The Italian courts ordered the surrender of the requested person to Romania under an European Arrest Warrant for the execution of a final sentence of nineteen years and four months’ imprisonment. The appellant argued that detention in Romania would expose him to inhuman or degrading treatment because of inadequate personal space and prison conditions and that his cardiac conditions created a concrete risk of serious deterioration of his health. The Supreme Court held that the Romanian authorities had provided sufficiently individualized information showing that the requested person would have at least three square metres of personal space, adequate structural and sanitary conditions, daily outdoor exercise and access to appropriate medical care, including prison hospitals and external healthcare facilities where necessary. The appeal was therefore dismissed, as the information obtained excluded a real risk contrary to Article 3 ECHR and Article 4 of the Charter.

The case concerned a Romanian execution European Arrest Warrant issued for the enforcement of a two-year prison sentence for continued theft, committed and attempted. The requested person opposed surrender, arguing that Romanian detention conditions would expose him to inhuman or degrading treatment because the guaranteed personal space in semi-open detention would be three square metres including furniture, and that surrender should be postponed due to pending criminal proceedings in Italy. The Italian Supreme Court rejected the appeal. It held that the assessment of detention conditions must be concrete and overall, taking into account not only the metric calculation of personal space but also compensatory factors such as the duration of the detention regime, freedom of movement outside the cell, access to activities and the general dignity of prison conditions. In the case at hand, the information supplied by the Romanian authorities identified the likely prison, the applicable detention regimes, a minimum space of three to four square metres, open cells, access to common areas and adequate hygiene, lighting, ventilation, heating and sanitary conditions; these elements were sufficient to exclude a real risk under Article 3 ECHR. The Court also held that postponement of surrender under Article 24 of Law No. 69/2005 is discretionary and cannot be challenged in cassation merely on grounds of reasoning where the requested person had not specifically sought postponement and the Court of Appeal had considered the absence of precautionary measures in the Italian proceedings.

Romania sought the surrender of the requested person for the execution of a final sentence of one year and ten months’ imprisonment for unlawful entry into a dwelling, aggravated criminal damage, and driving under the influence of alcohol and psychotropic substances. The Court of Cassation held that the optional ground for refusal based on residence and social integration did not apply because continuous residence in Italy for at least five years had not been established. It further held that double criminality concerns only whether the conduct constitutes an offence in both legal systems, and is unaffected by the fact that prosecution in Italy would require a complaint by the victim. The possible expiry of the limitation period under Italian law was likewise irrelevant, since limitation is no longer a ground for refusing surrender and, in any event, Italy had no jurisdiction over the offence committed in Romania.

The requested person challenged his surrender to Romania under a prosecutorial European Arrest Warrant for attempted murder, relying on prison conditions in Romania and his alleged stable integration in Italy. The Italian Supreme Court held that, following the 2021 reform, cassation review in EAW proceedings is limited to violations of law and does not extend to alleged contradictions or illogicality in the reasoning of the Court of Appeal. It found that the executing court had obtained individualised information concerning the destination prison and available cell space and had excluded a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment; the Supreme Court could not reassess the logical soundness of that evaluation. The complaint concerning stable integration likewise challenged the merits of the lower court’s assessment and was therefore inadmissible.

The requested person challenged his surrender to Romania for the execution of a final sentence for aggravated theft, arguing that the available personal space in the proposed detention cell would be below three square metres. The Italian Supreme Court held that fixed furnishings must be deducted when calculating usable cell space, but that a shortfall below the three-square-metre threshold does not automatically require refusal where adequate compensating factors are present. It found that detention in a semi-open regime, with confinement to the cell essentially limited to night-time and access to wider common areas and activities during the day, sufficiently offset the reduced cell space. The Court therefore concluded that the overall detention conditions did not expose the requested person to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment and upheld surrender.

The requested person challenged his surrender to Romania for the execution of a four-year sentence for participation in a criminal organisation involved in drug trafficking, alleging a risk of inhuman or degrading detention conditions. The Italian Supreme Court held that mutual trust between Member States may be rebutted only by reliable, specific and up-to-date material showing a real and individualised risk to the requested person. It found that the reports relied upon were either outdated or concerned categories of prisoners not relevant to the case, while no concrete personal circumstances capable of establishing such a risk had been alleged. The executing court was therefore not required to seek supplementary information from the Romanian authorities, and surrender was upheld.

The case concerned a prosecution European Arrest Warrant issued by Romania for human trafficking, corresponding in Italy to offences relating to the induction and exploitation of prostitution. The requested person challenged the surrender order on three grounds: the alleged lack of reasoning in the domestic Romanian coercive measure, the alleged commission of the offence in Italy, and the risk of inhuman or degrading detention conditions due to his Roma ethnicity. The Italian Supreme Court declared the appeal inadmissible. It held that, in a prosecution EAW, the issuing judicial authority is not required to state the reasons justifying the internal coercive measure, and the executing authority does not review the necessity of the requested person’s presence in the issuing State, except where the warrant is issued exclusively for investigative purposes. The Court also rejected the territoriality argument, recalling that refusal on that ground requires an objective indication that the Italian State is actually asserting jurisdiction, such as pending investigations for the same facts, which was not shown in the case. Finally, the Court found the detention-risk complaint generic: the defence had merely referred to a report concerning the situation of Roma persons in Romania, without demonstrating concrete and current systemic deficiencies capable of exposing the requested person to inhuman or degrading treatment. The surrender order was therefore upheld.

The case concerned a European Arrest Warrant issued by Romania for the execution of a sentence of two years, eleven months and fifteen days’ imprisonment imposed by the Motru Tribunal for offences including assault and bodily injury. The Court of Appeal of Palermo ordered surrender. The requested person challenged the decision, arguing that the information provided by Romania did not sufficiently identify the prison where the sentence would actually be served, did not clarify whether the minimum personal space excluded furniture, and did not properly address the conditions in Rahova prison, where he would initially be placed. He also argued that the Court of Appeal had failed to assess his integration in Italy for the purposes of the optional refusal ground based on social rehabilitation. The Italian Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. As to detention conditions, it held that the Romanian authorities had provided specific and adequate information. The requested person would spend only two and a half days in quarantine at Bucharest-Rahova, where the three square metres of personal space did not include the bed and furniture. Although Targu Jiu was indicated as the “very probable” place of execution, the Court considered that the semi-open or open regime, the possibility of spending substantial time outside the cell, and access to work, educational, cultural, therapeutic and rehabilitative activities were relevant compensatory factors. The Court also referred to recent case law finding that Romania had overcome earlier structural deficiencies in its prison system following reforms adopted after the ECtHR pilot judgment in Rezmiveș and Others. As to social rehabilitation, the Court held that the defence had failed to provide specific allegations or evidence showing lawful and effective residence or stay in Italy for at least five years, as required by Article 18-bis of Law No. 69/2005. The mere assertion of the refusal ground could not trigger an exploratory assessment by the court. The surrender order was therefore upheld.

The case concerned a prosecution European Arrest Warrant issued by the Tribunal of Constanza for fraud, based on a Romanian pre-trial detention warrant. The requested person challenged surrender, relying on his alleged long-term residence and work activity in Italy, the alleged uncertainty surrounding the continued validity of the Romanian precautionary title, and the risk of inhuman or degrading detention conditions in Romania. The Italian Supreme Court declared the appeal inadmissible. It held that residence and social rehabilitation are irrelevant in relation to a prosecution EAW, since Article 18-bis of Law No. 69/2005 applies only to EAWs issued for the execution of a custodial sentence or security measure. The Court also found that the Romanian authorities had expressly confirmed both the continuing interest in surrender and the validity of the pre-trial detention warrant. Finally, as to detention conditions, the Court held that no systemic risk currently justified derogation from mutual trust in respect of Romania and that, in any event, the Romanian authorities had provided specific and individualized information on the detention path of the requested person, including pre-trial detention in Constanza and possible sentence execution in Slobozia. The surrender order was therefore upheld.

The case concerned a European Arrest Warrant issued by the Romanian judicial authorities for the execution of a six-year prison sentence imposed for continuing theft offences committed in Romania between August 2018 and June 2022. The Court of Appeal of Milan ordered surrender. The requested person challenged the decision, arguing that surrender should have been refused under Article 18-bis of Law No. 69/2005 because of his residence and social integration in Italy, and that the Italian court had failed to verify the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in Romanian prisons. The Italian Supreme Court rejected the appeal. It held that, for the social rehabilitation refusal ground in execution EAW cases, the five-year lawful and effective residence or stay requirement remains a necessary prerequisite. The 2023 reform broadened the category of persons who may invoke the refusal ground, extending it beyond Italian and EU citizens, but did not remove the minimum five-year residence requirement. Only once that temporal requirement is established must the court assess the further indicators of integration listed in Article 18-bis, including family, work, linguistic, cultural, social and economic ties. In the present case, the Court of Appeal had found no proof of stable residence in Italy for at least five years; the documents showed, at most, residence from 2023, while the commission of offences in Romania between 2018 and 2022 pointed against stable integration in Italy. As to detention conditions, the Court held that the defence had submitted only generic allegations and had not identified any specific, current and reliable source showing a concrete risk in Romanian prisons. In the absence of such material, the executing court was not required to seek supplementary information. The appeal was therefore dismissed and the surrender order upheld.

The case concerned a European Arrest Warrant issued by the Romanian judicial authorities for the execution of a prison sentence resulting from two convictions: one for unlawful drug trafficking committed in December 2020 and one for personal injury committed in February 2016, the latter conviction having led to the revocation of a previously suspended sentence. The Court of Appeal of Florence ordered surrender, finding that the offences satisfied double criminality, that no refusal grounds applied, that the requested person was not genuinely integrated in Italy, and that postponement of surrender was not justified despite pending Italian criminal proceedings. The requested person challenged the decision, arguing that the drug offence concerned only the free transfer of 1.04 grams of cannabis and would amount merely to an administrative violation under Italian law; that surrender should have been postponed because the Italian proceedings concerned more serious facts and were already at trial stage; and that his family ties in Italy established sufficient social integration. The Italian Supreme Court declared the appeal inadmissible. It held that the Romanian drug offence concerned the transfer of drugs to another person and therefore corresponded to the offence under Article 73 of Presidential Decree No. 309/1990, not to the administrative offence relating only to possession for personal use. The Court further held that postponement of surrender under Article 24 of Law No. 69/2005 is discretionary and had been reasonably refused, given that the Romanian sentence was final and significant, while the Italian proceedings were still pending at first instance. Temporary transfer to Italy was also unavailable because no request had been made by the issuing judicial authority. Finally, the Court held that the mere presence of the requested person’s mother and partner in Italy did not prove stable integration, especially in the absence of evidence of lawful employment, identity documents or genuine social roots. The surrender order was therefore upheld.

The case concerned a European Arrest Warrant issued by Romania for the execution of a sentence imposed by the Calafat Tribunal. The Court of Appeal of Milan ordered surrender only for the offence of driving without a licence, refusing surrender for the other offences. The requested person challenged the decision, arguing that double criminality was lacking because the Italian offence requires recidivism within two years and the previous conviction had been issued in Romania, not in Italy; he also relied on social rehabilitation, family life, the best interests of his minor daughter, proportionality, and execution of the sentence in Italy. The Italian Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held that double criminality does not require perfect correspondence between the legal elements of the foreign and domestic offences: it is sufficient that the conduct is criminal in both legal systems. Recidivism, understood as repetition of unlawful conduct, was not a concept exclusive to Italian law and could be assessed by reference to the Romanian conviction. The Court further held that the requested person had not shown lawful and effective residence in Italy for at least five years, since the relevant links documented by the defence dated only from 2024. The complaints based on the best interests of the child were considered generic, as no specific evidence had been provided on cohabitation, the child’s actual situation, or any systemic deficiencies in Romania affecting detained parents or their children. The Court also rejected the proportionality argument, noting that the sentence exceeded the four-month threshold for execution EAWs and that execution in Italy cannot be requested outside the statutory refusal grounds. The surrender order was upheld.

The case concerns the execution in Italy of an executive European Arrest Warrant issued by the Romanian judicial authorities for the surrender of a person convicted of using a false instrument, the issuing State having consented to the sentence being served in Italy. The Court of Appeal had acknowledged the appellant's settled residence in Italy and the issuing State's consent to transfer of execution, yet refused recognition of the foreign judgment on the ground that, after dissolving the cumulative sentence, the penalty attributable to the surrendered offence (four months) fell below the six-month threshold set for recognition of foreign judgments. The Court of Cassation held that the appellate court had no power to unilaterally re-determine or increase the sentence set by the foreign court, and that the six-month residual-penalty threshold for recognition under Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA cannot be read so as to neutralise the optional refusal ground under Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA based on the social rehabilitation interests of a person settled in the executing State, where the issuing State has already consented to domestic execution. The contested judgment was therefore annulled and remanded for a fresh assessment of the refusal ground under Article 18-bis of Law No. 69/2005, applying the principles set out.

The case concerned a European Arrest Warrant issued by the Romanian judicial authorities for the surrender of a Romanian national convicted, by a non-final judgment, of drug-related offences. The Court of Appeal of Naples ordered surrender, rejecting the defence objection based on the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in Romanian detention. The requested person argued that the Court of Appeal had failed to properly assess several reliable sources, including statements from directors of Romanian penitentiary institutions, showing overcrowding and the lack of the minimum three square metres of personal space, excluding fixed furniture. The Italian Supreme Court held that the appellate court’s reasoning was merely apparent: it had relied on the general adequacy of the detention regime indicated by Romania, without analytically addressing the defence material that appeared, in abstract terms, capable of contradicting those assurances. The Court stressed that, where relevant defence sources have been duly submitted, the executing court must carry out a full assessment of all available information and, if uncertainty remains, seek supplementary information on the individual detention conditions. By contrast, the Court rejected the argument that surrender was barred because the Romanian conviction was not yet final, holding that the Framework Decision requires enforceability, not finality, of the conviction. The judgment was therefore annulled with remand for a new assessment of detention conditions.

The case concerned an execution European Arrest Warrant issued by Romania for the enforcement of a final two-year prison sentence for aggravated theft and driving without a licence. The requested person resisted surrender, arguing that the Italian Court of Appeal had failed to assess documents allegedly showing stable integration in Italy and that refusal of surrender was required under Article 18-bis of Law No. 69/2005 in order to allow the sentence to be served in Italy. The Italian Supreme Court held that, after Legislative Decree No. 10/2021, an appeal against a surrender decision may not be brought on grounds of defective reasoning, including alleged omission or misreading of evidence. In any event, the Court found that the requested person had not even alleged the essential statutory requirement of lawful and effective residence or stay in Italy for at least five years, which applies under the amended Article 18-bis. A post-arrest offer of employment was insufficient to prove such integration and, if anything, confirmed the weakness of the claim. The appeal was therefore declared inadmissible and surrender remained ordered.

After obtaining information or assurances concerning detention conditions, the Court cannot simply reproduce the indications provided by the issuing authority without carrying out an actual assessment of the defence submissions challenging the reliability or adequacy of the information transmitted by the requesting State.

EAW and risk of inhuman treatment: if the lawyer of the sought person files reliable and specific sources concerning shortcomings in the current prison system of the requesting State (Romania), it becomes necessary to assess the individualised detention conditions and such an assessment cannot be excluded ab initio. Indeed, notwithstanding a trend of progressive improvement, international authorities continue to report widespread deficiencies in the Romanian penitentiary system.

In light of the principle of mutual trust among the Member States of the European Union, it must be presumed that detention conditions in Romania do not give rise to a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment. That presumption may be rebutted—and the executing judicial authority thereby required to seek further information—only where a specific and concrete risk of a breach of fundamental rights is put forward. Accordingly, a request for information is not an automatic consequence of a surrender request, but must be supported by specific elements advanced by the applicant or otherwise known to the Court of Appeal (for example, where serious systemic deficiencies in prison conditions in a given Member State constitute a matter of common knowledge or have been the subject of recent rulings by the supreme courts).

The case concerned a European Arrest Warrant issued by the Dolj Tribunal, Romania, and confirmed by the Court of Appeal of Craiova, for offences of human trafficking and exploitation of prostitution. The requested person opposed surrender, arguing that some of the alleged conduct had been committed in Italy and that surrender could therefore be refused on territoriality grounds. The Italian Supreme Court held that, where the facts underlying a European Arrest Warrant were committed wholly or partly in Italy, the optional ground for refusal based on territoriality applies only if criminal proceedings for the same facts are already pending in Italy. Since no such domestic proceedings were pending, the territoriality objection was rejected. The Court also dismissed the challenge based on detention conditions, noting that the Romanian authorities had identified a different detention facility from the one criticised by the defence and had provided information on available activities and minimum personal space. The appeal was declared inadmissible and the surrender order remained in force.

The judgment was delivered, with reasons given simultaneously, at the hearing of 31 March 2026, in the presence of the applicant’s defence counsel. As the applicant was absent, the judgment was served on him personally on 2 April 2026, in the Italian language, since it appears from the case file that the applicant speaks and understands Italian. From the date of service on the requested person, the five-day time limit — running from legal knowledge of the judgment — provided for by Article 22(1) of Law No. 69, began to run for the filing of an appeal before the Court of Cassation.

The executing judicial authority is required only to verify the existence of a valid legal basis for the surrender, and cannot review either the validity of such basis or the merits of any remedies pursued within the legal system of the issuing State. Surrender is therefore lawful where the European Arrest Warrant has been issued on the basis of a conviction that is enforceable but not yet final, since Article 8 of the Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 attaches relevance solely to the enforceability of the judgment, and not to its finality, as an essential condition of the system of cooperation aimed at the surrender of requested persons between EU Member States. Accordingly, the filing of an application seeking leave to appeal out of time is irrelevant for the purposes of surrender, as such application does not, in itself, affect the enforceability of the judgment underlying the European Arrest Warrant.

EAW execution cannot lead to inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court emphasized that when concrete risks of Article 3 ECHR violations exist, executing authorities must assess whether there is real danger of such treatment based on objective, reliable, precise and updated information. The Court noted that recent case law has recognized Romania's overcoming of structural prison system deficiencies through comprehensive initiatives and a 2020-2025 action plan, following the ECtHR pilot judgment in Rezmives v. Romania (2017). The Venice Court of Appeal had properly applied these principles by obtaining updated specific information from Romanian authorities about detention conditions. The Supreme Court rejected the appeal, finding that Romanian authorities provided adequate individualized information about detention conditions in Bucharest-Rahova prison (3 sqm minimum individual space with compensatory factors) and Baia Mare prison (4 sqm in semi-open regime with extensive freedom of movement). The Court noted that Romania had addressed previous structural deficiencies through massive interventions following the Rezmives judgment, and that the 2025 People's Advocate report did not specifically relate to the prisons where the appellant would be detained.

As regards the detention conditions in Romania, the Romanian authorities submitted to the Secretariat of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe — which is responsible for supervising the execution of ECtHR judgments — the Action Plan for the five-year period 2020–2025. In that official document, the measures aimed at addressing the issues identified by the ECtHR were set out, through the introduction of administrative and legislative remedies, both preventive (reduction in the use of pre-trial detention, construction of new prison facilities, and upgrading of existing institutions) and compensatory (the possibility of obtaining sentence reductions in the event of detention in inadequate conditions). The Italian Supreme Court considered those measures capable of overcoming the structural shortcomings that had been identified, holding that, in light of the principle of mutual trust among Member States of the European Union, it must be presumed that detention conditions in Romania are not such as to give rise to a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment. That presumption may be rebutted — with the consequent obligation for the executing authority to seek further information — only where a specific and concrete risk of a violation of the requested person’s fundamental rights has been shown. The panel therefore ruled out the continued existence of a systemic deficiency in detention conditions in Romanian prisons and held that, where the defence relies on outdated information, it is lawful not to request further information from the issuing State.

The requirements of concreteness and currency of the risk of absconding in European Arrest Warrant proceedings must be assessed by the court dealing with precautionary measures in light of the specific needs and characteristics of surrender proceedings. Accordingly, it is reasonable to attach weight to the applicant’s unjustified departure from Romanian territory, occurring precisely at the time of the conviction imposed on him, as a factual element from which the risk of future evasion of surrender may be inferred. For the same reasons, it is consistent to ground the finding of a “high” risk of absconding on the very statements made by the requested person during the validation hearing, where he declared that he had participated in the first-instance proceedings but left the country after lodging the appeal and, expressly, that he had moved to Italy—where his mother is established—seeking refuge at a residence considered, in abstract terms, suitable for the application of a non-custodial measure, thereby intending to evade the consequences of criminal proceedings and of a conviction which he considers unjust.

In the context of the European Arrest Warrant, the judicial authority of the executing State may refuse to execute the request, even where the issuing State has provided assurances that the person concerned will not be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, but only where, on the basis of precise elements, it nevertheless finds that there is a risk that the conditions of detention would be contrary to Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

The judgment, while granting the surrender request on the basis of an EAW issued for the enforcement of a custodial sentence, must indicate the extent of the sentence to be served, while leaving to the sentencing judicial authority the task of recalculating the penalty. In the case of an EAW issued for the enforcement of a conviction relating to multiple offences, compliance with the minimum threshold of the sentence (not less than four months), as provided by Article 7(4) of Law No. 69 of 22 April 2005, must be assessed with reference to the overall sentence imposed, and not to the sentence applied to each individual offence. The judgment must therefore be quashed, so that the Court of Appeal may remedy the identified shortcomings, if necessary by initiating further communication with the issuing judicial authority, specifically aimed at obtaining at least the transmission of the judgment — not for the purpose of recognition and enforcement in Italy (which that State has declared not to allow), but in order to determine the enforceable title and the duration of the sentence to be executed.

In matters of the European Arrest Warrant, where the issuing State provides assurances that the arrested person will not be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, the executing State may refuse surrender only if there exists a concrete risk of detention conditions contrary to Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The assessment of detention conditions must be overall and comprehensive, and must therefore take into account a range of factors, including whether there are elements capable of offsetting any shortcomings in relation to conventional standards.

The burden on the requested person to submit elements and circumstances capable of substantiating the risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment may also be discharged at the appellate stage before the Court of Cassation. This is because such materials consist of reliable international sources and information in the public domain, which may be directly assessed by the appellate court.