchange platform and money laundering. Germany subsequently issued a European Arrest Warrant concerning conduct allegedly overlapping with the facts underlying the extradition request. The Supreme Court quashed the decision authorising extradition because the Court of Appeal had relied on a decision issued in the separate EAW proceedings without formally introducing it into the extradition case or allowing the parties to comment on it, thereby breaching the adversarial principle. The Court further held that the requested judicial authority must activate the Petruhhin notification mechanism by informing the member state of nationality and allowing it a reasonable period to take appropriate action. In addition, where an EAW and a third-country extradition request coexist, the judicial authority must seek the prior opinion of the Minister of Justice under the EU-US Extradition Agreement before deciding which request should take precedence. The case was remitted for a new decision.

In matters of extradition of a national of a Member State of the European Union to a third State, the requested Member State, in application of the notification mechanism outlined in the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber, 6 September 2016, C-182/15), is required to inform the State of nationality also where that State’s domestic law alone provides nationality as a ground for refusing surrender. This is in order to enable that State to issue, in turn, a European Arrest Warrant and request surrender for the purpose of prosecuting the same acts.

Traditional extradition treaties refer to institutions of the criminal law of individual States — such as double criminality — for the specific purpose of allowing the requested State to assess the 'recognisability' and therefore the acceptability of the punitive claim of the requesting State, thereby ensuring the requirement of reciprocity. As regards criminal thresholds, the bilateral treaty with the United States contains no specific provisions on this point, which means that the double criminality requirement must be assessed according to the ordinary rules — that is, by way of a concrete, in concreto verification.

The Court of Appeal must refuse extradition “where reasons of health or age entail a risk of consequences of exceptional gravity for the requested person.” Such a ground for refusal may apply not only where adequate medical treatment cannot be ensured in the requesting State, but also where the extradition procedure itself is liable to prejudice the person’s health. In particular, such prejudice does not arise from any negative impact on the individual’s health, but only where extradition may result in consequences of exceptional gravity, namely serious and objectively verifiable pathological effects. Accordingly, the Court cannot confine its assessment to verifying whether the healthcare facilities in the requesting State are adequate to meet the person’s therapeutic needs, but must also take into account the concrete impact—and thus the potential adverse effects—of the surrender procedure on the requested person’s health. This includes, for example, the difficulties and possible complications arising from the transfer abroad or the need to avoid interruption of ongoing medical treatment.

Under the framework governed by the bilateral treaty of 13 october 1983, the possibility that a life sentence may be imposed does not constitute a bar to the issuance of a favourable extradition decision. this is due to the existence, within the united states legal system, of various mechanisms which, in relation to individuals sentenced to life imprisonment, may allow for early release—albeit on the basis of discretionary assessments by different public authorities—or, in any event, for commutation where humanitarian grounds or progress in the rehabilitative process are established. this is without prejudice to the situation where the requested person specifically alleges the existence of a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, contrary to article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.