Poland

The requested person challenged his surrender from Italy to Poland for the execution of a sentence concerning tax fraud and accounting offences, arguing that France had previously refused surrender on nationality grounds and had agreed to recognise and enforce the same Polish judgment. The Supreme Court held that the refusal by the French authorities did not preclude execution of the Polish EAW because there was no evidence that Poland had transmitted the judgment and the certificate required by Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA or that enforcement had actually begun in France. A French summons concerning a hearing on possible alternatives to detention could not be treated either as a valid EAW or as a formal request for surrender. Since Poland had confirmed that the EAW remained valid, while remaining willing to consider enforcement of the sentence in France, the appeal was dismissed and surrender to Poland was upheld.

Poland sought the surrender of a person for the execution of an eight-month custodial sentence imposed for failing to maintain a minor child. The requested person argued that the proceedings had been conducted in absentia and that, owing to his long-term residence and social integration in Italy, the Italian courts should refuse surrender and enforce the sentence domestically. The Court of Cassation held that objections concerning lack of knowledge of the foreign proceedings, raised for the first time on appeal and requiring factual findings, were inadmissible. It further held that refusal under Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA requires the issuing State’s consent to transmission and execution of the sentence under Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA; the absence of a positive response from Poland amounted to implicit confirmation that the sentence should be executed in the issuing State, so the appeal was dismissed and surrender confirmed.

The case concerned an execution European Arrest Warrant issued by Poland for the enforcement of custodial sentences. As regards one of the appellate judgments, the requested person had not appeared in person, and the District Court of Amsterdam held, in light of the Khuzdar judgment, that the requirements of article 12(b) OLW were not met. The Court found that there was no circumstance from which it could be inferred that the requested person had been informed of the time and place of the hearing, nor could it be held that he had deliberately avoided official notification. However, the Court decided to refrain from refusing surrender under article 12 OLW, noting that the requested person had appeared at first instance, had caused an appeal to be lodged, knew that appeal proceedings were pending, and had been at least careless in maintaining contact and ensuring his availability for official correspondence. Surrender to Poland was therefore allowed.

The case concerned a prosecution European Arrest Warrant issued by the District Court of Łódź-Śródmieście for participation in a criminal organisation, fraud, theft and impersonation of a public official. The Court of Appeal of Turin ordered surrender. The requested person challenged the decision, arguing that the EAW did not sufficiently describe his role, the specific contribution allegedly made to the offences, and the dates of commission of some of the alleged crimes. The Italian Supreme Court declared the appeal inadmissible. It held that, following the 2021 reform of Law No. 69/2005, the EAW must contain the elements necessary for the executing judicial authority to carry out its review, but it is no longer necessary to attach evidence or a detailed statement of the sources of proof. In this case, the warrant sufficiently described the requested person’s alleged participation in an organised criminal group involved in frauds against elderly persons, including the methods used, the purpose of money transfers and the role of the participants. The Court also held that the indication of a time frame for the offences is sufficient where the facts can be placed chronologically and their essential features are clear. The alleged lack of precise dates did not affect the right of defence. The appeal was therefore declared inadmissible.

The case concerned an execution European Arrest Warrant issued by Poland for the enforcement of a custodial sentence. The requested person had not appeared in person at the hearing at which a Polish court confirmed an agreement between the prosecutor and the requested person. The District Court of Amsterdam held that such a judicial confirmation decision falls within the scope of article 12 OLW, in light of the Khuzdar judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Court found that the summons had been sent to the address provided by the requested person and that his lawyer had confirmed at the hearing that he was aware of the hearing date. Since the requested person had authorised a lawyer who actually conducted the defence, including through a substitute trainee lawyer, the Court held that the requirements of article 12(b) OLW were met and allowed surrender.

Regular assistance and emotional support provided to a former partner suffering from mental health issues are insufficient, absent stable de facto family ties, to establish “family life” protected under Article 8 ECHR in extradition proceedings; furthermore, only exceptionally severe interference with private or family life may justify refusal of extradition on proportionality grounds.

The case concerned a European Arrest Warrant issued by the Polish authorities for the prosecution of a Polish national accused of robbery and drug-related offences. The District Court of Amsterdam examined whether surrender would expose the requested person to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR due to detention conditions in the Polish remand regime. Referring to the CJEU’s Dorobantu judgment, the court held that a guarantee of 4 m² of personal living space in a multi-occupancy cell, excluding sanitary facilities, is not in itself sufficient to dispel concerns under Article 3 ECHR, since other material detention conditions — including the amount of time spent outside the cell — must also be assessed. The court therefore reconsidered aspects of its earlier case law and found that the information provided by the Polish authorities was insufficiently concrete to exclude a real risk of rights violations. The proceedings were reopened and additional information was requested from the issuing judicial authority concerning detention conditions.

In the context of the execution of a European Arrest Warrant, the failure of the issuing State to answer to the Court of Appeal’s request for consent to the enforcement of the sentence in Italian territory must be regarded as a refusal, since the non-transmission of the judgment and the certificate constitutes implicit confirmation of the request for surrender already made through the issuance of the warrant.

EAW: although flight risk may, by its nature, be assessed more broadly than in ordinary proceedings, it must nonetheless exist and cannot dissolve into a form of “inadmissible presumption”. It must display characteristics of concreteness as well as present relevance, and must be supported by specific reasoning grounded in concrete elements drawn from the requested person’s life. Accordingly, the Italian court cannot base pre-trial detention in custody solely on the seriousness of the alleged offence, the severity of the penalties imposed, or the fact that the arrested person—despite being domiciled in Italy and identified by means of an Italian identity card—has not provided elements capable of excluding such risk (all the more so where the offence was committed many years earlier).

As long as the European Arrest Warrant has not been suspended, pursuant to Article 7(2) TEU, in respect of the Member State concerned, the possibility of refusing surrender on the basis of systemic deficiencies affecting the independence of the judiciary in the issuing State must be acknowledged—having regard to the judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 22 February 2022, joined cases C-562/21 and C-563/21—only where the executing judicial authority establishes, on the basis of the submissions made by the requested person, that there are serious and substantiated grounds for believing that, following surrender, the person would face a real risk of a breach of their fundamental right to be tried by an independent tribunal, as guaranteed by Articles 6 ECHR and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

The UK Supreme Court considered whether, in extradition cases based on conviction warrants, courts may take into account the possibility of early release under the law of the requesting State when assessing proportionality under Article 8 ECHR.The appellant was sought by Poland to serve a two‑year sentence for fraud. She argued that extradition would disproportionately interfere with her private and family life, partly because she might be eligible for early release under Polish law.The Court reviewed conflicting approaches in domestic case law and held that the mere possibility of early release is relevant but carries little weight. Courts in the requested State should not attempt to predict the likelihood of early release, as this would involve speculative assessment of foreign law and undermine principles of international comity.Only in rare and exceptional cases, supported by clear evidence, may a court attach greater weight to early release prospects. Ultimately, the Court endorsed a cautious approach: acknowledging early release as a factor but generally giving it minimal significance in the Article 8 proportionality balancing exercise.Although the extradition warrant was withdrawn (as the sentence had effectively been served), the Court ruled on the legal issues due to their general importance.

The case concerned an extradition request submitted by Poland against a Polish national sought for prosecution for intentional homicide. Polish judicial authorities initiated a murder investigation concerning the death of M. H. and issued international search measures for extradition purposes.The Antalya Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office initiated extradition proceedings following communications from the Turkish Ministry of Justice.The Antalya 10th Heavy Penal Court found the extradition request admissible under Article 18 of Law No. 6706.The defence appealed, arguing inter alia that:- the investigation was incomplete;- defence rights had been restricted;- the judgment was procedurally unlawful.The Turkish Court of Cassation rejected these objections. The Court held that:- the requested person and the internationally sought person were clearly identified as the same individual;- the alleged offence constituted an offence under Turkish criminal law;- the offence was neither political nor military in nature;- the alleged offence had been committed in Poland and therefore did not fall within Turkish territorial jurisdiction;- the prosecution was not time-barred under Polish law;- no evidence existed indicating discriminatory prosecution, torture, or ill-treatment risks.The Court additionally noted that:- the requested person had refused consent-based extradition procedures.The extradition admissibility judgment was therefore upheld and the release request rejected.

The proceedings concerned a request by Belarus for the extradition of a person sought for prosecution, after the appellate court had overturned a first-instance finding that surrender was legally inadmissible. The Supreme Court held that extradition could not be permitted where the requesting State lacked courts meeting the requirements of independence and impartiality and where pre-trial detention imposed by a non-judicial authority was not subject to timely judicial review. It further relied on the broader, documented deterioration of the rule of law and human-rights protection in Belarus. The appellate decision was quashed and the extradition proceedings were discontinued because the mandatory human-rights bar to extradition was established.

The proceedings sentencing the requested individual were not adversarial. The requested individual was present at the first hearing regarding his case and was notified of the adjournment to the hearing at which the judgment was delivered. He did not attend the latter, was not represented by a lawyer, did not receive personal service of the judgment and has no further means of appeal.The extradition request is rejected on optional grounds for refusal.

The proceedings sentencing the requested individual were not adversarial. The requested individual was present at the first hearing regarding his case and was notified of the adjournment to the hearing at which the judgment was delivered. He did not attend the latter, was not represented by a lawyer, did not receive personal service of the judgment and has no further means of appeal.The extradition request is rejected on optional grounds for refusal.

In matters of a European arrest warrant, the ground for refusing surrender cannot be based on the “clear risk of a breach of the rule of law” identified in the issuing State, since—so long as the European arrest warrant has not been suspended pursuant to Article 7(2) TEU in respect of that Member State—the possibility of refusing surrender must be recognised only in “exceptional circumstances”, in which the executing judicial authority, following a concrete assessment of the specific case, finds that there are serious and substantiated grounds for believing that the requested person would, after surrender, face a real risk of a violation of his or her fundamental rights. (Case concerning the risk to the rule of law identified by the European Parliament Resolution of 17 September 2020 regarding the lack of judicial independence in Poland).

The case concerned the requested extradition of a Ukrainian national to Russia for organised drug-related offences carrying a possible sentence of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court was required, even beyond the grounds expressly raised on appeal, to examine whether a life sentence would be reducible de jure and de facto through a realistic review and release mechanism compatible with Article 3 ECHR. The mere existence of a formal parole provision was insufficient without assessing its practical accessibility, governing criteria and actual operation. The decision permitting extradition was therefore quashed and the case remitted for a comprehensive reassessment.

Extradition may be refused where surrender would give rise to a real risk of violations of fundamental rights under the ECHR, including where the requested person may have already effectively served the sentence underlying the request or where surrender would entail a disproportionate interference with personal liberty; issues may also arise under Article 7 ECHR where extradition relies on the retroactive application of subsequent treaty frameworks to offences arguably time-barred under the previous legal regime. Furthermore, a cassation appeal is admissible only in the presence of a manifest and serious violation of law and does not extend to a reassessment of facts or evidence.