🇮🇹 Italy →

The requested person challenged her continued detention pending extradition to Venezuela, arguing that the applicable time limit was the 40-day period provided by Italian procedural law. The Supreme Court held that the bilateral Italy–Venezuela Extradition Treaty constitutes the applicable special regime and validly provides a 100-day period for provisional arrest instead of the domestic 40-day limit; despite its historical origin, that period remains reasonable and objectively proportionate today, having regard to the involvement of both judicial and diplomatic authorities in the requesting State. The Court further held that, in extradition proceedings concerning an EU citizen requested by a third State, the Petruhhin mechanism does not apply at the precautionary stage, but only when the merits of the extradition request are examined. The case was nevertheless remitted because the requested person remained in custody after expiry of the 100-day period and the legal basis for the continued detention required further verification.

Moldova requested the extradition of the requested person for the enforcement of a three-year and six-month prison sentence for theft. The Court of Appeal ordered detention pending extradition, relying on the seriousness of the offence, the length of the sentence and the person’s allegedly brief presence in Italy. The Court of Cassation held that this reasoning was merely apparent because flight risk must be based on specific, concrete and current circumstances drawn from the requested person’s individual situation. The seriousness of the conviction alone was insufficient, particularly where the defence had produced evidence of stable residence, employment and family ties in Italy. As the lower court had also failed to explain why detention in prison was the only suitable measure, the Court quashed the order without remand, declared the detention measure ineffective and ordered the requested person’s immediate release.

The requested person challenged an order validating his provisional arrest for extradition purposes and imposing detention pending proceedings requested by Algeria. The Italian Supreme Court held that an appeal against an extradition-related precautionary measure must be lodged within ten days from the latest notification of the order to the requested person or counsel. It found that the appeal had been filed out of time and clarified that a subsequent order correcting the legal basis of the original decision did not reopen the time limit, since correction merely makes explicit an effect already contained in the original order. The appeal was therefore declared inadmissible, without examination of the arguments concerning double criminality, the validity of the correction and flight risk.

The requested person challenged the refusal to replace extradition detention with house arrest and electronic monitoring after the judicial decision authorising extradition to Peru had become final. The Italian Supreme Court held that precautionary needs and judicial review of their continued existence extend into the subsequent administrative phase of extradition, during which statutory maximum time limits also apply. Courts must therefore remain able to assess whether concrete and current precautionary needs, particularly flight risk, still justify detention or instead require its attenuation or revocation. The Court distinguished this situation from detention ordered during the administrative phase under Article 704(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the imminent execution of the ministerial decree and the physical surrender of the requested person, which is functional to immediate delivery and does not depend on a separate assessment of precautionary needs. Since the Court of Appeal had failed to address the request for a less restrictive measure, the order was annulled and remitted for reconsideration.

The case concerned a person sought by Kuwait for extradition in relation to a money laundering offence and subject to extradition detention in Italy. Following an earlier annulment by the Italian Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal of Rome replaced custody in prison with house arrest at the requested person’s home in Rome, with electronic monitoring, relying essentially on his health conditions. Kuwait challenged that decision, arguing that the Court of Appeal had failed to assess the continuing concreteness and actuality of the risk of flight, despite the requested person’s foreign nationality, lack of stable ties in Italy, and the fact that the extradition proceedings had already been concluded. The Italian Supreme Court upheld the appeal. It held that, in extradition proceedings, the existence of a flight risk justifying coercive measures must be assessed concretely and currently, on the basis of recent factual indicators showing a real and foreseeable risk that the person may abscond and jeopardize Italy’s international obligation to secure surrender. The Court found that the Court of Appeal had merely replaced prison custody with a less restrictive measure on the basis of the requested person’s precarious health, without explaining whether a concrete flight risk still existed and, if so, whether house arrest with electronic monitoring was sufficient to address it. Since the previous annulment had expressly required the lower court to reassess both the existence of flight risk and the adequacy of any alternative measure, the order was annulled with remand for a fresh assessment.

As regards precautionary needs in European Arrest Warrant proceedings, the requirements of concreteness and actuality of the risk of flight for the application of coercive measures must be assessed by the judge in light of the specific characteristics and purposes of the surrender procedure, which is aimed at the traditio in vinculis of the requested person, by carrying out a prognostic assessment of the risk that the person may abscond. In the present case, no reasoning was provided as to the need to apply the precautionary measure. The challenged order merely stated, as the basis for the measure, the need to ensure the surrender of the appellant, without referring to any objective and concrete elements capable of supporting a precautionary prognosis, which in fact was not even formulated. Accordingly, in the complete absence of any indication in this regard, the contested order must be annulled without referral, with a declaration that the precautionary measures applied to the appellant have lost their effect.

The case concerned a person held in custody in Italy pending extradition proceedings before the Court of Appeal of Bologna. The defence sought revocation or substitution of the custodial measure, arguing that the requested person’s health conditions were incompatible with prison detention. The Court of Appeal rejected the application, relying on the continuing risk of flight and on a prison medical report which considered detention compatible with the person’s health, without ordering an independent expert assessment. The Italian Supreme Court annulled that decision. It held that, where an application for revocation or replacement of custody is based on alleged incompatibility between the person’s health conditions and prison detention, the court must order medical assessments in expert form unless the alleged incompatibility is unsupported by adequate justification or the situation is clearly compatible with detention. That was not the case here. The prison medical report did not provide a stable and conclusive clinical picture, referred to the need for constant monitoring, and did not clarify whether the necessary diagnostic and therapeutic measures could be adequately and promptly provided within the prison system or in a prison medical facility. Only after such assessment could the court properly evaluate the continuing need for custody, the concreteness of the risk of flight, and the possible adequacy of less restrictive alternative measures. The order was therefore annulled with remand for a fresh assessment.

The extension of the time limits of custodial detention ordered for extradition purposes — sought by the Prosecutor General pursuant to Article 714(4) of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure — must be decided by the Court of Appeal, failing which the decision is void under the intermediate nullity regime, after a concrete and effective adversarial exchange between the parties. Such exchange does not require a participatory chamber procedure, but may also take place in written form.

In extradition proceedings, a decision refusing to revoke or replace detention must be translated into a language understood by the requested person where their lack of knowledge of Italian has already been established. Translation of the operative part alone is insufficient where the reasons are filed later, since the person must be able to understand the grounds for the continued deprivation of liberty and exercise their defence rights effectively. Moreover, when deciding any application concerning the imposition, revocation or modification of detention, the court must assess whether objective, reliable and up-to-date evidence indicates a real risk that the requested person would be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment in the requesting State. Such an assessment cannot be deferred exclusively to the merits stage of the extradition proceedings.

The requested person challenged the refusal to revoke pre-extradition detention or replace it with house arrest in proceedings concerning an Albanian extradition request based on a conviction for bodily injury. The Court of Appeal had relied mainly on the requested person’s lack of employment, limited command of Italian, recent arrival and weak social integration in Italy. The Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the order, holding that flight risk must be supported by specific, concrete and symptomatic elements showing a genuine propensity and real possibility of clandestine departure. Considerations relating merely to the degree of social integration in the requested State are not sufficient unless connected to a predictive assessment based on the requested person’s conduct.

Requests for execution concerning offences committed before 7 August 2002 are governed by the provisions in force prior to the entry into force of the law on the European Arrest Warrant. Therefore, the Court of Appeal failed, when validating the provisional arrest and issuing the custodial measure, in applying the rules governing the European Arrest Warrant, since, in the present case, the applicable framework was that relating to extradition. However, where, during the proceedings, the EAW procedure is “converted” into extradition proceedings — together with all the related procedural steps — the fact that the procedure was initially commenced under the rules governing the European Arrest Warrant, rather than under the extradition regime applicable ratione temporis, does not preclude validation of the provisional arrest carried out by the judicial police. Accordingly, once the Minister of Justice has timely requested the continuation of the coercive measure, and the proceedings have been transformed with the application of extradition law instead of the EAW framework, the original custodial measure imposed following validation of the applicant’s arrest must be regarded as entirely lawful.

In extradition matters, decisions concerning family contacts issued by the Court of Appeal are subject to appeal pursuant to Article 111(7) of the Italian Constitution, both when the Court acts as the judicial authority conducting the proceedings and, after the extradition judgment has become final, as the execution judge. The Court of Appeal may not reject a request for telephone conversations (including video calls) with the wife and minor child of the requested person merely by referring to obstructive reasons “for security purposes” or to communications received from the U.S. authorities. In the present case, there was no independent assessment showing that, having regard to the specific arrangements for the telephone communications and to the special protection afforded to contacts with minor children, there actually existed security concerns or a risk of interference with evidence.

With regard to the so-called “Petruhhin doctrine” developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union, the principle according to which the requested State is obliged to inform the State of nationality, in order to allow the latter to issue, in turn, a European Arrest Warrant for the purpose of prosecuting the same acts, can only operate within the phase specifically devoted to the substantive examination of the extradition request, and cannot therefore be extended to the provisional detention phase, which is instead the subject of the present proceedings.

Article 714 requires, for the adoption of a coercive measure aimed at securing surrender, a prognostic assessment as to whether the conditions exist for a judgment granting extradition. This provision constitutes an unavoidable “safeguard” for the requested person, as it prevents the risk of unjustified restrictions on his personal liberty and introduces a threshold already at the moment when the Court must decide whether to impose the coercive measure — and also when it is called upon to decide on an application for revocation or replacement of the measure. Therefore, especially if the request comes from a State — Turkey — whose situation is extremely complex, in light of the circumstances specifically documented by the defence concerning the risk of violations of the requested person’s fundamental rights, the Court cannot omit the prognostic assessment.

The mere fact that a State is involved in an armed conflict does not automatically imply that detainees will be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. In any event, within extradition proceedings—during which the actual evolution of the armed conflict must be assessed on a case-by-case basis—it is always possible to request additional information from the requesting State, as well as any necessary assurances regarding the place of detention of the requested person and the respect of their fundamental rights.

The case concerned a requested person subject to an extradition request from Switzerland for drug trafficking and aggravated money laundering. The Court of Appeal of Ancona had ordered pre-trial custody in prison, relying essentially on the seriousness of the alleged offences and on a presumed flight risk. The appellant challenged the order, arguing that the court had failed to provide concrete reasons for the existence of a flight risk and had not assessed the adequacy of the custodial measure, including in light of her personal and family circumstances. The Supreme Court of Cassation held that precautionary measures must remain adequate and proportionate throughout their application and that the lower court’s reasoning was merely assertive and silent on adequacy. It therefore annulled the order and remanded the case to the Court of Appeal of Ancona for a new assessment, including possible substitution with house arrest.

The failure or delay in transmitting the documents, expressly required by the Treaty, to the Ministry of Justice and/or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs entails the immediate loss of effectiveness of the precautionary measure. Indeed, since the matter concerns restrictions on personal liberty, the mandatory time limits laid down by the treaty provisions and by the corresponding rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be regarded as essential and applied with the utmost strictness (as affirmed by the Constitutional Court).

The requested person sought the revocation of detention pending extradition to the United States, or its replacement with house arrest subject to electronic monitoring, relying on his family ties, employment and residence in Italy. The Supreme Court held that flight risk in extradition proceedings must be assessed by reference to the purpose of securing surrender rather than solely according to the ordinary criteria applicable in domestic criminal proceedings. The Court found that the requested person’s recent presence in Italy, uncertain employment and housing situation, international mobility, access to financial resources and foreign connections supported a concrete and current risk of absconding. It also held that house arrest with electronic monitoring would not adequately prevent flight and that the effects of lawful and proportionate detention on family life did not, in themselves, amount to a breach of Article 8 ECHR.

The Court of Appeal may rely on the guarantees provided by the issuing State, which clarified that the requested person: (a) will receive medical assistance within the penitentiary facility; (b) may, if necessary, be permanently admitted to the prison infirmary; (c) will be provided with pharmacological treatment and psychological support; and (d) may, if necessary, be placed in a cell under video surveillance. The Court also drew the requesting State’s attention to the need to put in place effective safeguards and monitoring measures to protect the requested person’s health, including by considering the possibility of alternatives to custodial detention.

The requirements of concreteness and currency of the risk of absconding in European Arrest Warrant proceedings must be assessed by the court dealing with precautionary measures in light of the specific needs and characteristics of surrender proceedings. Accordingly, it is reasonable to attach weight to the applicant’s unjustified departure from Romanian territory, occurring precisely at the time of the conviction imposed on him, as a factual element from which the risk of future evasion of surrender may be inferred. For the same reasons, it is consistent to ground the finding of a “high” risk of absconding on the very statements made by the requested person during the validation hearing, where he declared that he had participated in the first-instance proceedings but left the country after lodging the appeal and, expressly, that he had moved to Italy—where his mother is established—seeking refuge at a residence considered, in abstract terms, suitable for the application of a non-custodial measure, thereby intending to evade the consequences of criminal proceedings and of a conviction which he considers unjust.

Flight risk which justifies the application of a measure restricting personal liberty, may be understood as the risk that the requested person may leave the territory of the requested State, thereby jeopardizing compliance with the international obligation to secure their surrender to the requesting State. However, the existence of such a risk must be duly reasoned and grounded on concrete, specific, and indicative elements demonstrating a genuine propensity and a real possibility of clandestine departure by the requested person. Such elements must have a close connection to the factual circumstances and must not be based on presumptions, preconceived general assessments, or merely possible and hypothetical scenarios according to abstract human contingencies.

The particular complexity of the case, including procedural and substantive issues raised by the Defence, may justify—where analyses and further inquiries are required—the extension of the custodial measure. Such activities also include engaging in communications with foreign authorities within the framework of the so-called Petruhhin mechanism.

Among the circumstances that the Court of Appeal may rely on to establish flight risk are also those relating to the number and seriousness of the new offences for which the extradition of the requested person has been sought, as well as their ability to move across continents.

Extradition to the United States and loss of effectiveness of pre-trial detention in the absence of a timely extradition request (and supporting documents) within 45 days The extradition treaty between Italy and the United States provides that, within 45 days of the arrest, the United States must transmit to Italy the formal extradition request together with the documentation required under Article X. The purpose is to prevent provisional arrest from turning into prolonged detention without the formal legal basis constituted by a proper extradition request. In the present case, the arrest was carried out on 10/10/2025, from which date the above-mentioned peremptory time limit began to run. Since the Court of Appeal rendered its decision at a time when, within the mandatory time limits set by the Treaty, neither the extradition request nor the required documentation had yet been received — as was instead necessary — the challenged order must be quashed without remand and the custodial measure currently in force must be revoked.

The requested person challenged the refusal to replace detention pending extradition to the United States with house arrest. He argued that a note transmitted by the United States Department of Justice could not be used because the requesting State may participate in domestic extradition proceedings only under the conditions laid down by Article 702 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that the note formed part of the documentation supporting the extradition request and did not amount to the requesting State’s formal intervention or participation in the proceedings. In any event, the information contained in the note had merely reinforced a flight-risk assessment already based on other factors, including the inadequacy of the proposed residence, the absence of stable ties with Italy, substantial financial resources and the possibility of obtaining accommodation abroad. The appeal was dismissed and detention was maintained.

The Court may place particular emphasis on the seriousness of the offences for which the person is sought (murder and robbery) and on the corresponding penalties, as well as on the circumstance that the individual is unlawfully present in the national territory, lacking a residence permit. Although some arguments relied upon are not entirely pertinent (such as the alleged unreliability of electronic monitoring devices—so-called “electronic bracelets”—in ensuring compliance with custodial requirements, “as unfortunately demonstrated by numerous news reports”), the reasoning of the Court of Appeal is primarily grounded on the seriousness of the offences for which the person is sought and the severity of the applicable penalties, in addition to the fact that the individual is illegally present in the national territory. These elements consistently led the Court to consider as recessive the circumstances put forward by the defence, namely that the applicant has relatives in Italy willing to accommodate him and that he carries out undeclared work. This constitutes a reasoning that is by no means merely apparent and, as such, is not subject to challenge at this stage. The appeal, in fact, alleges an erroneous assessment of the elements underlying the decision, thus raising an issue of reasoning which is not reviewable under Article 719 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure.

Where the Court of Appeal has refused the surrender request and ordered the release of the requested person, any appeal lodged against the order imposing a custodial precautionary measure must be considered inadmissible due to a supervening lack of interest. However, the interest in bringing such an appeal “revives” where the appellant has personally stated—and duly substantiated—that he intends to rely on a favourable ruling for the purposes of seeking compensation for wrongful detention.

Pursuant to Article 16(4) of the European Convention on Extradition, provisional coercive measures applied to a person subject to extradition proceedings shall be revoked if, within forty days from the provisional application of such measure, the request for extradition and the supporting documentation have not been received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Justice.

The replacement by the requesting State of the extradition title for the same facts, prior to the decision of the Court of Appeal, does not constitute a ground precluding a finding of extraditability. It has been held that “there is nothing to prevent, provided that the cause of action remains unchanged, the legal basis of the extradition request from being subsequently and formally replaced by the requesting State before the Court of Appeal renders its decision. Such a novatio integrates the extradition request, thereby becoming part of it, and does not infringe any defence rights, since the person concerned is made aware of it prior to the decision.”

Extradition and coercive measures: the requirements of concreteness and present relevance of flight risk must be assessed by the judge in light of the purpose of surrender, to which the procedure is directed, and therefore through a prognostic assessment, based on concrete elements drawn from the requested person’s life, as to the risk that he or she may evade it by leaving the national territory.

Under the Italy–Brazil Extradition Treaty, the validation of a provisional arrest and the imposition of coercive measures do not require a formal extradition request at the initial stage. Pursuant to Article 13(4), such measures lapse only if the extradition request and supporting documents are not received within forty days from the notification of the arrest. Accordingly, a mere preliminary request is sufficient at the validation stage, provided that the complete extradition request is submitted within the prescribed time limit.

The application in Italy of a custodial measure for the purpose of executing an international arrest warrant issued by the United Kingdom, pursuant to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement signed on 24 December 2020, in relation to criminal proceedings pending before its judicial authorities, does not violate the ne bis in idem principle where, on the basis of the same warrant, a custodial measure has already been ordered by another State—namely, Poland—but the person concerned has in the meantime absconded from it. This is because, notwithstanding the existence of two enforcement measures relating to the same arrest warrant, only a single set of criminal proceedings is pending against the person in the issuing State.

The requirements of concreteness and immediacy of the risk of flight, for the purpose of applying coercive measures, must be assessed by the precautionary judge on the basis of specific indicators capable of demonstrating—even inferentially—the existence of a real and foreseeable risk that the requested person may abscond in the near future, such as to justify the imposition of a restrictive measure. The severity of the sentence to which the person would be exposed in the event of surrender does not, in itself, constitute a relevant circumstance for these purposes.

The requested person was placed under precautionary custody in Italy pursuant to Article 715 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure in connection with an extradition request submitted by a foreign State. The defence challenged the lawfulness of the custodial measure, arguing that the requesting State had failed to transmit the underlying arrest warrant within the mandatory 40-day period provided by the European Convention on Extradition and Italian procedural law. The Italian Supreme Court of Cassation annulled a previous decision rejecting the revocation request and remanded the matter to the Court of Appeal for verification of the timely transmission of the foreign arrest warrant. On remand, the Milan Court of Appeal found that the relevant arrest warrant had only been transmitted several months after the arrest of the requested person and therefore outside the statutory deadline. The court consequently revoked the precautionary custodial measure and ordered the immediate release of the requested person.

In assessing whether pre-trial measures have lost their effectiveness under the law of the requesting State, the Italian court cannot review the merits of the powers exercised by the Macedonian judicial authority. Therefore, where it does not appear that the precautionary measure has been revoked, the judicial authority of the requested State cannot challenge its validity.

The existence of a flight risk, which justifies the application of a measure restricting personal liberty, must be supported by a reasoned assessment based on specific, concrete, and indicative elements pointing to a real possibility that the requested person may abscond clandestinely. The severity of the penalty that the person would face upon surrender does not, in itself, constitute a relevant factor for this purpose. In the present case, the reasoning provided by the Court of Appeal is merely apparent, as it relied on a factor—the seriousness of the offence—which is not, per se, unequivocally indicative of a flight risk, while at the same time failing to verify the existence of elements capable of establishing the concreteness and present nature of such risk, or, conversely, its absence. As to the type of decision, the Court considers that the preferable solution is to make the annulment of the order for lack of reasoning entail the immediate release of the requested person.

In matters of precautionary measures, the requirements of concreteness and currency (actuality) of the risk of flight must be assessed by the judge in light of the purpose of surrender, to which the procedure is directed, and therefore on the basis of a prognostic evaluation, grounded in concrete elements drawn from the person’s life, as to the risk that he may evade it by leaving the national territory. That being said, the fact that the person’s wife is domiciled in Italy and that the lease agreement is in her name—relied upon by the defence as new elements allegedly demonstrating the person’s ties to Italy—were deemed of lesser weight, also in light of the circumstance that the identification and arrest of the appellant required a specific surveillance and tracking operation by the police, which would indicate the occasional nature of his presence in the place where he was found.

Flight risk: the reasoning of the Court of Appeal is adequate and comprehensive where it relies on the occasional and precarious nature of the applicant’s presence in Italy, as well as the absence of any genuine ties to the national territory, as elements demonstrating a concrete risk of flight.

Where multiple applications for house arrest are filed within a short timeframe, the Court of Appeal may legitimately reject the subsequent requests by referring to the reasoning already set out in previous decisions, provided that no new and relevant elements have been introduced. In such circumstances, defence arguments relating to the requested person’s personal or professional situation, or to their ties with the national territory, may be deemed insufficient to alter the prior assessment of custodial needs—especially where the Court has already highlighted a concrete risk of absconding or the existence of transnational support networks making alternative measures inadequate.

Failure of the translation of the precautionary measure order: in extradition proceedings for surrender abroad, the failure to translate the order imposing a custodial measure in respect of a foreign national who does not understand italian results in its nullity, with the consequent regression of the proceedings to the stage at which the invalid act was carried out, for the purpose of translation and renewal of the subsequent acts.

Flight risk: the reasoning is adequate where the court has assessed the requested person’s position within the territory, their personality, the circumstance that the attempted murder for which they are charged was allegedly commissioned to a hitman against their brother-in-law for economic reasons, their employment, the reasons for their domicile being different from their registered residence, and, from various perspectives, their actual ties to the state.

With regard to the request to replace the current custodial measure with house arrest, and as to why such measure — even with the prescribed conditions and safeguards — would not be sufficient to neutralise the identified precautionary needs, the Court is effectively silent. It follows that the challenged order must be quashed on this point; the Court of Appeal shall apply the stated principles and carry out a fresh assessment as to the adequacy of the measure currently in place, or the possibility of replacing it with house arrest.

Flight risk justifying the application of a measure restricting personal liberty may be understood as the risk that the requested person may abscond from the territory of the requested State, thereby jeopardising compliance with the international obligation to ensure his or her surrender to the requesting State. The existence of such a risk must be duly reasoned and grounded on concrete, specific, and indicative elements demonstrating a genuine propensity and a real possibility of clandestine departure by the requested person. These elements must be closely connected to the factual circumstances of the case and must not be based on presumptions, preconceived general assessments, or merely hypothetical or abstract possibilities.

The ministerial request for the application of pre-trial detention, submitted with a view to a favourable decision on surrender under article 704(3) of the italian code of criminal procedure, is not binding on the judicial authority. the custodial measure must in any event be ordered in light of the precautionary needs relating to the extradition proceedings, to be assessed pursuant to article 714(2) of the italian code of criminal procedure. accordingly, a concrete assessment is required as to the existence of a risk of absconding and the adequacy of the requested custodial measure.

The interest in obtaining a ruling on appeal against a pre-trial detention order persists even where such order has been revoked during the course of the de libertate proceedings, provided that a decision annulling the measure may constitute, pursuant to Article 314(2) of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, a prerequisite for claiming compensation for wrongful detention, where the coercive measure was issued or maintained in the absence of the legal conditions for its application. On the one hand, where personal liberty has been restricted in the context of a passive extradition procedure that has concluded without a final decision granting extradition, the right to compensation may arise. On the other hand, for the applicant’s interest in pursuing the appeal to be recognised—specifically in view of relying on a favourable decision for the purposes of a future compensation claim—it is necessary that such interest be expressly and duly substantiated by the person concerned. This requires a specific and reasoned submission demonstrating, in concrete terms, the prejudice that would result from the failure to obtain such a ruling, and must be made personally by the applicant.

The prohibition under Article 297(3) of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure on multiple precautionary charges entailing the application of the same coercive measure for “the same facts” also applies in extradition proceedings, in the absence of specific conventional or domestic provisions to the contrary. This follows from the general reference made by Article 714(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the provisions set out in Title I of Book IV of the Code. The Court declared the custodial measure ineffective in respect of a requested person who had already served the maximum period of detention in the course of a different extradition proceeding initiated, for the same facts, following a prior request.

Secisions on the revocation or substitution of coercive measures ordered for extradition purposes pursuant to article 716 of the italian code of criminal procedure, following arrest by the judicial police, fall within the jurisdiction of the court of appeal, sitting in a panel, after the scheduling of a specific hearing, and not of a single judge delegated by the president of the court of appeal.

In matters of extradition to a foreign State, where a foreign State succeeds another State with which Italy had already concluded an extradition agreement or convention, no obligation of reciprocal judicial cooperation exists in the absence of an expression of mutual consent by Italy and the newly established State demonstrating their shared intention to remain bound by the previously signed convention. (In the case at hand, the Court held that a unilateral communication was insufficient—namely, New Zealand’s notification to Italy of its intention to rely on the 1873 agreement on “reciprocal extradition” concluded with Great Britain, pursuant to Article 44 of the Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers—since no corresponding intention had been expressed by Italy).